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Abstract
In this dissertation I enquire into the status, scope and limits of human knowledge, given the 
fact  that  our  perceptual  and  cognitive  faculties  are  the  product  of  evolution  by  natural 
selection. I argue that the commonsense representations these faculties provide us with yield a 
particular,  species-specific  scope  on  the  world  that  does  not  ‘correspond’  in  any 
straightforward  way  to  the  external  world.  We  are,  however,  not  bound  by  these 
commonsense  representations.  This  particular,  species-specific  view  of  the  world  can  be 
transgressed.  Nevertheless,  our  transgressing  representations  remain  confined  to  the 
conceptual  space defined by the combinatorial  possibilities of the various representational 
tools we possess. Furthermore, the way in which we fit representations to the external world is 
by means of our biologically determined epistemic orientation. Based on the fact that we are 
endowed with a  particular  set  of  perceptual  and cognitive  resources  and are guided by a 
particular epistemic orientation, I conclude that we have a particular cognitive relation to the 
world.  Therefore,  an  accurate  representation  for  us  is  a  particular  fit  (our  epistemic 
orientation) with particular means (our perceptual and cognitive resources).
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Abstrak
Hierdie tesis handel oor die aard, omvang en limiete van kennis, gegewe dat ons perseptuele 
en kognitiewe vermoëns die resultaat  van evolusie deur middel van natuurlike seleksie is. 
Eerstens, word daar geargumenteer dat die algemene voorstellings wat hierdie vermoëns aan 
ons bied ‘n partikuliere, spesie-spesifieke siening van die wêreld aan ons gee, wat nie op ‘n 
eenvoudige  manier  korrespondeer  aan  die  werklikheid  nie.  Ons  is  egter  nie  gebonde aan 
hierdie voorstellings nie. Hierdie partikuliere, spesie-spesifieke siening van die wêreld kan 
oorskry word. Ons is egter wel beperk tot die konseptuele ruimte wat gedefinieër word deur 
die  kombinatoriese  moontlikhede van die  voorstellingsmiddele  tot  ons beskikking.  Verder 
word die manier waarop ons hierdie voorstellings aan die wêreld laat pas deur ons biologies 
gedetermineerde  epistemiese  oriëntasie  bepaal.  Dus,  gegewe  dat  ons  ‘n  spesifieke  stel 
perseptuele  en  kognitiewe  vermoëns  het  en  deur  ‘n  spesifieke  kognitiewe  epistemiese 
oriëntasie  gelei  word,  staan ons in ‘n spesifieke kognitiewe verhouding tot  die wêreld.  ‘n 
Akkurate  voorstelling  (m.a.w.  kennis  vir  ons)  is  om spesifieke  vermoëns  (perseptuele  en 
kognitiewe vermoëns) op ‘n spesifieke manier (epsitemiese oriëntasie) aan die wêreld te laat 
pas.
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Introduction
In a letter to William Graham, Charles Darwin (1881) expressed the following concern:
With me the horrid doubt arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has 
been  developed  from  the  mind  of  the  lower  animals,  are  of  any  value  or  at  all 
trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are 
any convictions in such a mind?
The theory of evolution  by natural  selection  – developed by Darwin (1859) and Wallace 
(1858)  –  has,  indeed,  consequences  that  extend  far  beyond  the  science  of  biology.  The 
philosopher Daniel Dennett (1995) likens it to a ‘universal acid’. ‘Darwin’s idea’, he argues, 
‘eats through just about every traditional concept,  and leaves in its wake a revolutionized 
world-view,  with  most  of  the  old  landmarks  still  recognizable,  but  transformed  in 
fundamental ways’ (63). Epistemology is no exception. It is affected to its very core by this 
corrosive idea, since – as Darwin (1881) himself fully realised – the theory of evolution sheds 
a whole new light on the origin and therefore the scope and limits of the human mind.
Age-old epistemological questions, in this regard, have recently been recast in the light of the 
theory of evolution. Such evolutionary approaches to epistemology have led to two distinct 
research  programs.  The  first,  which  Bradie  (1986)  labels  the  ‘evolution  of  epistemic 
mechanisms’,  reasons  about  human  knowledge  from the  premise  that  our  cognitive  (and 
perceptual)  faculties  are  the  product  of  evolution  by  natural  selection.  The  second,  the 
‘evolution of epistemic theories’ (Bradie, 1986), on the other hand, is concerned with the 
evolution of ideas or theories themselves, using models and metaphors drawn from biological 
evolution. This dissertation forms part of the former research program, gauging the status, 
scope and limits of human knowledge, from the premise that our perceptual and cognitive 
faculties are the product of evolution. 
Typically, evolutionary considerations on human knowledge – in the sense of Bradie’s (1986) 
‘evolution of epistemic mechanisms’ – have given rise to two opposite positions. The first 
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argues that natural selection will shape our cognitive faculties in such a way that they produce 
representations of the world which correspond (to a large extent) to the external world, since 
accurate  representations  will  enhance  an  organism’s  chances  of  survival  and  successful 
reproduction and – therefore – the faculties shaping those representations must have been 
selected. The second – in contrast – argues that we cannot expect our cognitive faculties to 
produce accurate representations of the world, since natural selection will only endow us with 
faculties  generating  representations  which  lead  to  survival  and  reproduction  enhancing 
behaviour and that there are other, non-adaptive evolutionary forces at work.
In this dissertation, I will reject both positions. I reject the former ‘evolutionary justification 
arguments’, claiming that natural selection ensures the correspondence of our representations 
to the world, based on the counter-arguments provided by the opposite sceptical camp. I do, 
however, also reject the sceptical conclusion this camp reaches, based on what I’ll refer to as 
the  distinctive  human  ability  to  transgress  the  biologically  based,  commonsense 
representations  it  holds  of  the  world.  We are,  indeed,  able  to  overcome  the  biologically 
determined representations evolution endowed us with (i.e. we are able to represent the world 
in ways that go beyond and against these uncritical  representations) and are therefore, not 
bound by these particular representations,  which cannot – as rightfully pointed out by the 
sceptics – be expected to correspond to the external world. 
The status, scope and limits of human knowledge, therefore, have to be considered in the light 
of this distinctively human cognitive ability to transgress the uncritical representations it holds 
in virtue of its perceptual and cognitive nature, shaped by the process of evolution by natural 
selection. Homo sapiens is, indeed, as opposed to any other species on this planet, free to 
conceptualise  the  world  in  an  unlimited  number  of  contingent  ways.  This  remarkable 
cognitive ability is the true hallmark of the human epistemic situation.  An analysis  of our 
ability to transgress will, consequently, enable us to shed new light on those epistemological 
questions. 
Human knowledge, I will argue, is both constrained and free. It is constrained in the sense that 
it is the product of a particular and contingent set of perceptual and cognitive resources. It is 
free in the sense that it is not restricted to the biologically based representations that evolution 
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endowed us with. This insight is at the core of this dissertation. Radically thinking through the 
consequences of what I’ll call our ‘open epistemic relation to the world within the boundaries 
of a particular conceptual space’, I will gauge both the status of knowledge (what makes a 
representation true?) as well as its scope and limits. 
Plan of the thesis
Chapter 1 looks at the way we are biologically predisposed to view the world, as the result of 
the perceptual input we gather from it through our senses and the innate cognitive knowledge 
systems  we apply to  this  input.  I  will  argue  that  evolution  provided us  with a  particular 
species-specific scope on the world that does not ‘correspond’ in any straightforward way to 
the external world. Our senses do, indeed, gather but part of the potential stimuli from the 
world, and the stimuli to which they react give rise to a particular phenomenal ‘percept’. Our 
cognitive  predispositions,  on  the  other  hand,  interpret  this  input  in  the  light  of  intuitive 
theories which are at odds with the modern sciences.
Chapter 2 looks at the argument of Konrad Lorenz (1941, 1973) which states that, since our 
perceptual and mental abilities are the product of natural selection, the representation of the 
world they provide us with must be (approximately) accurate. I will reject this claim, arguing 
that we cannot expect evolution to provide us with accurate representations. This reinforces 
the conclusion  that  the  uncritical  view of  the  world  we hold in  virtue  of  our  senses  and 
cognitive  apparatus  is  a  contingent,  species-specific  view,  which  cannot  be  expected  to 
correspond (even approximately) to the external world.
In Chapter 3, however, I will point out that this particular, species-specific view of the world, 
as the result  of the perceptual  and cognitive apparatus that the blind process of evolution 
provided  us  with,  can  nevertheless  be  transgressed –  i.e.  that  those  commonsense 
representations  can  be substituted  by different  and often  contradictory  representations  we 
perceive  as  epistemically  preferable.  I  will  argue  that  the  possibility  of  transgressing our 
biologically based views is grounded in the three-fold cognitive ability to metarepresent, to 
produce alternative representations with the available resources and, when doing so, to be 
guided by an epistemic orientation. 
3
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Chapter 4 will gauge the scope and limits of these transgressing representations. I will argue 
that we can both shape an infinite amount of possible representations and that we are not 
bound to represent any subject matter in a particular way. Therefore, I will characterise the 
cognitive relation we entertain with the world as an ‘open cognitive relation’. This, however, 
does not imply that there are no limits to the representations the human mind can produce. 
Those limits, I will argue, are set by the particular senses and cognitive reasoning patterns that 
evolution provided us with. They either bias us against or straight-forwardly close us off to 
certain  possible  representations  of  the  world.  Our  epistemic  situation,  therefore,  while 
providing us with an open epistemic  relation to  the world,  is  – nevertheless  – comprised 
within a particular conceptual space.
Chapter 5 will bring the main argument of this thesis to a close, looking at the implications 
this ‘open cognitive relation within the boundaries of a particular conceptual space’ holds for 
our epistemic endeavours. In doing so, it will consider the issue of epistemological realism, 
analysing whether our representations can correspond to the external world and – if so – what 
the nature of this correspondence is. Furthermore, it will look into the threat of relativism and 
outline possible sources of limitation to a successful epistemic relation with the world.
Chapter 6, finally, defends the approach taken in this dissertation against the two most basic 
threats  evolutionary approaches to epistemology face.  In this  regard,  I  will  argue that  my 
argument resists both the threat of being self-defeating and the threat of being circular. 
4
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Chapter 1: A particular intuitive view of the world
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will look at our intuitive view of the world - the way the world appears to us 
on a commonsensical level. Reasoning that this view is the product of both the perceptual 
input we receive through the senses and our innate predisposition to frame this perceptual 
input in intuitive assumptions about the world, I will conclude that we are endowed with a 
particular, species-specific understanding. This intuitive understanding of the world can be 
opposed  to  a  theoretical  or  critical  understanding,  which  attempts  to  overcome  our 
commonsensical  grasp  by  identifying  and  questioning  the  assumptions  and  methods  of 
inference underlying it. The possibility of ‘transgressing’ our intuitions about the world will 
be the subject of chapter 3.
As pointed out above, my claim is that we perceive the world in a particular way and hold 
particular intuitive assumptions about the world, yielding a  particular view of the world. 
‘Particular’, in the sense I use it, can be defined as: a contingent way of viewing (perceiving 
and understanding) the world, both not necessary and not universal. This implies, on the one 
hand, that the properties of the world do not force us to perceive and understand them in the 
way that we do (not necessary) and, on the other hand, that other organisms could view the 
world differently (not universal). 
 
Regarding perception, I will argue that we are perceptually closed to certain elements of the 
world, that there is a causal but contingent relation between stimuli and percept, and that our 
sensory apparatuses have an active role in creating the percept, i.e. that they add to the content 
of the percept.  Therefore,  I conclude that what is given in perception does not mirror the 
world, but is a particular representation of it.
Regarding our intuitive assumptions about the world, I will look at our innate predisposition 
to ‘carve up the world’ into different categories and to apply intuitive theories to each of 
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them. These underlying, commonsensical assumptions about the structures of the world, I will 
argue, can be shown to be innate, scientifically inaccurate and thoroughly species-specific, 
meaning that they are tailored to the specific needs of our species. They are, in other words,  
particular: both not necessary – the world can be understood differently, as achieved by the 
framework of modern science – and not universal – they provide us with a species-specific 
framework.
Both how we perceive and how we interpret this perception is, indeed, the outcome of an 
evolutionary process that selects particular features in the light of particular biological needs 
in a particular environment. These abilities evolved in order to increase our control over our 
environment,  guiding  our  actions  in  ways  that  enhance  our  chances  for  survival  and 
reproduction,  not to give us an accurate,  objective and complete  understanding of reality. 
Therefore, I conclude, we are endowed with a particular intuitive view of the world.
2. Perception
In this  section,  I  will  first  give  a  scientific  overview of  the  working of  our  senses.  This  
includes  the  physical  causes  triggering  the  different  senses  and  the  way  our  perceptual 
abilities process these data to provide us with useful information (cf. vision and hearing as 
problem solving).  Based  on this  scientific  account,  I  will  then  draw general  conclusions 
regarding the relation between the external world and our perception of it. 
2.1 Vision
2.1.1 Physical cause 
Vision works by the projection of light onto the retina. A light source emits photon particles 
that move in a more or less straight line at, of course, the speed of light. Photons are units of 
light energy. The flight path of a photon is called a ray. Our visual experience, in this context, 
is  made  up  by  the  distribution  and  directionality  of  photon  flow entering  the  pupil  and 
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projecting  onto  the  retina  (Boynton,  1979:47-48).  By  doing  so,  the  flow  stimulates 
photoreceptors  (rods  and cones),  which  in  turn  pass  a  neural  signal  to  the  brain  (Pinker 
1997:215). 
Before entering the eye, the photons are reflected off surfaces of objects. When they hit a 
surface, depending on the reflectance of the surface, a certain percentage of the light cast upon 
the surface will be reflected. Depending on the pigmentation and the texture of a surface, it 
will  absorb  a  certain  percentage  of  light.  The  more  a  surface  absorbs  light  –  or  photon 
particles – the fewer photon particles will bounce off. An object that mostly absorbs light, 
therefore, will appear black, while one that mostly reflects light will appear white (Levine & 
Schefner, 1991:326). 
What  we see,  therefore,  are  light  particles  or  photons  reflecting  (or  not)  on  all  kinds  of 
surfaces, each time reflected in different amounts depending on the properties of that very 
surface. That is what makes us aware of the presence of objects and their particular colour. 
Colour is the visual experience we derive from the wavelength of photons. The human eye is 
sensitive to a very narrow portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. It perceives wavelengths 
in  the  range  of  375  to  750  nm  (nanometer).  The  shortest  perceptible  wavelengths  are 
perceived as violet or reddish blue. As the wavelength increases, it is perceived as blue, then 
as  green,  then  as  yellow,  and  finally  as  red,  which  is  the  way  we  perceive  the  longest 
wavelengths of the spectrum (Levine & Schefner, 1991:387-388;  Boynton, 1979:48) . 
Different wavelengths of light, caused by reflection off different surfaces, are perceived as 
different colours. Natural light contains almost all wavelengths. The light emitted by the sun 
contains  all  wavelengths  in  approximately equal  amounts.  This light  appears  white to  the 
human observer. White, therefore, is the least ‘pure’ colour – it contains all wavelengths in 
equal amounts, not one particular part of the visible spectrum (Levine & Schefner, 1991:388).
2.1.2 Vision as problem-solving
How can we turn a myriad of light and colour into a useful, clear picture in which objects  
stand out and distances can be judged? In order to do this, our visual apparatus has to turn 
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two-dimensional (reversed) projections on the retina – caused by billions of photons reflecting 
off  surfaces  –  into  three-dimensional  mental  hypotheses  about  the  spatial  layout  of  the 
perceived environment. There is an important (re)construction at work here, considering that 
the retinal projection holds no information whatsoever about the third dimension. The two 
main aspects to be reconstructed from this two-dimensional  projection are the distance of 
particular  objects  and  the  discrimination  of  objects  against  their  background  (Pinker, 
1997:215). Furthermore, the brain needs to deform and obstruct much of the original input in 
order to provide us with a useful, intelligible representation (Granit, 1977: 128).
A) Judging distance
Every single point on the retinal image can be caused by a point at any possible distance from 
the eye (Pinker, 1997:215). Without this constructive ability to hypothesise about the relative 
depth of every perceived point, both from one another and from the position from which one 
is looking, we would see nothing but moving colours crammed together. This is not an easy 
task to complete, and yet, a very crucial one. Without depth-vision, we wouldn’t gather much 
useful  information  about  our  surrounding  environment,  perceiving  only  a  kaleidoscopic 
myriad of colours. How do we solve this problem and obtain three-dimensional information 
about the distance of objects based on a two-dimensional projection onto our retina?
We owe this ability to the mechanism of stereoscopic vision. Each eye has a slightly different 
view. This is called ‘binocular parallax’. These two pictures have to be united into a single 
picture. Every point, in this regard, is in a slightly different position on each retina. This very 
problem, however is the source of the solution. Indeed, the distance of every particular point 
can now be inferred from the difference in position that this point occupies in the projection 
onto each retina. Based on the angle formed by the eyes and their separation in the skull, the 
relative  difference  of  every  point  in  the  projection  in  both  eyes  can  now  be  instantly 
‘calculated’ to infer the distance of the source of the perceived point (Pinker, 1997:219-222). 
This system, however, is not infallible. The brain has to detect the same mark in both views 
and unite them. This matching problem is responsible for visual illusions caused by repeated 
patterns (often on wallpaper), where looking at it you often see one of the patterns leaping 
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out,  creating  false  perspective.  This  happens  when  two  different  patterns  are  connected 
together as if they were one and the same point, seen from a slightly different angle by both 
eyes, and therefore at some distance (Pinker, 1997:225). 
B) Discriminating objects
The other important problem to solve in order to obtain a three-dimensional visual experience 
based on a  two-dimensional  projection  is  perspective.  How do we see  three-dimensional 
shapes by drawing upon a two-dimensional projection of colours onto our retina? We appear 
to have what Pinker (1997:243) calls a ‘shape analyzer’. It infers from the retinal image what 
the most probable state of the world is. In order to do so, it is equipped with both an innate  
theory of projection – how do objects appear in projection? – and an innate theory about the 
world – what kind of objects does it have (244)? This, however, does not suffice by itself. We 
complete this picture with our sense of lightness and colour (245). Different kinds of matter – 
as we have pointed out above – reflecting back different wavelengths, give us the perception 
of  different  shades  of  colour  and  brightness.  The  problem  is  that  shades  of  colour  and 
brightness also depend on the level of illumination. So in order to deduce an object’s material,  
our ‘lightness analyzer’ must try to factor out the level of illumination (246). This is done by 
making further assumptions. The first one is that the lighting is uniform – in other words, that 
the whole scene is either in the sun, in the shade or in the dark. Different levels of lightness, 
therefore,  are the result  of the different matter of objects on which the light reflects.  The 
second assumption is that the world is a rich mixture of wavelengths (i.e. different colours). 
The  final  assumption  is  that  gradual  changes  in  brightness  and  colour  are  the  result  of 
illumination, while abrupt changes are caused by boundaries of objects (247). Yet another 
problem to solve in order to discriminate between objects and to see their shapes is what 
Pinker refers to as ‘the effect of slant on shading’(248). This problem arises as a result of the 
fact that a surface facing a light source will reflect back a lot of light, while a surface angled 
parallel to the source reflects much less. The same amount of reflected light could therefore 
be reflected from a darker surface facing the light or from a lighter surface angled away. Once 
again, we fall back on another assumption, namely that the surface of the object uniformly 
reflects back light. Our ‘shape-from-shading analyzer’, in this light, is fooled by the moon. 
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Since it is pockmarked with craters, it does not reflect back light uniformly and, therefore, 
looks like a disc rather than a sphere to us (249).
This is obviously a fallible way of deducing what really is the case. However, the different 
analysers  –  making  hypotheses  about  shape,  lightness  and  shade  –  are  all  taken  into 
consideration when deducing a three-dimensional picture from a two-dimensional projection. 
Together, they provide us with a hypothetical and fallible representation, but one that works 
fine in most cases (Pinker, 1997:249). 
C) Reliable illusions
As  shown  above,  in  order  to  provide  us  with  a  useful  visual  representation,  our  visual 
apparatus  reconstructs  a  three-dimensional  image,  based on a two-dimensional  projection, 
using a variety of cues and innate expectations. We also perceive different wavelengths and 
amounts of light as different shades of colour and brightness, to yield an orderly and useful 
representation of the surroundings. However, this does not suffice. As Ragnar Granit (1977), 
Nobel laureate for his work in visual physiology, points out, the brain must deform much of 
its informational content in order to make our visual experience intelligible.
We must not underestimate what the interpreting brain itself adds to make the seen 
world more intelligible than does a pure peripheral input, dependant though the cortex 
is on information from feature detectors. The purposive brain requires a considerable 
degree  of  invariance,  size  constancy,  a  fixed  verticality,  approximately  invariant 
surface colours, some constancy of velocity and direction of movement and, above all, 
a steady world; in short, a large number of what one is fully entitled to call ‘reliable 
illusions’. They are all constant errors with respect to the informational content of the 
primary sensory message. (Granit, 1977:128).
Vision, in this light, does not reflect the environment as accurately as possible, but provides 
us with a clear, simplified picture. In order to achieve this, our visual apparatus constantly 
deforms  the  original  sensory  input,  yielding  a  mental  picture  stripped  of  its  chaotic 
complexity. 
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2.1.3 Conclusion
The problem that visual perception faces becomes clear at this point –  how to deliver a useful 
representation of the world, based on an enormous amount of potential stimuli? First of all, in 
order not to ‘cram’ our vision with useless data, we only respond to a small portion of the  
electromagnetic spectrum. This relevant part is then experienced as different shades of colour 
and brightness, to make us perceive objects against a neutral background of natural lighting. 
This coloured projection is immediately processed by different innate modules in our brain to 
deliver a full-fledged – albeit hypothetical – three-dimensional image of our surroundings. 
This is how we get an intelligible representation of our surroundings. If, on the other hand, we 
merely received the two-dimensional projection on our retina as input, vision would provide 
us with nothing more than an indistinct blur. It is therefore precisely because of its selective 
receptiveness, its particular way of experiencing stimuli, and its ability to make hypotheses 
about a three-dimensional layout, that vision provides us with useful information.
2.2 Auditory perception
2.2.1 Physical cause
What do we hear? What is the physical nature of sound? Similarly to light, sound consists of 
waves. However, those waves are not a type of electromagnetic radiation – as light is – but a 
purely mechanical phenomenon. Sound consists of changes in air pressure, generated either 
by vibrations of objects (e.g. by knocking on something) or by a release of air (e.g. whistling 
or speaking). This change in air pressure then propagates as a wave, moving in all directions 
as ever increasing circles around the source. The speed at which those waves travel depends 
on the medium through which they travel. Sound travels at approximately 340 m/sec through 
air, considerably faster through water, and even faster through metals.  The frequency of a 
sound, measured in Hertz (Hz), is the number of times a particular waveform is repeated per 
second. The period, on the other hand, is the amount of time that one particular waveform 
lasts (Warren, 1999:1). 
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Just as our visual apparatus is only sensitive to a particular portion of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, our auditory apparatus only perceives frequencies ranging from more or less 20 Hz 
to 20 kHz. The frequency of the sound wave is related to the perceived pitch of the sound in 
hearing, just as the wavelength of photon particles are perceived as colour. The amplitude of 
the sound wave – the amount of pressure or energy – is related to the perceived loudness of 
the  sound.  However,  other  factors  also  come  into  play  -  frequency,  for  instance,  also 
influences perceived loudness (Levine & Schefner, 1991:476-477, 485).
 
When sound waves reach our ear, they are processed through three different stages. First, they 
reach the outer ear - the visible part of the ear - which – as I will explain later – contributes to 
the localisation of the source of the sound. Reflections in our pina - our outer ear - enacts an 
acoustic transformation and leads the pressure changes through our ear canal, ending at the 
eardrum.  This  ear  canal  does  more  than  just  pass  on  the  sound.  It  works  as  a  powerful 
amplifier, comparable to a resonant tube. Those amplified pressure changes then cause the 
eardrum to vibrate. This vibration is then picked up and transmitted by a chain of three small 
bones, or ossicles, located in the middle ear. At this point the air-borne pressure waves are 
converted into liquid-borne waves. Normally this would mean a loss of 99.9% of the power of 
the wave.  However,  three  mechanical  levers,  amplifying  the sound each time,  enable  the 
hearing system to make the transition without too much loss. The inner ear, finally, contains 
the  receptors  responsible  for  hearing,  converting  those  pressure  waves  into  experienced 
sound,  linking  its  frequency  to  perceived  pitch  and  its  amplitude  to  perceived  loudness 
(Warren, 1999:5-12). 
2.2.2 Hearing as problem-solving
A) Reconstructing the origin of sound
The main problem that hearing must solve is to reconstruct the origin of the sound. Without 
this  information,  hearing  wouldn’t  be  a  very  useful  sense,  leaving  us  with  an  indistinct 
brouhaha. With respect to this problem, however, things are not as simple as they appear.  
Unlike  light  waves,  sound waves  do not  travel  in  a  straight  line.  Rather,  they behave as 
expanding circles,  much like the circles  of waves on water after  dropping a stone on the 
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surface. This makes it very difficult to locate their source. In order to accomplish this feat, we 
appear to be using different cues involving both ears together (binaural) or each ear separately 
(monaural) (Warren, 1999:29).
A first binaural cue is the difference in intensity. When the left ear is directly in the path of 
the sound waves, and the other is blocked by the head, an inference is made about the spatial 
origin of the sound. There are two ways by which the sound can then reach the right ear. It 
can  either  bend  around the  head  or  pass  through the  skull.  Low-frequency sounds  (long 
wavelengths)  can  easily  bend around the  head and,  in  doing so,  will  reach  the  right  ear 
without being significantly blocked. High-frequency sounds, on the other hand, cannot bend 
around the head and will  have to go through the head. In doing so, the head will  cast an 
‘auditory shadow’ over the right ear. It will filter  and reduce the amount of stimulus that 
reaches the right ear. Therefore, the sound reaching each ear will differ slightly in intensity, 
leaving a cue as to where the sound originates from. (Levine & Shefner, 1991:506). Another 
binaural cue is the slight difference in time at which each ear – being at a different distance 
from the source – will receive the sound stimulus (507). 
These cues alone, however, could not provide us with a satisfying result. But we have another 
trick  up  our  sleeve.  We  can  move  our  head,  changing  the  stimuli  and  comparing.  This 
sensitively increases the information we gather from these cues (508). In addition to the cues 
involving both ears,  we also have monaural  cues.  As pointed out above,  the outer  ear  is 
equipped with a characteristic shape that significantly helps us to locate the source of the 
sound.  Batteau  (1964) investigated  this  and concluded  that  the  corrugation  of  the  pinnae 
(outer ears) produces echoes and has an effect on the intensity of high-frequency components. 
These  echo-induced  intensity  transformations  provide  us  with  information  concerning  the 
direction as well as the elevation of the sound source.
But direction isn’t all that matters – estimating the distance to the sound source also offers 
valuable information. The first and most obvious cue is the decrease in intensity correlated 
with the increase in distance. The intensity of a perceived sound is approximately inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance of its source (to the listener). This means that a 
twofold change in  distance  corresponds more  or less with a  fourfold change in  intensity.  
13
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
However, this still does not enable us to distinguish a loud sound from afar from a faint one 
close by. Another cue, however, adds to this information – the ratio of direct to reverberant  
sound. The more reverberant components of the sound (echoed components) reach the listener 
in relation to direct components, the further off the source is thought to be (Warren, 1999:51-
52). A last cue, finally, works for far off sounds only. It appears that high frequencies carry 
less far than low ones. Thunder, for instance, is perceived as a deeper, lower rumble from far 
away than when it is close by, since only those frequencies cross the distance. Therefore, the 
lower the sound, the further off its origin is thought to be (54).  
B) Clearing up the input
The mechanics of hearing and the ways of utilising several cues to further determine direction 
and distance to the source of noise,  however,  do not suffice to provide us with the clear  
audible information we gather from our environment. Similarly to vision, in order to obtain a 
useful, clear ‘picture’ of what’s going on, a thorough selection and (re)construction has to be 
performed by the brain, cancelling out irrelevant sounds that often obstruct important signals. 
Warren points out that we need to pick up relevant sounds out of a swamp of (often more  
intense) insignificant  noise.  If we could only hear the loudest sounds, hearing would lose 
much of its usefulness. Therefore, the auditory system is endowed with mechanisms giving us 
access to the fainter sounds. Furthermore, we even seem able, under some circumstances at 
least, to restore sounds that have been obliterated (Warren, 1999:134). 
Signals of importance can, of course, be completely masked and therefore unperceivable. But 
when signals are only partially masked, leaving audible snatches of the signal before and after 
the obliterated segment, we are able to reconstruct these parts. This reconstruction happens 
unconsciously, leaving the listener to believe that what he hears is an unobstructed, perfectly 
clear  signal  –  as  if  there  were  no  missing  segments  at  all.  Both  components  of  familiar 
nonverbal sounds and missing components in speech can be restored. In the latter, of course, 
linguistic skills also come to the rescue in inducing from the context which word or fragment 
of  a  word  is  appropriate  (Warren,  1999:135-136).  The  importance  of  restoring  important 
missing sounds is enormous. If we weren’t endowed with this faculty, much of the relevant 
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information gathered through our auditory faculty would be lost in the loud and meaningless 
brouhaha of the environment.
 
2.2.3 Conclusion
Just  as  is  the  case  for  vision,  in  order  to  provide  us  with  useful  information,  hearing  is 
selective, triggered by only a small part of the range of frequencies, giving us a particular 
phenomenal experience derived from stimuli – perceiving frequency as pitch – and making 
hypotheses about the state of the world – the direction and distance of the origin of the sound 
– by using several cues. Furthermore, much of the irrelevant input is obstructed and much of 
the lost input is reconstructed, yielding a clear perception. 
2.3 Other senses
Both smell and taste, the so-called ‘chemical senses’, are triggered by particular substances. 
These substances,  when coming in contact  with taste-buds or olfactory receptors,  cause a 
particular phenomenal quality, the taste or smell. Other substances do not trigger the receptors 
and remain unperceived. (Levine and Shefner, 1991:573-574, 592-593).
Somato-sensory sensation, on the other hand, is caused by stimuli directly in contact with our 
body.  Four  submodalities  can  be distinguished within  somato-sensory sensation,  although 
there is some overlap. The first one is ‘proprioception’ – literally: perception of oneself – the 
awareness of the position of the body and the limbs  in space.  The second one is  ‘tactile 
sensation’  –  the  non-painful  stimuli  sensed  when  something  is  placed  against  the  body 
surface. The third one is ‘nociception’ or pain - the sense elicited by noxious stimuli.  The 
final one is ‘temperature’ – the sense elicited by stimuli either warmer or colder than the body 
surface (Levine and Shefner, 1991: 545). Interestingly,  the feeling of pain is triggered by 
separate receptors, not merely by an excess of stimuli exerted on the touch and temperature 
receptors (when one suffers from an excessive pressure on the body or extreme temperatures 
in contact with the skin). Some receptors are sensitive to noxious mechanical stimuli, others 
to thermal stimuli and some respond to both. Pain, therefore, has to be viewed as a completely 
independent modality, evolved to give us additional information (551). 
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In this regard, different realms of phenomenal qualities are derived from stimuli directly in 
contact with the body surface. Similarly as for vision and audition, where wavelengths are 
perceived as colour and frequency as pitch, certain properties of the somato-sensory stimuli 
give rise to particular perceptual experiences. We feel hot and cold, different kinds of pain, 
soft, rough, tickly,  etc., because of some particular physical properties of the substances in 




Our senses are triggered by only a small part of the available stimuli. First of all, they respond 
only to stimuli within a small range. Our visual receptors are sensitive to a narrow portion of 
the electromagnetic spectrum, our auditory receptors to frequencies above 20 Hz and below 
20 kHz, our chemical senses only to particular substances, and our somato-sensory receptors 
to particular properties of elements in the environment (e.g. temperature, pressure exerted by 
objects on our skin, texture of surfaces, etc.). Other organisms perceive different elements of 
the environment, because the range to which their sensory apparatuses are sensitive differs. 
Bees, for instance, are known to see UV-light and dogs hear frequencies above 20 kHz.
Secondly, the stimuli within the perceivable range need to be strong enough for us to perceive 
them. Our senses only provide us with a certain level of resolution. We do not see Mars or 
even the craters on the moon with the naked eye,  because they are too far off, nor do we 
perceive sounds that are too faint, and the same goes for smells, tastes and tactile sensations, 
for that matter.  Other organisms have senses providing them with more detailed levels of 
resolution. Eagles, for instance, are known to see more sharply than we do, dogs smell better, 
and so on. 
Finally, there are realms of potential information for which we have not evolved appropriate 
receptors  at  all  and which,  therefore,  remain  unnoticed  by us.  Some migrating  birds,  for 
instance, are endowed with ‘magnetoception’, the perception of the earth’s magnetic fields, 
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providing  them  with  information  about  direction  and  latitude.  Those  magnetic  fields, 
however, remain irremediably outside our perceptual radar, because we are not endowed with 
the proper sense-organs to be receptive to those stimuli. 
Therefore, we cannot escape the conclusion that we perceive but part of the world. Our senses 
are only triggered by a small  range of potential  stimuli  that,  moreover,  need to be strong 
enough. Furthermore, some stimuli are not perceived, simply because we do not possess the 
necessary sensory abilities  to  be triggered  by them.  In this  context,  each organism has  a 
particular window on the world. Whatever falls outside of that window remains irremediably 
hidden to the organism. 
2.4.2 The contingent causal relation between stimuli and percept
The account of the physical cause of the senses tells us that wavelengths of rays of photon-
molecules are perceived as colour, changes in air pressure are perceived as sound, pressure 
and  temperature  of  objects  in  contact  with  our  skin  are  processed  by  different  kind  of 
receptors  to  provide  us  with  a  typical  phenomenal  quality,  and  finally,  some  chemical 
properties are detected by olfactory and gustatory receptors, making us experience a particular 
smell and taste. 
The picture we gather from this is that the causal originators of perception – i.e. the external 
stimuli – are mediated by the perceptual organ to deliver the percept – i.e. the phenomenal  
experience. This mediation is the result of the working of our particular sense organs. This 
implies that the same stimulus could, in principle, give rise to a different percept, given a 
different mediation.  In other words, different organisms with different  sense organs could 
experience the same stimuli in different ways. Indeed, nothing about the physical causes of 
perception, whether they are reflecting light molecules or suddenly displaced air molecules or 
an interaction of external molecules with some of our own – as in the case of somato-sensory 
and chemical  perception  – forces  us  to  perceive  them the way we do.  While  changes  in 
perception correspond to changes in the world, the detection of the latter could have been 
realised by radically different perceptual contents. 
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Let’s imagine, for instance, that the (perceivable part of) the electromagnetic spectrum was 
heard instead of seen. Different wavelengths could, in theory at least, give rise to differences 
in perceived pitch instead of colour. The distance of the objects on which the light reflects 
could, in turn, be perceived as a difference in volume. In principle, in other words, we could 
hear light. This, of course, is not saying that hearing light would be as useful as seeing it, nor 
that it is physically realisable by a hearing apparatus with anatomical resemblance to our own, 
but merely that it is logically possible. It is, as pointed out, possible in principle, which does 
not imply its practical feasibility. Similarly, we have to acknowledge the possibility that we 
could  have  developed  radically  different  sense  organs,  sensitive  to  the  same  stimuli  but 
mediating  these  stimuli  in  a  different  way,  therefore  yielding  a  different  type  of  percept 
altogether. 
It appears, indeed, that we have evolved particular phenomenal ‘translations’ of the external 
stimuli triggering our sensory apparatus. Our sensations are causally connected with external 
stimuli, but this connection is contingent. Different organisms could perceive the same stimuli 
in different ways. 
2.4.3 The constructive role of the sensory apparatus
In order to extract  useful  data from the environment,  our senses do not only mediate  the 
stimuli to yield a particular percept, but also actively contribute to the content of the percept.  
Indeed, we do not merely receive images and sounds through our sensory receptors. Before it 
reaches our consciousness, it has already been processed by our mind in order to provide us 
with more information. Depth-perception appears in what was a two-dimensional projection 
on our retina, and sound is given a certain direction and distance. This information is based on 
automatic  hypotheses  that  the  mind  constructs,  using  several  cues.  Without  these  mental 
constructions,  our senses wouldn’t  be of much use.  Vision, for instance,  would be utterly 
useless if it merely provided us with a two-dimensional projection of colours. We need, on the 
contrary,  to  structure  those  rays  of  light  in  order  to  get  a  useful  representation  of  the 
environment, enabling us to discriminate objects and judge distances. Auditory perception, in 
the same way, wouldn’t be very helpful if we didn’t (re)construct the direction of and the 
distance from the origin of the sound. 
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This  constructive  role  of  the  senses,  however,  further  divorces  our  perception  from  the 
external  world  causing  it.  Not  only do we perceive  but  a  (small)  part  of  the  world,  and 
perceive this part in a contingent way, but, moreover, we add to the content of the percept. In 
other words, not all information we receive in perception comes from external stimuli. This 
paints  a  picture of perceptual  abilities  as  detecting  modules.  Our senses detect  particular, 
relevant elements in the environment, rather than duplicating the environment in our ‘mind’s 
eye’.  Therefore, our perception of the world by no means mirrors the external world. We 
appear to be sensitive merely to a small range of elements in the environment (perceptual  
closure), to perceive these elements in a particular, contingent way, and to reconstruct the 
state of the world hypothetically, using several automatic cues. 
This leaves us to conclude,  that – just  as any other organism – we are encapsulated in a 
particular ‘experiential bubble’. Our perception of the world is both incomplete – only part of 
the potential external stimuli trigger our senses – and species-specific – the stimuli causing 
perception are perceived in a particular, contingent way and are completed with information 
that is not directly drawn from the external world.
3. Intuitive theories
3.1 Innate predisposition to individuate subject matters 
Different subject matters require different kinds of explanations. When we see an animate 
creature  moving  fast  we  infer  a  motive  behind  this  movement  (e.g.  it’s  fleeing  from 
something or chasing something), but when we see an inanimate object moving, we interpret 
this movement in purely physical terms (e.g. the movement of a twirling feather is caused by 
the force that the wind exerts on it, or the rolling stone is moved by gravity). Similarly, when 
we encounter  natural  kinds  (e.g.  animal  or  vegetal  organisms),  we understand them – as 
Pinker  (1997:314)  puts  it  –  ‘in  terms  of  their  innards’,  whereas  artefacts  (e.g.  chairs  and 
tables) are understood in terms of the function they serve.
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In this regard, Pinker (1997:315) argues that we are endowed with mental modules for dealing 
with  objects  and  forces  (intuitive  physics),  animate  beings  and  other  humans  (intuitive 
psychology),  artefacts  (intuitive  engineering)  and natural  kinds  (intuitive  biology),  among 
other categories. Each category is approached in a different way. On a commonsensical level,  
it seems, indeed, absurd to try to explain the actions of other human beings in physical terms 
or, vice versa, to accord an intention behind the twirling movement of an air-borne feather.1 
This  predisposition  to  ‘carve  up  the  world’  into  different  realms  and  to  apply  different 
intuitive  theories  to  each of  them appears  to  be  at  least  partly  innate.  Infants  distinguish 
between animates and inanimates (Spelke et al,  1995; Gelman et al,  1995) and treat them 
differently. They seem to grasp that animate creatures have an internal source of energy and 
intentions  moving  them,  while  inanimate  objects  can  only be  moved  by external  causes. 
Indeed, while they try to bring people to them by making noise, they bring objects to them by 
moving them physically (Pinker, 1997:322). Furthermore, this way of carving up the world 
and the different intuitive modes of thinking applied to them are similar across all human 
cultures (see Atran, 1998 on folk biology). 
However, as Pinker (1997) points out, the fact that different ways of knowing are innate does 
not  imply that  knowledge is  innate.  It  does not  replace  or minimise  learning,  but  merely 
makes  it  possible.  Indeed,  Pinker  continues,  learning  involves  more  than  recording 
experience. We need to couch experiences so that they are generalisable in useful ways (315). 
In this sense, we must have a predisposition to interpret the behaviour of fellow human beings 
in terms of goals and values in order to make sense of it, or a predisposition to interpret our 
sensory data as made up by objects governed by physical forces. 
Khalidi (2002), in this context, points out that innateness does not imply the presence of full-
grown, innate  ideas at  birth,  but requires environmental  stimuli  to develop it  (252).  Both 
‘nature’ – i.e. innate predispositions – and ‘nurture’ – i.e. environmental stimuli – constitute 
our intuitive understanding of the world, which, therefore, come together when our cognitive 
1 This,  however,  is  not  saying  that  humans,  in  their  creative  frivolity,  never  think of  inanimate  objects  as 
animated  (cf.  animistic  religions)  or  of  animate  creatures  as  being  reducible  to  inanimate  particles  (cf.  
physicalism), but that on a non-metaphysical level, non-critical level, people are predisposed to apply certain  
intuitions to certain categories.
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architecture is fed input from the environment. While the relative importance of the nature 
versus nurture components of human behaviour is still heavily debated in the social sciences 
(cf. Pinker 2002), it is now commonly accepted that our mind must have at least a minimal 
role in structuring the perceptual input in order to yield knowledge. How, indeed, could one 
acquire  knowledge based on observation alone? How could one make sense of any of it, 
without  some form of  (innate)  cognitive  mechanism that  structures  this  perceptual  input? 
Without the ability to, at least, detect similarities and differences among sensory data, there 
would be no way of classifying the input (e.g. of distinguishing night and day, animate and 
inanimate, animal and vegetal, etc.). These sensory impressions would be nothing but raw, 
unprocessed phenomenal experiences, remaining utterly unintelligible. Therefore, there is no 
escaping the conclusion that we need ‘modes of knowing’ – as Pinker puts it – to structure the 
input and generate knowledge. These innate mental predispositions, when informed by the 
perceptual  input  gathered  from the  environment,  give  rise  to  intuitive  theories  about  the 
world.  Those  theories  are  uncritical,  pre-scientific  and  shared  by all  human  beings  on  a 
commonsensical level. They are often referred to as ‘folk theories’.
Below, I will look at two deeply-rooted folk theories underlying our view of the world – folk 
physics and folk biology – and ask whether they correspond to their scientific counterparts.
3.2 Folk ‘sciences’
3.2.1 Folk physics
Careful  testing  on  infants  has  shown that  they  already show some  basic  appreciation  of 
physical  laws.  Kellman  and  Spelke  (1983),  Spelke  (1991)  and  Baillargeon  (1991)  have 
designed experiments on 3 to 8 month old children, to test their concept of objecthood and the 
laws that govern their interaction. In order to test this, they measure the looking time of the 
infant when confronted with either a possible or an impossible physical event (such as, for 
instance,  an object  passing through another  or  an object  disappearing  after  being veiled). 
When infants consider something as an impossible physical event, their looking time will be 
considerably longer than when confronted with a possible event, which bores or ‘habituates’ 
them much faster, making them look away (Baillargeon et al, 1995:81). 
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Several  conclusions  emerge  from these  tests.  First  of  all,  infants  possess  the  concept  of 
objecthood. They appear to perceive an object whenever parts are moving together. Whatever 
constitutes an integrated whole, in this sense, is considered an object. (Kellman and Spelke 
1983).  They do not,  in  other  words,  perceive  the  world  as  ‘one  great  blooming  buzzing 
confusion’, as James (1890:462) famously put it, but as an ordered whole made up of different 
objects. Indeed, when babies are shown two sticks poking up from behind a veil and moving 
in synchrony, they expect these to be part of a single object – i.e. to be attached. When shown 
that these are in fact two separate sticks they ‘express’ their wonder in their looking time. 
(Kellman and Spelke, 1983:493). However, when the sticks are not moving behind the veil, 
they expect them to be two separate objects (497-498).
Once established that infants perceive the world as made up of different objects, Baillargeon 
(1991) and Spelke (1991) went on to test their intuitions about objects and the physical laws 
governing them. They concluded that infants expect objects to be impenetrable by each other, 
to move along continuous trajectories and to be cohesive. Furthermore, they already ‘know’ 
that objects can only move each other by making contact. As Pinker (1997) points out, infants 
see objects, remember them and expect them to obey several physical laws. They have an 
understanding of a stable,  lawful world,  which they could never have acquired by simple 
induction (they are barely able to manipulate objects, they don’t see them very well, etc.) or 
through feedback from anyone else (they obviously can’t communicate). Therefore, they must 
be endowed with an innate predisposition to understand physical entities in a particular way 
(319). 
As to the nature of this innate predisposition, however, opinions differ. Spelke (1995:45-51) 
argues  that  infants  are  endowed with core-beliefs  or  guiding principles  when considering 
physical happenings. Baillargeon (1995:79-80), on the other hand, rejects the assumption that 
infants are born with substantive beliefs about objects, but claims that they are endowed with 
highly constrained mechanisms guiding their acquisition of knowledge of objects. In any case, 
whatever the underlying cause, both Spelke and Baillargeon established that intuitions about 
physical  events  have  an  innate  basis  –  either  in  the  form of  core-beliefs  or  constrained 
knowledge gaining mechanisms – and underlie the way adults  still  intuitively think about 
these events. 
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This intuitive thinking,  however,  is  not  necessarily accurate.  Indeed,  our ‘folk physics’  is 
often  at  odds  with  scientific  physics.  As  Pinker  (1997)  argues,  our  intuitions  match 
Aristotelian physics – claiming that all objects strive towards rest – rather than Newtonian 
physics – claiming that all moving objects will continue indefinitely on their trajectory unless 
a  force  acts  upon it.  We spontaneously think  that  a  moving  object  is  impressed  with  an 
‘impetus’ - a force acting upon it (e.g. the wind blowing on a leaf or a rock being thrown in 
the air) - until this impetus gradually dissipates and the object comes to rest. Similarly, when 
we say that ‘the ridge keeps the pencil on the oblique writing table’, we seem to imply that the 
pencil has a tendency to move (an impetus) and that the ridge overcomes this impetus by 
exerting a greater force, which not only gives us a distinctly unscientific account of events, 
but  is  also  in  direct  contradiction  with  Newton’s  third  law that  states  that  action  equals 
reaction (320). Furthermore, as Proffitt and Gilden (1989) have established, when it comes to 
more complicated motions, such as, for instance, wheels rolling down ramps, colliding balls 
or spinning tops, people’s intuitions completely fail them in predicting the outcome. 
However,  as  Pinker  (1997)  explains,  the  fact  that  the  mind  is  non-Newtonian,  is  not 
surprising. In the real world, Newton’s laws are masked by friction (from the air and contact 
with the ground). This friction slows everything down until it comes to a stop, making it very 
natural to conceive of objects as having an inherent tendency towards rest.  Our intuitions 
have, indeed, not evolved to give us an accurate account of events, but merely to enable us to 
predict probable outcomes in our natural environment. The same reason explains our failing 
intuition  when  it  comes  to  complicated  motions,  as  these  complicated  motions  are  very 
unlikely to happen in natural environments (321). 
3.2.2 Folk biology
People everywhere have deep-rooted intuitions about natural kinds, such as animals, plants 
and minerals. According to Atran (1998), we are endowed with a predisposition to think about 
fauna and flora in a highly structured way. Indeed, we divide the natural world into a complex 
taxonomy which  incorporates  different  groups,  each  further  defined  in  different  levels  of 
subgroups (e.g. a lion is an animal, a mammal and a cat). Atran argues that these taxonomies 
are widely shared across all cultures and eras, and are therefore much less arbitrary than the 
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assembly of, for instance, entities in cosmology, artefacts or social groups (547). As Simpson 
(1961:57) puts it, classifying animals and plants into basic groupings is ‘quite as obvious to 
[the] modern scientist as to the Guarani Indian’. 
This  innate  predisposition  manifests  itself  – as can be expected – at  an early age,  where 
children  not  only  distinguish  between  animals  and  non-animals  (Atran  1998:549)  – 
corresponding to the animate–inanimate divide pointed out above - but also between plants – 
inanimate but organic – and non-living things (Gelman and Wellman, 1991). With respect to 
the natural, organic world, as mentioned above, human minds intuitively distinguish different 
realms, each realm itself divided up into groups and sub-groups.
This predisposition to classify the organic world according to a complex taxonomy arises 
from an intuition of a hidden trait or essence that members of the same group share with each 
other (Pinker,  1997:323).  As Atran (1995:219-220) explains,  the nature of this  essence is 
initially unknown to children, but is already presumed. We are, in other words, predisposed to 
look for essences when dealing with the natural world. Interestingly enough, these essences 
are not based on visible similarity but on what is presumed to be the underlying constitution 
(Pinker, 1997:324). It rests on the assumption that natural kinds have an underlying causal 
nature,  uniquely responsible  for  their  typical  appearance,  behaviour  and ecological  niche. 
(Atran, 1998:548). It is also what makes the caterpillar the same animal as the butterfly it  
develops into. Although its appearance might be radically changed, we are still inclined to 
reason that its underlying constitution remains constant and causes the organism to develop 
into a new form. As Atran (1998:548) puts it, the essence maintains the organism’s integrity 
even as it causes the organism to grow, change and reproduce, in which process it passes 
down its essence to a new organism. 
Gelman and Wellman (1991) argue that this essentialism develops in children at a certain age. 
For instance, when asked what happens when doctors take a tiger, bleach its fur and sew on a 
mane (making it look like a lion), five year olds typically say that it is now is a lion, while 
seven year olds say it’s still a tiger, pointing to the fact that they attribute an identity to an 
animal based on its innards or its hidden essence, rather than its external appearance. Pinker 
(1997:327) argues that  this  essentialism cannot  be learnt.  Indeed,  children have not  taken 
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biology at that age and parents commonly do not describe animals in terms of their innards or 
internal constitution. Furthermore, children never develop essentialist thinking about artefacts. 
(Pinker, 1997:326). A table that is taken to pieces and reassembled as a chair is for all people 
at all  ages now a chair.  In this regard, it  seems established – as pointed out above – that 
people treat natural kinds and artificial kinds differently, intuitively according essences to the 
former, while describing the latter in terms of the function they serve.
Once  again,  as  is  the  case  for  folk-physics,  our  intuitive  grasp  of  the  natural  world  is 
contradicted by modern science. Indeed, while this essentialist thinking was still the basis of 
pre-Darwinian scientific taxonomy, known as the ‘Linnaean classification system’, Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory proved this intuitive thinking wrong. Species do not possess immutable 
essences, but are themselves subject to change. Birds evolved out of reptiles and elephants out 
of rodents; all ‘essences’ appear to be nothing but temporary forms of species in adaptation to 
specific environmental conditions. Species do not fit into classes and subclasses because of 
their essence, but because of the relative proximity of their common ancestors. 
In a broader perspective, this categorical thinking is criticised by Lakoff (1987), who claims 
that  there  are  no  clear-cut  categories  applicable  to  the  world  at  all.  A  prima  facie 
unambiguous category,  such as, for instance,  mother  – which could be defined as female 
genitor or parent – instantly becomes more problematic when borderline cases have to be 
accommodated. What about an adoptive mother, the woman ceding a donor egg, or the case in 
which a ‘surrogate mother’ has a fertilised egg implanted in her uterus and gives birth? If you 
say the origin of the egg counts, women having donor eggs implanted are not mothers. If, on 
the contrary, you say that giving birth makes one a mother, what about ‘surrogate mothers’ 
who ‘rent’ out their uterus to bring somebody else’s child into the world? If you want to keep 
parental  care  as  the  only  condition,  you  include  adoptive  mothers,  but  what  about  the 
biological  mother?  In  whatever  way you  twist  and  turn  the  issue,  there  seems  to  be  no 
necessary  and sufficient  condition  to  define  the  category.  Similarly,  biological  categories 
notoriously resist  an unambiguous definition.  The category of ‘fish’, for instance,  appears 
impossible  to define2,  and the category of mammals  became problematic  when naturalists 
2 Fish,  as Pinker (1997:311) points out,  ‘do not occupy one branch in the tree of life.  One of their kind, a 
lungfish, begot the amphibians, whose descendants embrace the reptiles, whose descendants embrace the birds  
and the mammals. There is no definition that picks out all and only the fish, no branch of the tree of life that  
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stumbled upon the Platypus, an egg-laying, breast-feeding species living in remote corners of 
Australia and Tasmania. This, of course, is the result of evolution, where species drift in and 
out of larger categories, new categories are formed, and old ones disappear.
However,  while  our  intuitive  way  of  structuring  animal  and  vegetal  organisms  in  fixed 
categories might be scientifically inaccurate, it is nevertheless very useful in dealing with the 
environment. Our life spans are, indeed, considerably too short to have to take the evolution 
of  species  into  account.  Considering  organisms  as  endowed  with  immutable  essences, 
therefore, works perfectly well. Furthermore, intuitive theories enable us to assign properties 
to unknown but ‘similar’ elements in the environment. A category of poisonous animals, for 
instance, might not be clearly defined and might even mistakenly include species that are not 
poisonous  but  that  have  a  lot  of  characteristics  in  common  with  species  that  are.  This, 
however, does not change the undeniable advantage of having an approximate (and, in this 
case, conservative) classification. Indeed, as Pinker (1997:312) rightly points out: ‘systems of 
rules are idealizations that abstract away from complicating aspects of reality’. They evolved 




Our intuitive grasp of the world appears to be founded on innate predispositions. Both tests on 
infants enquiring about their uninformed expectations about states of the world (cf. Spelke, 
1995 and Baillargeon,  1995)  and comparative  anthropological  research  (cf.  Atran,  1998), 
show that the human mind is endowed with an innate predisposition to make sense of its 
environment. This predisposition underlies the way we carve up the world, explain events and 
predict  probable  outcomes.  While  this  view has  traditionally  been opposed by empiricist 
theories,  which  argue  that  the  mind  is  nothing  but  an  empty  shell,  it  is  now commonly 
accepted that the mind is endowed with genetically based modes of knowing. As pointed out 
includes salmon and lungfish but excludes lizards and cows.’
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above, tests on infants and comparative anthropological research point conclusively towards a 
shared, innate, intuitive view of the world.
 
3.3.2 Scientific inaccuracy
This intuitive view, however, is not an accurate and objective one. Indeed, both the way we 
split the world into different categories and the different intuitive theories we apply to those 
categories appear at odds with a scientific account of the world. Regarding our predisposition 
to individuate subject matters, it appears that even animate and inanimate or organic (living) 
and inorganic (lifeless) entities – giving rise to a very different intuitive conception – are not 
accounted for in radically different ways by modern science. Indeed, science tells us that all 
matter – which includes, of course, animal and human organisms as well as rocks – is made 
up of molecules of atoms. Even animate organisms, in this sense, obey purely physical laws, 
where its movements are caused by nothing other than atomic interaction (within the brain, 
from brain to muscles, and so on). This physicalistic conception of living organisms clashes 
with our deeply-rooted intuition that living organisms possess a quality that is absent in other 
matter.  It  is,  therefore,  not  surprising  that  the  premise  that  everything  is  physical  has 
notoriously awakened vivid criticism throughout history and is still  heavily debated today 
with regards to the mind in general and consciousness in particular.   
Furthermore, as pointed out above, our conceptual framework providing us with an intuitive 
grasp of physical happenings – ascribing an ‘impetus’ to moving objects, assuming that every 
object’s natural state is rest, and so on – contradicts Newtonian physics, let alone Einstein’s 
account of the universe.  Similarly,  our essentialist  categorising of the organic world is in 
direct contradiction with the theory of evolution. Species are not endowed with immutable, 
internal ‘identities’, but change over time. Organisms, in this sense, are only part of species 
and larger groups because of genetic similarities due to the proximity of a common ancestor, 
not because of a shared essence that resists time.
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3.3.3 Species-specificity
While  our  intuitive  grasp  of  the  world  obviously  fails  in  terms  of  scientific  accuracy,  it 
nevertheless provides us with a very useful framework, specifically tailored to our needs. We 
do not need to grasp how celestial bodies interact with each other or how matter is constituted  
by atoms to get by on this planet. Folk physics, with its naïve, uncritical conceptual basis for 
explaining  and  predicting  events  in  this  world,  provides  us,  nevertheless,  with  all  the 
information we need to function. Indeed, both the macroscopic and microscopic dimension do 
not  concern  our  ability  to  manage  our  surroundings.  We  are  confined  to  the  ‘medium 
dimension’ that we occupy – somewhere in between electrons and galaxies – on the particular 
planet we live, with its gravity, air resistance, and so on. Those are the only elements that our 
intuitive grasp takes into account, yielding an erroneous, biologically biased view, shaped to 
fit our ‘ecological niche’.
Similarly, in the biological realm, we do not have to be evolutionary geneticists to predict the 
behavioural traits of animals, the medicinal properties of certain plants, or the environment in 
which they will thrive. In order to do this, our erroneous essentialist conception, carving up 
the natural world into a complex taxonomy, is more than adequate. It provides us with a very 
useful  framework  to  deal  with  our  environment,  enabling  us  to  predict  properties  of  an 
unknown  element  based  on  its  similarity  with  known  elements.  Without  this  ability  to 
categorise, our knowledge could not extend beyond the realm of elements we are actually 
acquainted with and would leave us utterly unprepared for any new element. 
Therefore, our intuitive theories about the world are thoroughly species-specific. They are 
tailored to the needs of our particular species in our particular  environment.  They yield a 
biologically biased view of the world that – while obviously mistaken from a scientific point 
of view – enables us to function in the world.  This, of course, is the result of an evolutionary 
process adapting organisms to meet their biological needs in their environment.
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4. Why do we perceive and make sense of the world the way we do?
Both our perceptual and cognitive abilities – the mental mechanisms underlying our intuitive 
assumptions about the world – are the outcome of an evolutionary process, driven by the blind 
mechanism of natural selection.  The theory of evolution by means of natural selection,  as 
formulated  by  Charles  Darwin  (1859)  and  Alfred  Russel  Wallace  (1858)3,  states  that  all 
species  evolve  through  the  selective  retention  of  random  mutations  and  genetic 
recombinations occurring in their gene pool.4 Variations that increase an organism’s chance 
for survival and reproduction in their particular environment will soon spread over the entire 
population, because they are passed on by organisms with a higher than average chance of 
reproducing.  Variations  that  negatively affect  chances for reproduction  will,  by that  same 
rationale,  soon be weeded out of the gene pool. Therefore, species evolve and can evolve 
more complex abilities. This is how a single cell, constantly copying itself, eventually evolved 
– through copying errors that proved beneficial – into the mind boggling variety of flora and 
fauna flourishing on this planet.  This process is called natural selection. 
Selection is  the product of what Darwin calls  ‘Malthusian pressures’5,  meaning that  more 
individuals are born than can survive and successfully reproduce. This results in a struggle for 
life. Organisms with beneficial characteristics will get the upper hand in this struggle and their 
genes  will  spread  throughout  a  species’  gene  pool.  With  regard  to  this  struggle  for  life,  
Darwin rhetorically asks when introducing the concept of natural selection: 
3 Wallace sent Darwin a letter, with a fairly brief account of the theory of evolution by means of natural selection 
while Darwin was still postponing publication of the Origin of species, after decades of research.
4 More recently,  this Darwinian account  of evolution by purely environmental  (external)  selection has  been 
criticised by Riedl (1984a) and Wuketits (1990),  among others. The new view defends a ‘systems theory of 
evolution’,  stating  that  organisms  are  not  simply  moulded  by  their  environment,  but  are  active  systems  
developing  better  living  conditions.  Organisms,  in  this  regard,  evolve  both  by  external  and  internal 
(intraorganismic)  selection.  Evolution,  in  other  words,  is  constrained  and  influenced  by  the  structures  and 
functions of organisms themselves. There is a feedback flow of information from phenotype to genotype. It is  
argued, that without this feedback and internal regulatory constraints informing the genotype about phenotypic 
requirements, random mutations could not account for the order of systems and subsystems in the organism. All  
forms of  life  would break  down in chaos.  (Riedl  1984b,  Wuketits  1990).  However,  the fact  that  there  are  
constraints from within the organism, along with external conditions, does not change our premise that evolution 
is  a  blind  process,  gradually  adapting  organisms  to  particular  needs  in  a  particular  environment  based  on  
selective retention of random (undirected) variations.
5 The English economist, Thomas Malthus, stated that available living space and food supply could never keep 
up with the increase  of  population. Populations have a tendency to grow much too fast  for  the increase in 
resources, which inevitably leads to a struggle for existence, leading to war, epidemics and famine. (Malthus 
1798).
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[C]an we doubt (remembering that many more individuals are born than can possibly 
survive)  that individuals  having any advantage,  however slight,  over others,  would 
have the best chance of surviving and of procreating their kind? On the other hand, we 
may  feel  sure  that  any  variation  in  the  least  degree  injurious  would  be  rigidly 
destroyed.  This preservation of favourable variations  and the rejection  of injurious 
variations, I call Natural Selection (Darwin, 1859:80-81).
The origin of our perceptual and cognitive abilities resides in this selective process, slowly 
shaping  organisms  by  retaining  favourable  variations  and  rejecting  injurious  ones.  They 
evolved to increase an organism’s chances for survival and reproduction. In this sense, every 
organism’s mental abilities gradually evolved together with their sensory abilities, pushed by 
the selective advantage of enabling the organism to extract more useful elements out of its 
environments  and  avoid  more  harmful  ones.  This  implies  two  things:  firstly,  that  our 
perceptual and cognitive abilities are tailored to the  particular needs of our ancestors, and 
secondly, that these abilities have only been selected for when they enabled our ancestors to 
behave in ways that increased their chances for survival and reproduction. Abilities that do 
not translate into fitness enhancing behaviour will not be selected for. 
4.1 Perception
Perception  might  not  yield  an  objective  and  complete  representation  of  reality,  but  it 
nevertheless seems inconceivable that evolution provided us with a simply useless realm of 
awareness. As explained above, the mechanism of natural selection entails that it evolved to 
increase our chances of survival and reproduction. In this regard, our perceptual faculties must 
have  evolved  to  provide  us  with  information  eliciting  ‘appropriate’  behaviour  in 
correspondence with our surroundings. Vision allows us to avoid obstacles, to stalk prey, and 
to  find our  way home.  Auditory perception,  on the other  hand,  warns  us  of  approaching 
danger and allows us to communicate at a distance. The chemical senses, finally, cause us to 
avoid eating putrid substances, while the sensation of pain stops us from damaging our body, 
to name but a few examples.
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Indeed, gradual adaptations in our evolutionary history have provided us with an extremely 
useful realm of information which we draw from our environment,  guiding our actions in 
appropriate  ways.  This  leaves  us  with  a  very  useful  ability  that  is,  on  the  one  hand, 
irremediably particular, on the other hand, selective. Vast realms of potential stimuli, in this 
context, remain beyond our awareness, simply because their detection has not been selected 
for. Boynton (1979) points out what he considers an apparent paradox:
Considered within the framework provided by the theory of evolution, it is perhaps not 
particularly difficult to understand why we should be so limited and yet at the same 
time so gifted. Our perceptual abilities have presumably evolved, along with our other 
capacities,  according  to  what  is  important  in  the  external  environment  from  the 
standpoint of adaptation and survival.  If,  say,  static fields of magnetic  flux carried 
significant  information  for  us,  we probably  would  have  evolved magnetoreceptors 
(Boynton, 1979:44).
Every  organism’s  perceptual  abilities,  in  this  sense,  detect  the  particular  elements  in  the 
environment  that  provide  an  input  which  increases  an  organism’s  chances  for  successful 
reproduction.  These  elements  are  different  for  every  species.  Therefore,  different  species 
perceive the world differently. Their senses are triggered by different stimuli and they often 
perceive similar stimuli in different ways.
4.1.1 Detecting ‘affordances’
Gibson’s (1979) notion of ‘affordances’ is illuminating in this context. An affordance of the 
environment is an element or aspect of it that is relevant for an organism. It is something the 
environment provides the organism with, either in a beneficial way or a harmful way. The 
same environment, therefore, can hold different affordances for different species (127). An 
impala for instance, will have as affordances the grassy plains, the watering holes, and the big 
carnivorous cats in its environment. A fly, living in the same environment, will, of course, 
have very different affordances, such as the presence of dung on which it feeds, birds and 
reptiles that feed on it, and so on. On an even more basic level, an affordance of the impala  
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would be the terrestrial  surface on which it moves while that of the fly would be the air  
through which it moves.
Indeed, every species has evolved to meet nature in a certain way. Each of them has carved its 
ecological  niche,  developing  a  certain  way  of  life  using  particular  affordances  in  its 
environment, and allowing the species to subsist. An ecological niche, in this sense, is a set of  
affordances. Species develop adaptations to these affordances. Their biological constitution is 
shaped by natural selection to maximise the benefits it can reap from its environment (in order 
to keep the organism safe, to nourish it and to reproduce), and to minimise the chances of 
encounters  with  elements  of  the  environment  that  threaten  its  survival  and/or  chances  of 
reproduction (e.g. preying animals, poisonous substances, competition for reproduction, etc.) 
(129). 
These  adaptations,  however,  do  not  only  include  physiological  adaptations  (such  as  the 
extremely light weight that is divided over long legs which enables the water bug to stride on 
water,  the hydrodynamic  shape  of  fish or  the camouflaged colours  of  so many animals). 
Perceptual  abilities  have  also  evolved  in  relation  to  those  affordances.  Each  species  is 
endowed with a particular way of detecting its affordances and with a way of translating this 
detection  into  action.  The  success  in  benefiting  from  positive  affordances  and  avoiding 
negative  ones  is  the  only  reality  in  the  light  of  which  natural  selection  has  shaped  the 
perceptual abilities of every species. In this context, our perceptual experiences are shaped to 
provide us with a useful picture of the particular environment in which we have spent most of  
our recent evolutionary history. 
4.1.2 Using the perceptual input
Detecting affordances, however, as mentioned previously, is not enough for natural selection 
to shape the perceptual apparatus. This detection needs to elicit fitness enhancing behaviour. 
A species only develops the ability to perceive affordances insofar as it possesses the ability 
to ‘translate’ this input into ‘appropriate’ behaviour. As Matthen (2005) points out, there is an 
interdependence of perception and use that explains the specialisation of perceptual abilities 
of organisms. Indeed, if an organism does not translate the perception of particular features of 
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its environment into action, it will not evolve the ability to perceive it. Since perceiving these 
features would not enhance its chances for reproduction, the genetic variations allowing for 
this ability will not be selected for. Reciprocally, an organism can only develop behavioural 
strategies if it has evolved the necessary perceptual abilities to gather the required information 
for these strategies (223). Therefore, both perceptual abilities and either cognitive abilities (in 
the case of humans and higher scale animals) or effector cues6 (in the case of lower scale 
animals), co-evolved to ‘match’ an organism’s bodily actions with the relevant changes in its 
environment.
Perception, in this light, is used differently by different organisms. It has evolved, as David 
Marr explains, to serve different purposes. 
A pigeon  uses  vision  to  help  it  navigate,  fly,  and  seek  out  food.  Many types  of 
jumping  spider  use  vision  to  tell  the  difference  between  a  potential  meal  and  a 
potential mate. (…) The frog (…) detects bugs with its retina, and the rabbit retina is 
full of special gadgets, including what is apparently a hawk detector, since it responds 
well to the pattern made by a preying hawk hovering overhead. Human vision, on the 
other hand, seems to be very much more general, although it clearly contains a variety 
of  special-purpose  mechanisms  that  can,  for  example,  direct  the  eye  toward  an 
unexpected movement in the visual field or cause one to blink or otherwise avoid 
something that approaches one’s head too quickly. (...) The general point here is that 
because vision is used by different animals for such a wide variety of purposes, it is 
inconceivable  that  all  seeing  animals  use  the  same  representations;  each  can 
confidently be expected to use one or more representations that are nicely tailored to 
the owner’s purposes (Marr, 1982:32).
In this regard, since perceptual abilities are used for different purposes, and since different 
elements in the environment matter for satisfying those purposes, the perceptual input that 
organisms gather from their environment can differ radically. Human perceptual abilities are 
no exception, as they are the outcome of our evolutionary history.
6 Effector  cues  are  immediate  behavioural  reactions  triggered  by a  particular  perceptual  sensation.  A good  
example is the reflex of a tick to drop from its leaf when its perceptual faculties are triggered (by sensing butyric 
acid and the exact temperature of 37° Celsius, indicating the presence of a mammal).
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4.1.3 Human perception
As Matthen (2005:181) points out, homo sapiens inherited from its primate ancestors a special 
kind  of  colour  vision  that  facilitates  the  detection  of  fruit  among  foliage  (thanks  to  a 
particularly sharp contrast between red, orange and green). Similarly, our stereoscopic vision, 
enabling depth-vision – crucial for swinging from one branch to the other – was selected for 
in our tree-dwelling ancestors. However, our hominid ancestors, while still closely linked to 
their  primate  ancestors,  swapped  an  existence  as  arboreal  frugivores  for  that  of  hunters. 
Therefore,  according to Campbell  (1985:370),  our perceptual  abilities  must  have evolved. 
Indeed, hunting animals’ perceptual abilities are specialised to identify mobile objects (i.e. 
their prey), while frugivores’ perception principally serves to identify static objects (plants 
containing  fruit).  Kortlandt  (1965),  in  this  context,  recorded  that  when  zoo  chimpanzees 
receive food at a location at which they are not accustomed to receive it, they react as though 
it is something strange and often refuse to eat it. This is, of course, not the case for carnivores. 
A cat will find and eat its food wherever it is placed. 
However, the main difference, as Campbell (1985) notes, between homo sapiens and other 
hunting animals, is that the latter mainly hunt by olfactory perception,  while we – having 
inherited a  highly developed sense of vision from our primate ancestors  – ‘rebooted’  our 
primary  sense – i.e.  vision – to  serve the  purpose of  hunting.  We evolved the  ability  to 
identify  objects  on  the  move,  visually,  without  any  reference  to  a  fixed  position  in  the 
environment, and became the first land animals to hunt almost exclusively by sight (370). The 
result is a particular visual representation of the world, different from any other organism, as 
the  outcome  of  both  our  primate  heritage  and  its  adaptation  to  new  selective  pressures 
associated with hunting.
Similarly,  our  auditory faculty  has  evolved to  discriminate  and analyse  sound to  a  much 
greater  extent  than that  of any other  species  (Campbell,  1985).  This  ability,  allowing for 
human spoken language, is the result of the evolution of the auditory apparatus in primates, 
where hearing was mainly concerned with detecting elements from the social environment – 
i.e.  from other members  of the species  – rather than the general environment.  This,  once 
again, yields a perception of the world that is very different from that of most other species, 
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who use –  for  the  most  part  at  least  –  hearing  as  a  general  detection  mechanism in the 
environment, often hearing fainter sounds, but not discriminating to the same extent between 
different kinds of sound (247-248). 
4.1.4 Umwelt
Every species is, therefore, encapsulated in a particular realm of awareness as the outcome of 
its evolutionary history. Jacob von Uexküll (1909) coined the term ‘umwelt’ to describe this 
perceptual encapsulation. All species, he states, have their own umwelt - their own ambient 
reality  -  that  is  both  the  product  of  their  environment  and  the  way  of  perceiving  this 
environment.  In this  sense, every living being – including ourselves – is ‘locked up’ in a 
particular  phenomenal  reality.  The  world,  Uexküll  rightly  states,  is  never  perceived 
objectively.  Its  perception  is  always  mediated  by  the  particular  functioning  of  the  sense 
organs that an organism has acquired in its evolutionary history. 
4.2 Cognition
4.2.1 Increasing control over the environment
While our perceptual abilities have evolved to provide us with useful information about the 
environment,  our cognitive abilities,  underlying our mental  predisposition to structure and 
understand the world in a certain way, have evolved to interpret this input in ways leading to 
‘appropriate’  behavioural  responses.  As  perception  without  cognition  remains  utterly 
unintelligible, both abilities have necessarily co-evolved in organisms to match their actions 
to the constantly changing states of the environment. Just as our perceptual abilities have only 
evolved to yield an input that is useful for the needs of our particular organisms, so have our 
cognitive abilities only evolved to provide us with a grasp of our environment that increases 
our chances for successful reproduction. They have evolved in order to increase our control 
over the environment, enabling us to extract more useful elements from it and to avoid more 
harmful ones. 
35
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The evolution of mind, in other words, is directed by the selective advantage of the increasing 
ability of organisms to use the environment to their benefit. In this context, Dennett (1995) 
proposes an account of different levels of mind, each level providing the organism with more 
efficient  ways  to  cope  with  the  environment.  As  each  new level  is  reached,  it  makes  it 
possible for the evolving organism to ‘construct’ the next one, enabling it to interact with its  
environment with increasing efficiency.  Dennett  calls this the ‘tower of generate and test’ 
(373).
At the basic level of Dennett’s tower you have ‘Darwinian creatures’, where each species has 
evolved through natural selection in adaptation to its environment, but is entirely ‘hardwired’. 
The organisms cannot adjust to their environment - only the species themselves can adjust 
over the generations by retaining advantageous variations in their gene-pool (374). 
At the second level you have ‘Skinnerian creatures’, named after the behavioural psychologist 
B.F. Skinner, who pointed out the possibility of acquired behaviour (not genetically fixed) 
through the process of conditioning. These creatures can try out different actions in response 
to their environment and retain, by means of trial and error, the actions that worked. This, 
however, is still a pretty laborious and perilous process. Indeed, trying out random options can 
take a while to yield a fitting one and organisms can pay with their life for trying out risky 
errors (374).
Therefore, the next level involves a mental selection of those endless possibilities, avoiding 
the risky activity of testing out too many errors. Organisms capable of this feat are called 
‘Popperian creatures’, since, according to Dennett, as ‘Sir Karl Popper once elegantly put it, 
this design enhancement permits our hypotheses to die in our stead’ (375). This level requires 
mental representations of actions in a particular situation and their probable outcome. This is, 
according to Dennett, not an exclusively human ability, and not even an exclusively primate 
or even mammalian ability. Birds, reptiles and fish are all endowed with this capacity to use 
information  from their  environment  and  mentally  select  their  behavioural  options  before 
putting them into action (376). 
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The last level, on the other hand, is attained to only a very small extent by other animals. It is  
referred to by Dennett  as the level of ‘Gregorian creatures’,  after  the British psychologist 
Richard Gregory,  who emphasises  the role  of information,  transmitted  non-genetically  by 
members of a group in what Dennett calls, ‘the creation of smart moves’ (377). We humans 
are endowed with language, an abstract framework of symbols picturing reality. Therefore, 
we  can  profit  from  detailed  information  thought  up  by  our  fellow  human  beings.  The 
invention  of  writing,  furthermore,  exponentially  increased  the  available  amount  of 
information. Writing can be stored on papyrus, clay tablets, in books and now even on hard 
drives, and this eliminates the necessity of mouth to ear transfer, making it accessible to a 
much larger number of individuals and to future generations. 
The  picture  Dennett  paints  of  the  evolution  of  mind  is  one  pressured  by  the  biological 
advantage of gaining increasing control over the environment. It shows that the human mind – 
even in its vertiginous complexity – can be accounted for in naturalistic, evolutionary terms, 
by the hand of natural selection. There is, indeed, an obvious advantage to be gained at each 
new level of mind, all the way up to the Gregorian mind, allowing for human culture.7 
4.2.2 Adaptive problems
While  Dennett  shows  that  the  evolution  of  mind  in  general  is  pushed  by  the  adaptive 
advantage of providing the organism with an increasing ability to use the environment to its 
benefit, he does not provide an account of the particular elements in the environment that our 
minds have evolved to control. This is the field of evolutionary psychologists.  Tooby and 
Cosmides (1992, 2003), along with others (e.g. Pinker, 1997), fill this void. They argue that 
our mental abilities have evolved to meet certain challenges in our environment - so-called 
adaptive problems. Those adaptive problems, best described as reproductive opportunities or 
7 Miller (2000), however, argues that a purely survival oriented theory of selection can never account for some 
abilities of the human mind. He points towards a different, but equally important driving force of evolution: 
sexual selection. Arguing that just  as the tail of the peacock did not evolve to provide the male birds with  
increased survival chances – quite to the contrary, the tail makes them more exposed to predators – some mental  
abilities in humans, such as, for instance, art, music, drama and comedy, cannot be accounted for by survival  
enhancing selection. These abilities, according to Miller, are the product of sexual selection through mate choice.  
They developed because pre-hominids endowed with them were preferred mates and therefore were able to pass 
down their genes to a greater extent. In this regard, these mental capacities are best seen as a ‘sexual ornament’,  
in the same way as the peacock’s tail or the feathers of the paradise bird. 
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obstacles created by enduring conditions in the environment, include a multitude of domains, 
such as winning social  support from group members,  detecting cheaters,  remembering the 
location of edible plants, hitting game animals with projectiles, identifying objects, assessing 
the character of self and others, acquiring language, thwarting enemies, and so on (Cosmides 
and Tooby, 2003:59).
According  to  Tooby and  Cosmides,  adaptive  problems  have  two defining  characteristics. 
Firstly,  they  are  recurrent  conditions  in  the  environment,  meaning  that  most  individual 
ancestors encountered them, and that these conditions reappeared again and again over the 
evolutionary history of our species. Secondly,  they are ‘a subset of enduring relationships’ 
that could, in principle, be exploited by a property of an organism in order to increase its 
chances for successful reproduction. Those problems could, in other words, be met with an 
adaptive response, thereby endowing the organism with an advantage in terms of reproductive 
success. (Cosmides and Tooby, 2003:59).
Adaptive problems are, by their very nature, species-specific.  Since different species have 
different sets of affordances (cf. Gibson, 1979), the reproductive opportunities and obstacles 
they encounter will, of course, be very different. Therefore, just as perceptual abilities do not 
evolve in an organism in order to provide it with a neutral window on the world, but rather in 
order to detect what matters for that particular organism, so cognitive abilities evolved in the 
light  of  a  particular  set  of  challenges  that  the  environment  holds  for  a  certain  type  of 
organism. This results in a particular species-specific way of framing the perceptual input – a 
particular  grasp  of  the  world  –  directly  related  to  the  adaptive  problems  encountered 
throughout the evolutionary history of a species. 
4.2.3 Particular intuitive assumptions about the world
Our innate, cognitive predisposition to carve up the world in a certain way and our various 
intuitive theories about the world are, therefore, shaped in the light of the particular adaptive 
problems  faced  by  our  ancestors.  They  provide  us  with  a  framework  that  enabled  our 
ancestors to thrive in their environment, increasing the efficiency to use it to their benefit. 
They do not,  however,  as indicated in the previous section,  provide us with scientifically 
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correct assumptions about the world. Indeed, they are not shaped to enlighten us with the true, 
objective structures of reality, but to endow us with assumptions that work to our benefit in 
terms of survival and reproduction in the particular environment we have occupied throughout 
our evolutionary history. Our intuitive framing of the perceptual input gathered through our 
senses is, therefore, both fallible and thoroughly species-specific.
5. Conclusion
This chapter set out to investigate the way in which we intuitively view (i.e. perceive and 
understand) the world. In order to do this, I looked at perception and cognition. Adopting a 
naturalistic perspective, I reasoned from the prevailing scientific account of those abilities, 
casting them in an evolutionary context. 
Regarding perception, I argued that we perceive but part of the external world (perceptual 
closure),  that  we  perceive  this  part  in  a  particular  way  (the  contingent  relation  between 
perceptual cause and perceptual content) and that our sensory apparatuses actively contribute 
to  the  content  of  the  percept.  Therefore,  it  follows  that  what  we  perceive  is  a  radically 
incomplete and species-specific representation of the world.
Regarding cognition, I argued that we are endowed with an innate predisposition to interpret 
our perceptual input in a particular way. Our mind intuitively carves up the world and applies 
different  modes  of  thinking  to  different  categories.  This  results  in  a  variety  of  intuitive 
theories about the world, which are incorrect from a scientific point of view.
Both our perceptual and cognitive abilities are, indeed, the product of evolution by natural 
selection, entailing that they have evolved in response to particular aspects of the environment 
which mattered to our particular organisms in terms of survival and reproduction throughout 
our evolutionary history. These abilities evolved to provide us with the right input and the 
right way of processing this input for appropriate action schemes in our natural environment.  
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This leaves us with both a particular, incomplete input (perception) and particular intuitive 
assumptions about the world (cognition).
Therefore, our intuitive view of the world, as the result of both the senses and the cognitive 
predispositions with which we are endowed, is a thoroughly particular one. Indeed, we are 
perceptually closed to parts of the world, and what we perceive comes to us in a particular 
way. Furthermore, the way we interpret this perception is the result of innate predispositions 
providing us with intuitive theories about the world that are at odds with modern science. We 
are, in other words, encapsulated – on a commonsensical level – in a contingent,  species-
specific scope on the world, as a direct consequence of the evolutionary road we took. This 
view is not imposed upon us merely by the structures of the world (as it  is based on our 
particular and incomplete perception of the world and our intuitive assumptions, which are 
contradicted by modern science) and is not the only possible representation (meaning that 
organisms with a  different  perceptual  and cognitive  make-up could  view the same world 
differently).8 Indeed, in the same way as every other organism on this planet, we grasp the 
world - on an intuitive level – in a specific way that does not yield an accurate, objective and 
complete representation of it. 
8 Cf. Definition of ‘particular’ in the introduction of this chapter.
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Chapter  2:  The  Lorenzian  fallacy:  deducing  truth  from 
functionality
1. Introduction
In this chapter I will outline the argument of Konrad Lorenz (1941, 1973) which states that,  
since  our  perceptual  and  mental  abilities  are  the  product  of  natural  selection,  the 
representation  of  the  world  they  provide  us  with  must  be  accurate.  This  argument,  very 
influential in evolutionary epistemology9, contradicts the conclusion of the previous chapter 
that our intuitive representation of the world is particular and therefore does not correspond in 
any straightforward way to the structures of the external world.
I will argue that this central argument of evolutionary epistemology is fallacious. In order to 
support this position, I will look at Alvin Plantinga’s (1993) argument against evolutionary 
naturalism,  pointing out the fact  that isolated beliefs remain outside of natural  selection’s 
radar.  Furthermore,  I  will  ask  whether  rationality  is  automatically  fitness  enhancing. 
Following Stich (1990),  I  will  argue that  in some cases natural  selection will  not lead to 
rationality. In this context, I will point at cognitive biases that we appear to succumb to, and 
throw an evolutionary light on them, as well as at non-cognitive purposes that belief-forming 
serves.
The mechanism of evolution by natural selection will also be taken into account. Drawing 
from the fact that variation is generated randomly and the selection of particular traits and 
abilities are both dependent on an organism’s evolutionary history (path-dependency) and its 
particular environment, I will argue that this does not guarantee us the accuracy of our gene-
based representation of the world. Moreover, I will point towards the existence of genetic drift 
and genetic ‘hitch-hiking’ which allows for certain traits and abilities to spread, regardless of 
their adaptive value.
9 Evolutionary epistemology, in the context of this dissertation, refers to the research program, labelled 
‘evolution of epistemic mechanisms’ by Bradie (1986) (cf. Introduction).
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Finally,  I  will  argue that  the  Lorenzian  argument  – inferring the  accuracy of  our  mental 
representation a priori from the fact that there must be a connection between adaptations and 
the environment, and that our mental faculties must be adapted – fails in principle because of 
a lack of external perspective.
2. Lorenz’s evolutionary epistemology
At the dawn of World War II, Konrad Lorenz (1941), an Austrian biologist,  published an 
article that proposed a radical new perspective on traditional epistemological questions by 
situating  them  in  a  Darwinian  context.  In  this  article,  Lorenz  attempts  to  provide  an 
evolutionary  account  of  the  working  of  our  cognitive  mechanisms  and  points  out  the 
consequences that this holds for our epistemic endeavours. While similar approaches have 
been  hinted  at  by  Herbert  Spencer  (1855),  Charles  Darwin  (1871)  himself  and  famous 
pragmatists such as William James (1890) and John Dewey (1910), Lorenz was the first to 
elaborate this view and to offer empirical evidence in support of it. 
Despite its importance and implications, however, it remained largely unknown for over three 
decades. The world was at war, Lorenz was Austrian, and to make matters worse he joined the 
Nazi party and published pseudo-scientific writings supporting Nazi ideology. However, more 
than  three  decades  later,  Lorenz’s  groundbreaking  work  in  the  field  of  biology  was 
recognised,  and  he  was  awarded  a  Nobel  Prize,  together  with  his  colleagues  Nikolaas 
Tinbergen and Karl von Frish. He officially apologised for his previous political opinions and 
was embraced by the world as one of the founders of a new science: ‘ethology’ -  the study of 
animal cognition and behaviour. 
In this  section,  I  will  outline what  I  refer  to as ‘the Lorenzian  argument’,  at  the core of 
evolutionary epistemology10, stating that: 
10 When referring to evolutionary epistemology, I aim at those theories reasoning about human knowledge from 
the premise that the cognitive abilities underlying it are the outcome of biological evolution. As pointed out (cf.  
General  introduction),  a  distinct  program also  runs  by the  name of  evolutionary epistemology,  drawing an 
analogy between the evolution of ideas or theories and biological evolution by means of blind variation and 
selective retention. These theories, developed by thinkers as Popper (1972) and Campbell (1974), are not our 
concern here.
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Since our perceptual and cognitive apparatus, providing us with a representation of the 
world,  are  the  result  of  evolution  by  natural  selection,  the  structures  of  this 
representation must – at least approximately – match the structures of the world itself, 
because being endowed with an accurate representation of the world increases one’s 
biological fitness and therefore the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms allowing for 
this accurate representation must have been selected. 
2.1 Ontogenetic a priori as a phylogenetic a posteriori
2.1.1 Adaptations as representations
Lorenz (1941) starts his argument by stating that all features of organisms ‘mirror’ nature. 
Indeed,  he  claims,  the  process  of  natural  selection  has  adapted  these  features  to  the 
environment  in  which  the organism lives.  The eye  reflects  the laws of  optics  in  its  very 
structure, the shape of a fish reflects the laws of hydrodynamics, and the anatomy of a bird’s 
wings those of aerodynamics. All characteristics of an organism, shaped by the process of 
natural selection, reflect the elements of the environment to which they are adapted. 
In this regard, Peter Munz (1993) views organisms as ‘embodied theories’. The organism, he 
claims,  incarnates  theories  about  the  environment  -  it  reflects  ‘knowledge’  about  the 
environment. According to Munz, however, this does not mean that the organism mirrors or 
even describes those parts of the world to which it is adapted, but merely, that some properties 
of  the  organism  disclose  information  about  certain  properties  of  the  environment.  The 
hydrodynamic shape of fish does not describe water, let alone mirror it, but tells us something 
about  the properties  of  water  in  relation  to locomotion.  This representation,  of course,  is 
neither verbal nor conscious. It is expressed through an organism’s anatomical structure and 
behavioural programming. 
In this sense, it is embodied, not disembodied – meaning that it cannot be separated from the 
organism expressing it. When the kingfisher dives into the water to catch a fish, it does so by 
correcting the angle of refraction. However, it does not  know Snell’s law – calculating the 
angle of the refraction of light when it passes from air to water – but, that knowledge is,  
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unconsciously and in a non-verbal, non-mathematical way, present in its genetic constitution, 
triggering a particular action-scheme when it spots a fish from above (154-158). This is what 
is meant by ‘incarnated knowledge’ or ‘embodied theory’. Adaptations, in this perspective, 
are representations of aspects of the world.
2.1.2 A non-arbitrary a priori
Lorenz (1941) argues that human perceptual and cognitive structures are no exception. Our 
mental  a  priori,  structuring  data  into  (conscious)  knowledge,  has  evolved through natural 
selection  in  the  same  way as  every  other  characteristic  or  ability  of  any organism.  This 
implies,  according to  Lorenz,  that  they  are  not  arbitrary.  Just  as  any other  feature  of  an 
organism reflects or represents the structures of the elements of the environment to which 
they are adapted, so do our perceptual and cognitive abilities.
Just as the hoof of the horses is adapted to the ground of the steppe which it copes 
with,  so  our  central  nervous  apparatus  for  organizing  our  image  of  the  world  is 
adapted  to  the  real  world  with  which  man  has  to  cope.  Just  like  any organ,  this 
apparatus has attained its  expedient species-preserving form through this coping of 
real with the real during a species history many eons long (Lorenz, 1941:124).
 In other words, our perceptual and cognitive systems are shaped by natural selection to cope 
with  the  external  world.  Therefore,  he  argues,  it  must  provide  us  with  an  accurate 
representation of reality, allowing us to make true inferences about what really is the case. If, 
indeed, our mental abilities did not represent reality in a truthful way, Lorenz argues, they 
could never have evolved. Organisms endowed with perceptual and cognitive structures that 
did not lead to a truthful representation of reality would have less than average chances for 
survival  and  reproduction.  Therefore  the  genes  responsible  for  these  inaccurate 
representations  of  reality  would  soon  be  weeded  out  of  the  gene-pool.  Natural  selection 
shapes every organism to ‘fit’ their environment - similarly it has shaped our mental a priori 
to ‘fit’ the world around us, i.e. to yield a truthful representation of objective reality. 
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In  this  context,  Lorenz  casts  the  Kantian  a  priori  –  our  innate  perceptual  and  analytical 
structuring of external data – in an evolutionary light. Lorenz agrees with Kant that we are 
endowed with a mental a priori - we do not merely absorb reality as it is, but actively structure 
it, both through perception and understanding. He denies, however, that these perceptual and 
analytical structures are necessary and universal. According to Lorenz, they are the product of 
evolution  by natural  selection  and are  therefore  ‘tuned’  to  the external  constraints  of  the 
world. This entails that they are no longer necessary, nor arbitrary – as Kant considered them 
– but become particular and reliable. Indeed, whereas Kant considered the structures through 
which we mould reality as universal – every rational or thinking being would, in his opinion, 
perceive and understand reality through those structures – but arbitrary – there was no way of 
conceiving why we structure reality the way we do - Lorenz explains this a priori as the result 
of  natural  selection.  In  this  regard,  it  is  no  longer  necessary  or  universal,  since  it  is  an 
adaptation of a particular organism, but it  also loses its arbitrary character,  for it must be 
shaped to provide us with an accurate representation of the world. 
2.1.3 The experience of the lineage
Therefore, what is a priori – prior to experience – from an ontogenetic level (the level of the  
organism), becomes a posteriori – posterior to experience – on a phylogenetic level (the level 
of the species) (Wuketits, 1990). We might look at reality through spectacles that structure it 
and therefore not see the world as it is in itself, but evolution by natural selection entails that 
the world itself shaped these spectacles, and therefore ensures that the picture of reality they 
provide us with is a truthful one. The particular way in which we perceive and understand 
reality is the result of the experience gathered by our species through evolution.  Accurate 
ways of representing reality are kept at the expense of inaccurate ones. As Lorenz phrases it:
The ‘spectacles’ of our modes of thought and perception, such as causality, substance, 
quality, time and place, are functions of a neuro-sensory organization that has evolved 
in the service of survival. When we look through these ‘spectacles’, therefore, we do 
not see, as transcendental idealists  assume, some unpredictable  distortion of reality 
which does not correspond in the least with things as they really are, and therefore 
cannot be regarded as an image of the outer world (Lorenz, 1977:7).  
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The Lorenzian argument, therefore, rejects both empiricism and transcendental idealism. As 
Buskes (1998) explains, the empiricist’s tenet, claiming that all knowledge is derived from 
experience, is false, because humans – like any other organism for that matter – are endowed 
with innate,  a priori knowledge. Kant’s transcendental  idealism, on the other hand, which 
argues that the world in itself is necessarily beyond our ken since it is moulded by the subject,  
is – according to the Lorenzian epistemologist – equally mistaken, because our perceptual and 
cognitive apparatus conform to a pre-structured world by the process of natural selection (43). 
Indeed, according to Hoffmeyer (1993), with every generation, a meeting between the species 
and its environment occurs – each time with a different outcome – as every generation passes 
on  a  different  set  of  genetic  material  to  the  next  generation.  The  genes  that  provide  an 
organism with the best ways of coping with the environment will be more present in the next 
generation than in the previous one, because the organisms endowed with these genes are 
more successful in reproducing. Every single generation, however, is faced with a unique set 
of conditions,  since environments are constantly changing. This means,  from the point of 
view of the lineage or the gene-pool of the species, that it constantly adapts in response to the 
experience it gathers from the confrontation of every generation with the environment (21-
22).
This ongoing experience of the lineage through consecutive generations, it is argued, ensures 
a correspondence between cognition and nature. While we are endowed with an a priori (an 
innate  way  of  perceiving  and  understanding  the  world;  in  other  words,  the  ‘spectacles’ 
through which we view the world) that we cannot transcend on the ontogenetic level,  the 
process of evolution by natural selection entails that this a priori is the product of a posteriori  
knowledge (i.e. knowledge gained from experience) on the phylogenetic level. The lineage, in 
other  words,  acquires  knowledge  of  the  ‘world  in  itself’  through  experience,  and  this 
knowledge  is  reflected  in  the  working  of  our  perceptual  and  cognitive  abilities.  The 
representation of the world they provide us with must,  therefore,  correspond to the world 
itself. 
46
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
In this regard, the view of the world that emerges from our perceptual and cognitive abilities 
can be  seen,  according to  Vollmer  (1984),  as  hypotheses  about  the structures  of  the real 
world.  These hypotheses are unconscious and uncritical,  and therefore utterly incorrigible. 
However,  through  the  process  of  evolution  by  natural  selection,  (heavily)  mistaken 
hypotheses soon die out and are replaced by better trials and better conjectures, enhancing the 
chances of survival and reproduction. Indeed, if these ‘a priori conjectures’ about the world 
are relevant for survival and reproduction, natural selection will gradually improve them, as it 
does for any other characteristic of the organism. This process of trial and error; mutation and 
selection,  must  eventually  lead  to  a  far-reaching  similarity  between  an  organism’s 
representation of reality  and the objective  structures of reality  (75).  So,  at  least,  goes the 
argumentation of many evolutionary epistemologists (see also Wuketits, 1990:88). 
2.1.4 The enigmatic congruence between mind and the world
This view of natural selection ensuring the correspondence between our mental a priori and 
the  external  world,  offers  an  explanation  to  a  philosophical  conundrum that  has  baffled 
philosophers for ages and that has led to a wide variety of theories. How is it possible that our  
mental structures apply to the external world? How, in other words, can external events and 
properties be predicted on the basis of a priori, mental models? Why is – as Galileo (1623) 
phrased it – the great book of nature written in the language of mathematics? 
Plato  (380  B.C.)  thought  this  ability  originated  in  the  pre-existence  of  the  soul,  which 
contemplated the Ideas – the essence of reality – freely, before being cast in an earthly body. 
Descartes (1641) ‘proved’ the existence of a perfect God – and therefore one that would not 
deceive us – to explain why our innate ideas enable us to understand reality. Leibniz (1704) 
invoked a ‘pre-established harmony’ between the subject and the objective world as given by 
the hand of God. Kant’s (1781) transcendental philosophy turns the tables on these traditional 
approaches, and holds that our cognitive structuring does not match the world, but rather that 
it is the experienced world – through the categories of perception and understanding – that 
matches our cognitive structuring. Our mind – in other words – is not shaped to unveil the 
objective structures of reality, but our subjective experience of reality is shaped in a way that 
allows us to acquire knowledge of it. Lorenzian evolutionary epistemology, on the other hand, 
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explains this congruence between our cognitive structures and external reality through the 
process of adaptation. Our mental a priori, it claims, is the product of a process shaping it in 
accordance with the external world. 
2.2 Hypothetical realism
The claim that the representation of the world that we acquire through our ‘a priori veil’ – i.e.  
through our perceptual and cognitive apparatus – matches the structures of the real world, can 
therefore, according to the Lorenzian argument, not be doubted. In the meantime – as Lorenz 
(1941, 1973) was fully aware  – natural selection does not ensure an autonomous and absolute 
validity of man’s grasp of reality. They do not have a priori validity; they are not necessarily 
true, nor infallible, but merely provide us with decent approximations of what really is the 
case. In other words, they provide us with a truthful ‘basic’ representation of the world, but 
not one that mirrors the world in all its inherent complexity. 
This approximate character of cognition is elegantly illustrated by Lorenz in the following 
comparison:
[Just  as]  the  ‘dots’  produced by the  coarse  ‘screens’  used  in  the  reproductions  of 
photographs  in  our  daily  papers  are  satisfactory  representations  when  looked  at 
superficially, but cannot stand closer inspection with a magnifying glass, [so], too, the 
reproductions of the world by our forms of intuition and categories break down as 
soon as they are required to give a somewhat closer representation of their  objects 
(Lorenz, 1941:128). 
Therefore, it is argued, evolutionary epistemology leads to ‘hypothetical realism’ (Vollmer, 
1984:78). It concludes, from the fact that our cognitive system is shaped by natural selection, 
that there is a far-reaching agreement – albeit an incomplete and imperfect approximation – 
between the objective structures of the world and our mental reconstruction of those structures 
through perception and cognition. 
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Vollmer (1984) points out the impossibility of a perfect agreement. Such an ideal adaptation, 
he claims, is not necessary for survival, and could only occur at a very high cost. Evolutionary 
change does not come for free. Homo sapiens’ increased brain power necessitated an equally 
increased amount of nutrients to keep the organism going. Therefore, there is always a trade-
off  between  advantages  procured  by a  new ability  or  physical  trait  and  the  cost  of  this 
adaptation.  Furthermore,  he  claims,  a  perfect  fit  would  mean  a  very  rigid  ‘reflection’  of 
nature, leaving no chance of survival in the case of environmental changes (78). 
This  hypothetical  realism  forms  the  backbone  of  Lorenzian  evolutionary  epistemology. 
Admitting that our representation of the world might never match the world itself perfectly, it 
argues that  it  must  nevertheless  be a decent  approximation of it  (see Lorenz 1941, 1971; 
Vollmer 1975, 1984; Riedl 1984b; Oeser 1987; Wuketits 1990). This train of thought is at the 
core of Quine’s famous quote with respect to the infamous problem of induction.
If people’s innate spacing of qualities is a gene-linked trait, then the spacing that has 
made  for  the  most  successful  inductions  will  have  tended to  predominate  through 
natural selection. Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but 
praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind (Quine, 1969:126).
At first glance, within the framework of evolution by natural selection, this claim seems very 
plausible. How, indeed, could a more accurate representation of the world - a more correct  
way of inducing - not profit an organism in terms of survival and reproduction? However, as I 
will argue, this view commits the fallacy of deducing the truthfulness of our representation of 
the world from its mere functionality with regards to biological fitness. In order to show this, I 
will first point out that natural selection, only shaping perceptual and cognitive abilities to 
produce desired behaviour  (cf.  previous chapter),  cannot  be expected  to yield  true beliefs 
about the world automatically. In doing so, I will give an overview of the possible relations 
between beliefs and behaviour, based on Plantinga’s (1993) argument against evolutionary 
naturalism. Moreover, I will argue, the assumption that true inferences have more survival 
and reproductive value than false ones is not as self-evident as it  appears. Furthermore,  a 
closer look at variation as the motor of adaptation, and the importance of both the particular 
elements  of  the  environment  and previously acquired  traits  in  the  selection  of  new ones, 
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points  to  the  constitution  of  an  imperfect  and  very  particular,  species-specific  way  of 
representing reality. 
3. Uncovering the fallacy
3.1 Plantinga’s case against evolutionary naturalism
Alvin Plantinga (1993, 1994) caused quite a stir with an analytical argument claiming that 
evolutionary naturalism is self-defeating. At first glance, this seems an outrageous and even 
absurd claim. Indeed, it is precisely the theory of evolution that provides a naturalistic account 
of  the  organic  world,  its  apparent  design,  and even the  appearance  of  mind.  As Richard 
Dawkins (1986:6-7), the famous British evolutionary scientist, points out, atheism might have 
been logically tenable  in the pre-Darwinian era,  but it  is  nevertheless  Darwin’s theory of 
evolution by natural selection that made it possible to be ‘an intellectually fulfilled atheist’. 
Indeed, how could one have explained the obvious order and design in nature, the fact that all 
organisms are interdependent  on each other  and that  one species  – namely our own – is 
endowed  with  conscious  thought,  before  Darwinism  entered  the  stage?  How  could  this 
undeniable  design  in  nature  be  the  product  of  mindless  causality  in  a  purely  material 
universe?
Plantinga (1994), however, detects in this inseparable pair, i.e. evolution and naturalism, a 
core of contradiction. Naturalism – meaning that there is no supernatural entity involved in 
the world – and evolution, he claims, are at odds with each other. Indeed, if both are true, the 
probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low or at least inscrutable – meaning that 
we cannot assess their  reliability (1). For Plantinga,  cognitive faculties  are reliable  if  ‘the 
great  bulk’  of  its  deliverances  are  true.  If  naturalism  is  true,  there  is  no  God  or  other  
supernatural entity creating mankind in its image and therefore ensuring us that our reasoning 
faculties are reliable. Evolutionary naturalism entails that all organisms, including mankind 
and its cognitive faculties, are the result of selected random variation (2-3). The problem that 
brings us to the core of the argument is that – as pointed out – natural selection does not care 
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about  beliefs,  only  about  behaviour.  Believing  something  does  not  enhance  survival  and 
reproductive success; only particular behaviour does. Therefore in order for natural selection 
to have ‘a grip’ on cognitive faculties, they have to be causally related to behaviour. 
3.1.1 Possible relations between beliefs and behaviour
Plantinga (1994) goes on to enumerate the possible relations between beliefs and behaviour. 
The first possibility is known as ‘epiphenomenalism’. Under this view, beliefs cannot exert 
any influence on the material world. They are in no way connected with behaviour, since only 
matter  can change matter,  not mind.  This is  one way of solving the infamous body-mind 
problem which asks how mind could be connected with matter. It claims that they are two 
completely different  and separate  substances.  There is  no interaction  whatsoever.  On this 
perspective, of course, the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low, since 
natural selection won’t have any grip on them (6-7). 
The second possibility is known as ‘semantic epiphenomenalism’. Beliefs do have a causative 
link to behaviour. However, they cause behaviour not in virtue of their semantic properties – 
their  content  or  meaning  –  but  only  in  virtue  of  their  syntactic  properties.  Behaviour  is 
influenced by electrochemical properties in the brain, not by the content these electrochemical 
properties cause us to believe. The proposition itself - the statement which can either be true 
or  false  -  remains,  in  this  view,  out  of  the  grip  of  evolution.  Therefore,  once  again,  the  
probability is low that the beliefs produced by our cognitive faculties are reliable (7-9).
The third possibility is that our beliefs cause behaviour – both semantically and syntactically 
–  so  the  content  of  our  beliefs  influence  behaviour,  but  these  beliefs  are  maladaptive. 
Organisms would be better off without them. Of course, in this case too, the probability that 
beliefs  are  reliable  is  low,  since  they  actually  prevent  appropriate  behaviour  and  natural 
selection would strive to eliminate them (9).
The final possibility is the one adhered to in our commonsense thinking about the relation 
between behaviour and beliefs or body and mind, and is the one underlying the Lorenzian 
school of thought which links cognition and reality. It states that our beliefs cause behaviour, 
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semantically and syntactically, and that these beliefs are adaptive. In other words, our beliefs 
lead to appropriate behaviour. In this case, natural selection does have a grip on beliefs. It  
selects those that lead to appropriate behaviour and eliminates those that do not (10). In this 
regard, one is tempted to conclude – as do the above mentioned evolutionary epistemologists 
– that our beliefs must be, at least to some extent, reliable, since it seems almost indubitable 
that the more reliable a belief is, the more appropriate the resulting behaviour will be. How, 
indeed, could mistaken beliefs about the world lead to better behaviour in the world? 
3.1.2 Belief-cum-desire systems
However, as Plantinga (1993) argues, the probability that these beliefs would be accurate isn’t 
nearly as high as one would be inclined to think. The reason he offers in support of this is that 
behaviour is not only caused by belief but also by desire. In this light, any kind of adaptive 
action could be caused by a wide variety of ‘belief-cum-desire’ combinations. To illustrate 
this, he gives the example of a prehistoric hominid, Paul, running away from a hungry tiger. 
This  appropriate  action,  however,  can  be  caused  by  a  lot  of  different  belief-desire 
combinations, leaving no guarantee as to the reliability of the isolated beliefs.
Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always 
runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely the tiger he sees 
will  eat  him.  This  will  get  his  body parts  in  the  right  place  so  far  as  survival  is 
concerned, without involving much by way of true belief. … Or perhaps he thinks the 
tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussy cat and wants to pet it; but he also thinks the 
best way to pet it is to run away from it. … or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a regularly 
recurring illusion, and, hoping to keep his weight down, has formed the resolution to 
run a mile at top speed whenever presented with such an illusion; or perhaps he thinks 
he is about to take part in a 1600m race, wants to win, and believes the appearance of 
the tiger is the starting signal; or perhaps… . Clearly there are any number of belief-
cum-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behavior (Platinga, 1993:225-226).
These examples, of course, strike us as very implausible. The point they are trying to make,  
however, is right on the mark. Since natural selection only shapes perceptual and cognitive 
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abilities  to  yield  particular  behavioural  schemes  that  favour  an  organism’s  chances  for 
successful reproduction, we cannot assume that this process provides us with accurate beliefs. 
As shown in the previous chapter, flawed beliefs in folk physics or biology can provide a 
suitable basis for behavioural interaction with the environment that is highly adaptive. 
3.1.3 Conclusion
Plantinga concludes, therefore, that since these four possibilities are jointly exhaustive, and 
since all lead to the conclusion that, reasoning from an evolutionary naturalistic perspective, 
the reliability of our beliefs are low or at least inscrutable, evolutionary naturalism is self-
defeating.  Indeed,  it  is  itself  a  belief,  and thus  the  probability  of  it  being  true  is  low or  
inscrutable,  leading  to  the  conclusion  that,  from an  evolutionary  naturalistic  perspective, 
evolutionary naturalism is improbable. To this perceived self-defeating aspect of evolutionary 
naturalism later, however, I will return later (cf. Chapter 6). 
At this point, Plantinga’s argument is offered in support of the claim that evolution in no way 
cares for the truth of the interpretations held by the organism it shapes. There is absolutely no 
way of deriving the truth or accuracy of our beliefs about reality from the fact that they are the 
product  of  abilities  shaped  by  natural  selection,  precisely  because  natural  selection  only 
shapes cognition to yield appropriate behaviour.11 In short, the mindless process of evolution 
by means of natural selection is driven by survival and reproduction, and these cannot account 
for the truthfulness of our representation of the world. In some cases, as I will argue below, it  
can even be shown to prevent rational or true beliefs.
11 A similar argument is held by the neurophysiologist and philosopher of mind, Patricia Churchland (1987). She 
claims that the main function of human brains is to allow the organisms to move in appropriate ways – this  
means to make the organism succeed in ‘the four F’s’: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. Another way  
of representing the world will only be selected for as long as ‘it is geared’ to the organism’s biological needs,  
increasing its chances for survival and reproduction (548).
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3.2 Natural selection and rationality
3.2.1 Lorenzian evolutionary epistemology’s problematic assumptions
The philosopher Stephen Stich (1990), points out that the common argument of (Lorenzian) 
evolutionary epistemology – i.e. that natural selection guarantees the accuracy of our beliefs 
or the rationality of our thinking – is mistaken. There are, indeed, two unproven assumptions 
in this claim - firstly, that evolution produces optimally well-designed systems, and secondly,  
that an optimally well-designed system is a rational one. Both statements appear problematic 
under closer examination (56).
The  first  statement  claims  that  since  the  process  of  natural  selection  selects  the  genes 
endowing  the  organism  with  the  highest  chance  for  survival  and  reproduction,  it  will 
eventually yield the best possible cognitive system for that organism - the best in terms of 
biological  fitness,  that is.  In this  light,  one can say that a cognitive system is better  than 
another when it enhances an organism’s chances for survival and reproduction to a greater 
extent. 
The second statement claims that such an optimally well-designed system must be a rational 
one, meaning that it produces good reasoning or just inferences, yielding a true representation 
of the world. This is the main argument of the evolutionary epistemologists cited above. A 
system that is biologically fit must be a rational cognitive system and produce at least  an 
approximately accurate representation of what really is the case. The more a system is fitness 
enhancing, they argue, the more rational it will be. Why? Because having true beliefs rather 
than false ones increases an organism’s chance of survival and reproduction. 
3.2.2 Does evolution produce optimally well designed systems?
With respect to the first statement, things are not as straightforward as they appear. It can be  
said that a cognitive system is better  than another one when the ‘input/output  pairings’ it 
provides enhances an organism’s chances for reproductive success (Stich, 1990:60). However, 
there is another factor to take into consideration. A cognitive system will also be better than 
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another one if it offers the same biological fitness to the organism at a lower cost. This is  
pointed out by Elliott Sober (1981). There are both external and internal considerations to take 
into account in order to assess biological fitness. 
External considerations look at the effectiveness in achieving the intended purpose (in this 
case, survival and reproduction) and internal considerations look at the costs - the amount of 
resources the system requires (in this case the demands on the memory,  energy and other 
resources of the organism).  At some point,  the benefit  of additional  information extracted 
from the environment will not weigh up against the additional resources this requires from the 
organism. Fitness, in this regard, is not just a function of the abilities of an organism, but also 
of the demands these abilities make. 
Therefore, the best possible cognitive system will not automatically be selected. There is a 
trade-off between external fitness of the system – how well the abilities enhance survival and 
reproduction in a given environment – and internal fitness – how much these abilities cost the 
organism or  how much  resources  have  to  be  committed  to  the  particular  abilities  which 
therefore  cannot  be  spent  on  other  needs.  This  argument,  however,  is  accepted  by  most 
Lorenzian  evolutionary  epistemologists  and  is  often  mentioned  in  order  to  point  out  a 
‘hypothetical realism’ (cf. Vollmer, 1984). The second assumption, on the other hand, is non-
negotiable  for  Lorenzian  epistemologists.  The  process  of  natural  selection  shapes  our 
cognitive system to yield a true representation of the world. Stich will point out cases where 
this statement fails. 
3.2.3 Are optimally well designed systems rational ones? 
Stich (1990) claims that the best possible system – in terms of biological  fitness – is not 
automatically the most rational one – i.e. the most reliable inferential system. Even if one 
system is less reliable than another one – i.e. in that it produces less accurate beliefs – it is 
nevertheless possible that it will exceed the more reliable system not only in terms of internal 
fitness – in that it could run more economically – but also in external fitness, and, therefore, 
will obviously be favoured by natural selection. 
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Stich starts by distinguishing between two different kinds of wrong inferences. The first one is 
to infer that something is the case, when in fact it is not. The second one is the opposite,  
inferring that something is not the case, when in fact it is. The former are referred to as ‘false  
positives’, while the latter are ‘false negatives’ (61). A false positive, for instance, would be to 
think a plant is poisonous when in fact it is not. A false negative, on the other hand, would be 
to think a plant is not poisonous when in fact it is. These strategically chosen examples bring 
us to the core of the argument. Some mistakes are cheap, while others are very expensive. In 
this case, the false positive would be relatively cheap – missed nutrition which has only a 
small negative impact on the general chances for survival and reproduction of the organism – 
while  the false negative would be very expensive,  intoxicating the organism and possibly 
ending its life. 
Therefore, as Stich points out, an inferential strategy bringing about a high level of external 
fitness would be very risk-averse when assessing which plants are poisonous and which are 
not. Such a conservative strategy would undoubtedly generate an important number of false 
positives, since it would consider a plant poisonous on relatively weak evidence (e.g. vague 
resemblance to a known poisonous plant, or even an assumption that it is poisonous based on 
a lack of information). Since false negatives, in this case, are lethal, and false positives are 
relatively ‘cheap’  mistakes,  the  inferential  system leading to the highest  level  of  external 
fitness would be one that makes a considerable number of cheap mistakes, thus avoiding the 
expensive ones. In this light, a system might provide more fitness to an organism and still 
make more mistakes, therefore being less reliable. The most reliable system would indeed be 
bound to make more expensive mistakes, since it would only strive to reduce the absolute 
number  of  mistakes  made,  without  distinguishing  between  kinds  of  mistakes  and  their 
respective  consequences.  Natural  selection,  therefore,  will  in  some cases  provide  us  with 
error-prone systems due to conservative strategies – yielding a substantial  amount of false 
positives as in the aforementioned example – rather than more reliable systems – yielding far 
fewer false positives at the cost of a few more false negatives (62). 
Of course, as Stich is fully aware, the ideal inferential  strategy would be one that always 
yields the right answer. However, as we pointed out above, such a system – even if it were 
available – would be very expensive in terms of internal fitness. Indeed, when the utility of 
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further  information  does  not  exceed  the  cost  which  this  additional  ability  entails  for  the 
organism in terms of energy, time, and so on, it will not be selected. Furthermore, it seems 
very dubitable to even suppose that this could in theory be possible, as the environment is 
continually subject to change. Other organisms evolve new ways of deception (i.e.  edible 
plants  evolve  characteristics  resembling  poisonous  ones  to  avoid  being  eaten),  predators 
evolve new camouflages, parasites new resistances, and so on. Therefore, danger detection is 
bound  to  be  imperfect  and  bound  to  make  a  trade-off  between  ‘overall  reliability’  and 
‘reliability when it matters’ (62-63). 
Since  natural  selection  does  not  care  in  the  slightest  for  truth,  but  only  for  reproductive 
success, it will not shape our cognitive system to provide us with the best possible grasp of 
what really is the case, only with inferences that – even when they’re often mistaken – guide 
our actions in such a way so as to maximise our chances for survival and reproduction.
3.2.4 Cognitive biases and error management theory
In this context, studies in cognitive sciences have brought to light a myriad of cognitive biases 
that human thinking is subject to. (Kahneman, Tversky, 1973; Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky, 
1982; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994; Sutherland, 1994). These ‘inevitable illusions’, as Piattelli-
Palmarini  (1994)  calls  them,  are  the  product  of  ‘heuristics’,  or  mental  strategies  for 
information processing, that in some cases lead to erroneous inferences. Just as in the case of 
visual illusions, we cannot help but fall into the trap of this predisposition towards irrational 
inferences in certain particular situations. In this sense, cognitive illusions are general, in that 
all human beings are subjected to them; systematic, in that they can be reproduced in different 
contexts; directional,  in that their  effects tend in one direction (i.e. rounding off, framing, 
segregating, and so on); and, as pointed out above, incorrigible by logic, in that even when we 
see  the  error,  we  are  still  spontaneously  inclined  to  make  it  again.  (Piattelli-Palmarini, 
1994:139-140). In the same way as our vision – most often reliable and accurate – can fool us 
in particular circumstances, so can  our cognitive abilities fool us under specific conditions. 
They evolved in order to provide us with accurate inferences in most cases, but in particular 
conditions they lead us systematically to mistaken inferences.
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A typical  example  of  such an  illusion  is  known as  ‘the  gambler  fallacy’.  When playing 
roulette,  after ten consecutive reds, people will be very tempted to bet on ‘black’, feeling 
they’re ‘overdue for black’. Of course, statistically,  chances remain 50/50. Another one is 
known as probability blindness. Apparently, we’re disposed to pay more for something that 
reduces the risk from one in a thousand to zero, than from two in a thousand to one in a 
thousand, or from four to three in a thousand. Another example of such ‘blindness’ is the 
difference in our perceived incentive to purchase extra lottery tickets, for instance, to increase 
the probability of winning, according to the range in which the probability hovers. We’ll be 
much less willing to buy extra tickets when our chances go up to 37% from 32%, than in the 
case where we can boost our chances to 99% from 94%. Mathematically, of course, the cost-
benefit  calculation  should be the same in both  cases:  a  5% gain  in  probability.  (Piatelli-
Palmarini, 1994:130-131).12
The cause of these biases, as Stich (1990) predicts, relates to both internal fitness - weighing 
general results against the cost supported by the system and endowing us with inferences that 
work in most cases, but which can break down in (atypical) particular circumstances – and 
external fitness – originating in the selective preference for biased reasoning, which leads to 
more  low-cost  errors,  rather  than  unbiased  reasoning,  which  reduces  the  total  amount  of 
errors, but results in more high-cost errors. 
This last consideration gave rise to what the psychologists Haselton and Buss (2000) labelled 
‘Error Management Theory’. Error management theory is a theory about judgements made 
under conditions of uncertainty. It predicts that if false positives and false negatives entailed 
different costs over the course of evolutionary history, natural selection will have biased our 
inferential system in order to reduce the amount of potential costs, regardless of the absolute 
number of mistakes this causes. Building on this insight, Haselton (2006), together with a 
fellow psychologist, Nettle, argues that the human psyche evolved into a ‘paranoid optimistic’ 
decision maker. Depending on the context – associated with a particular pattern of potential 
12 With respect to intuitively biased probalistic calculations, Gigerenzer and his colleagues point out that these 
apply more to a ‘Baysian’ than a ‘frequentist’ take on probability. Whereas Baysians view probability as the  
subjective degree of confidence one can have in predicting, frequentists view it as the frequency with which 
events occur in the world. When problems are formulated in terms of the latter framework, intuition seems to  
serve us better (Gigerenzer, 1991). Tooby and Cosmides point out that this can be explained in an evolutionary 
context, where our ancestors only encountered problems of the second kind. (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996).
58
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
benefits versus costs throughout evolutionary history – we either take a very conservative 
(paranoid) stance, and are not willing to take any chances, or, on the contrary, we appear to 
throw caution to the wind, ‘blinded’ by the anticipation of success. Cognitive biases, in this 
light, incite us to adopt a belief in one domain on much sparser evidence than a belief  in 
another domain. 
It has been shown, for instance, that we systematically underestimate the time-to-impact of 
approaching  sounds,  i.e.  we always  expect  the  object  to  arrive  faster  than  it  really  does 
(Neuhoff,  1998).  On  the  other  hand,  men  apparently,  have  a  tendency  to  overestimate 
women’s sexual intent towards them (Haselton & Buss, 2000). Both biases make sense in an 
evolutionary perspective. Indeed, with regard to the former, the additional cost of expecting 
the impact too soon is very low, whereas the risk of expecting it just a fraction of a second too 
late is, of course, rather high. Therefore, natural selection biased us to expect it too soon, 
leaving us prepared for what’s coming. As for men’s sexual ‘over perception’, it is similarly 
obvious  that  the  costs  of  missing  a  possibility  of  reproduction  is  very  high  in  terms  of 
biological fitness – which is directly linked to reproductive success – whereas the cost of 
overestimating the possibility of a sexual encounter rarely exceeds a slap on the cheek. 
3.2.5 Non-cognitive purposes
Tackling  the  question  as  to  whether  natural  selection  leads  to  rational  thinking  from  a 
different perspective, Peter Munz (1993) points out that theories often fulfil functions other 
than representing the environment,  stemming out of the obvious evolutionary incentive to 
extract useful elements and avoid harmful ones. Indeed, shared beliefs seem to play a crucial 
role in what Munz labels ‘non cognitive purposes’, such as, for instance, social bonding. False 
beliefs, in this context, will thrive precisely in virtue of this non-cognitive purpose. Indeed, 
because of their particular content which is adhered to by a particular group, these beliefs 
operate  to  set  out  boundaries  for  a  social  group,  including  believers  and excluding  non-
believers.  In  order  to  achieve  this  purpose,  these  beliefs  cannot  be obviously accurate  or 
truthful – rational – beliefs, because such beliefs would be accepted by any sound minded 
person, which, of course, defeats the whole purpose (169-170). 
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In this regard, it can be argued that natural selection has provided us with a cognitive system 
that  not  only  deals  with  reality  in  a  representative  way  –  a  way  that  incites  us  to  act 
appropriately – but that also forms irrational beliefs, satisfying other purposes. This aspect of 
human belief-forming is at the core of the wide variety of mythological, religious and other 
esoteric accounts of reality. While in the age of enlightenment such theories were often seen 
as primitive and superfluous in our scientific era, and as soon to be eradicated, it appears that  
they are not simply replaceable by rational, scientific thought. This is precisely because they 
stem from a different aspect of our cognitive system, adapted to fulfil other, non-cognitive 
purposes, such as providing social boundaries. The importance of such beliefs in delimiting 
social groups is, indeed, rather obvious throughout history, which has been infested by wars 
and conflicts based on religious and cultural differences. It is precisely this aspect of humanity 
that made Schopenhauer (1819) characterise man as ‘homo metaphysicus’. We do not limit 
the representation of our world to objective, realist descriptions, but seem to have a constant  
urge to go beyond what is manifestly given. 
3.2.6 Conclusion
We are  not  ‘programmed’  to  develop expectations  that  reflect  what  really  is  the  case  as 
accurately as possible, but to develop expectations that direct our actions in such a way so as 
to maximise our biological fitness. As Plantinga (1993) rightly claimed, natural selection does 
only have a grip on behaviour. Cognition,  as in expectation and belief-forming, is merely 
there to enable us to act in appropriate ways. Therefore, the central argument of evolutionary 
epistemology – that natural selection shaped our perceptual and cognitive abilities to yield an 
accurate representation of the world – fails. 
In this context, Stich (1990) shows that natural selection leads not only to less than optimally 
well designed systems (internal fitness), but, moreover, that optimally well designed systems 
in terms of fitness are not per se the most rational ones. Indeed, some cognitive schemata may 
generate a larger number of false beliefs than other schemata, and nevertheless endow us with 
‘fitter’ behaviour than the latter. When this is the case, these will be selected and leave us with 
biases, systematically deceiving us in a particular way. Finally, Munz (1993) points at non-
cognitive  purposes  that  our  belief-forming  system  serves.  Precisely  because  of  their 
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irrationality,  these  beliefs  will  be  adopted.  Therefore,  arguing  from  an  evolutionary 
perspective,  we cannot infer the rationality or accuracy of our representation of the world 
from the fact that this representation is the product of abilities evolved by natural selection. 
3.3 The mechanism of evolution
Besides these compelling arguments showing that biological fitness does not automatically 
imply truthful representations,  a closer look at  the mechanism of evolution itself  provides 
further reason to reject Lorenz’s claim. Indeed, as I will show below, the human mind, being 
the outcome of an evolutionary process in the same way as any other adaptation, must be both 
an imperfect and utterly particular organ.
3.3.1 Undirected variation
Evolution by natural selection happens because of the selective retention of genetic variation 
endowing organisms with phenotypic advantages (i.e. characteristics enhancing its chances 
for reproduction). But what causes variation? Darwin himself could not provide an answer to 
that  question.  However,  when Mendelian  genetics  –  uncovering  the  basic  mechanisms of 
inheritance – was combined with Darwinism, in what would become known as ‘the synthetic 
theory of evolution’ or ‘the modern synthesis’, the chips fell into place. 
The two main causes of variation are genetic mutation and genetic recombination.13 The first 
cause, mutation, happens in the case of a replication error in cell division. As Mayr (2001) 
points  out,  although  the  replication  of  DNA  molecules  during  cell  division  and  gamete 
formation is very accurate, the occasional error can occur. When this happens, DNA is altered 
and subsequently inherited, until a new error arises. The mutation can either be beneficial, 
neutral or deleterious to the chances of reproduction of the organism. When it is beneficial – 
which again is very rare – it will be favoured by natural selection and spread over the gene-
13 A third source  of  genetic  variation is the rare  case of  ‘unidirectional  lateral  transfer’  found in asexually  
reproducing bacteria, where a bacterium attaches itself to another bacterium and transfers some of its genes. 
Interestingly enough, this process apparently found its way into sexual reproduction, where one gene can move 
from  their  position  on  one  chromosome  to  another  chromosome.  Whether  this  phenomenon  is  common, 
however, is not yet known. (Mayr 2001:117).
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pool. This is the way in which genetic variation arises in asexual reproduction, where the 
offspring are clones of the reproducing organism (106-108).
With sexual reproduction, however, a new source of genetic variation enters the scene. In this 
case, the genes of both parent organisms are recombined in the offspring in a random fashion. 
The  result  is  a  unique  genotype,  different  from  either  parent  organism.  This  way  of 
reproducing  speeds  up  the  process  of  evolution  in  a  considerable  way,  providing  natural 
selection with a far greater number of new phenotypes to select from (114-115). However, as 
Dercole and Rinaldi (2008:9) point out, with only genetic recombination, where the genetic 
material  is  a  mix  of  the  parents  genes,  no  new  phenotypic  value  –  meaning  increased 
adaptation of a phenotype to a constant environment – can appear, other than those already 
observed or potentially observable by suitable mixing of individual genotypes.  In order to 
alter the gene-pool of a species, therefore, mutations are necessary. Mutations, in this regard, 
are the ultimate source of genetic variation.
What  matters  here,  however,  is  the  randomness  of  genetic  variation.  The  production  of 
variation  through  mutation  and  recombination  is  completely  and  utterly  undirected.14 
Variation arises independently of what is needed for adaptation. In this light, Mayr (2001:131-
132) characterises natural selection as a two-step process. It is both a process of chance or 
accident (the production of genetic variation) and determinism (the testing of this variation, 
resulting in the selective retention of beneficial variations to the detriment of others). 
Ridley (1993) argues that there are both factual and theoretical reasons to suppose variation is 
undirected.  The  factual  evidence  comes  from  laboratory  observation  of  spontaneous 
mutations.  These  do  not  arise  in  relation  to  the  adaptive  needs  of  the  organisms.  The 
theoretical reason, on the other hand, points at the inexistence of a genetic mechanism that 
could direct the right changes to happen. Such a mechanism, Ridley points out, would be 
practically  impossible.  The  organism  would  have  to  recognise  that  the  environment  has 
changed, infer what change is needed to adapt to these new conditions and then cause this 
14 Ridley (1993:79)  points  out,  however,  that  whereas  variation  is  random with respect  to  the  direction  of 
adaptation – meaning that the necessary adaptation can only be generated by chance – it does not exclude the 
possibility that mutations are non-random at the molecular level. When I characterise variation as random or 
undirected, I do so in relation to adaptation. 
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change to happen in the relevant  parts  of its  DNA.  In other  words,  they would have to 
describe a subject matter they have never encountered (a new environment) in a language they 
do not understand (the information encoded in DNA), ‘[l]ike a seventeenth century American 
using  Egyptian  hieroglyphics  to  describe  how  to  change  a  computer  program’  (Ridley, 
1993:78).
3.3.2 Evolution as a gradual, non-teleological process
As Mayr (2001) emphasises, natural selection is not goal-directed. It is a mindless or blind 
process  without  any  form  of  long-term  vision.  It  simply  eliminates,  repeatedly  in  each 
generation, genes that have proved less adaptive than others in their phenotypic effect. It does 
not, in other words, strive to gradually alter a simple bacterium into a complex, intelligent 
creature or to systematically improve the adaptations in a particular direction. Lineages often 
end in extinction or are driven in a radically different direction in response to a new challenge  
from the environment (133). 
There is, in this regard, absolutely no way of predicting how species will  evolve. Indeed, 
different  genotypes  within  a  species  may  respond  differently  to  the  same  change  of 
environment, making it unpredictable which genotypes are going to be selected. Furthermore, 
the changes in the environment, pushing the organisms to adapt, are completely unpredictable, 
and finally, there are no known genetic mechanisms that could produce teleological processes 
(133-134).
Moreover,  evolution  is  gradual.  This  means  that  every  single  genotypic  alteration  of  the 
phenotype has to procure an advantage to the organism in terms of reproductive fitness. A 
species can only acquire new characteristics and abilities as long as every little step in their 
constitution provides it with an advantage. In this sense, qualities that would be adaptive, but 
that require mutations that do not have a direct and immediate beneficial effect, cannot be 
selected,  and  neither  can  mutations  that  would  be  adaptive  in  combination  with  other 
mutations, but not on their own. Natural selection, in this sense, is an utterly myopic architect, 
only looking one step ahead. 
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All organisms, therefore, are contingent products of a blind process. They are the result of an 
endless chain of coincidences. Both the appearance of particular variation and the selective 
forces retaining the most fit alternatives in the light of particular conditions, are responsible 
for the evolution of a species. The evolutionary road that species take, in this regard, is the 
result of a completely and utterly undirected process. This process has no long term vision, 
but shapes organisms in an unpredictable, non-teleological and, therefore, imperfect way.
3.3.3 Path dependency
Adaptation is problem-solving, not engineering. When species develop new adaptations, these 
do  not  arise  out  of  nowhere,  but  rather  alter  the  existing  model  as  a  result  of  new 
requirements. All organisms have unnecessary, non-adaptive traits, such as, for instance, the 
femur bone of the whale or the human coccyx.  These are leftovers from the evolutionary 
history of the species and have not been cancelled out completely, because their presence is as 
good as neutral with regard to fitness. In this context, evolutionary biologists do not talk about 
intelligent, but rather about stupid design. Buskes (2006) illustrates this imperfect design with 
the vertebrate eye. Often cited as the most obvious example of complex design, it appears, 
however, under closer examination, to have a remarkable flaw. This is that the nerve fibres do 
not connect at the back of the eye (as is the case for the eye of the squid, for instance), but in 
the front, and from there move back again, through the retina, to the brain. Because of this 
design, there is a tiny hole in the retina, causing a blind spot in each eye. This problem is then 
solved by natural selection by combining the vision of both eyes, each with a different blind 
spot, which can therefore be neutralised in united vision (282). According to Badcock (2000), 
this imperfect design results from the fact that the light-sensitive skin cells  that gradually 
evolved into the vertebrate retina were under the skin, rather than on top of it (19). This is a 
perfect illustration of natural selection at work. Instead of optimally designing the eye for its 
purpose, it can only solve the problems created by a less than perfect design. Because it has 
no  foresight,  it  cannot  engineer  a  perfect  organ,  but  can  only  adapt  imperfect  organs  to 
particular problems. 
The reason for this is that evolution is path-dependent. It depends on what has already been 
acquired. New adaptations are selected not only in the light of the purpose they are selected 
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for, but also in the light of the basic design already in place. Evolution cannot erase parts of 
the existing blue-print in creating a new adaptation, but merely transforms the blue-print to fit  
new requirements as well as possible. In this context, the human dorsal column is apparently 
not as well suited for an upright position as it was for our four legged ancestors. When we 
starting  walking on our  two feet,  however,  natural  selection  could  not  rethink  the  whole 
structure, but merely adapted the existing structure to the new requirements, leaving quite a 
few people with a sore back (Buskes, 2006:282).
Path-dependency, therefore, is responsible for both sub-optimal design – as in the case of the 
vertebrate eye or the human dorsal column – and for the restriction of possible adaptations in 
the light of previous ones, resulting in characteristics and abilities that are continuous with the 
evolutionary history of the species.  Indeed, every acquired characteristic  or ability of any 
organism throughout evolutionary history bears the marks of past acquisitions, all the way 
down to the very structure of our cells. In this regard, our perceptual and cognitive abilities 
can be seen as particular ‘enhancements’ based on a primate model, which again is grounded 
in  a  mammalian  and  then  a  vertebrate  model,  all  the  way down to  the  first  prokaryotic  
organisms. This yields a particular and imperfect way of adapting to the environment. Indeed, 
as pointed out, a new environmental challenge will always be met by altering some of the 
traits  and  abilities  which  are  already  in  place,  not  by  starting  from  zero  and  selecting 
variations in the creation of an optimal new adaptation. Since it is often necessary to take a 
step back in order to take three forward, and natural selection cannot backtrack, species can 
and do get stuck in sub-optima. 
3.3.4 The environment
To what is an organism adapted? The common answer is that organisms are adapted to their 
environment. However, as pointed out in the previous chapter (cf. Chapter 1, 4.1.1 Detecting 
‘affordances’),  species  are  adapted  only to  particular  properties  of  the  environment.  Two 
different organisms living in the same environment, therefore, can be adapted to very different 
aspects  of  that  environment.  The  properties  of  the  environment  relevant  for  a  particular 
organism are what Gibson (1979) calls ‘affordances’. The specific set of affordances for a 
particular  organism  constitutes  its  niche.  Adaptations,  through  the  working  of  natural 
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selection, are therefore shaped to answer the challenges presented by this particular niche, 
with both its beneficial and harmful affordances. In this context, homo sapiens too – including 
its  perceptual  and  cognitive  abilities  –  is  adapted  to  particular  aspects  of  a  particular 
environment: its very own niche.15
 
Building on this insight, Gerhard Vollmer (1975, 1984) argues that we are, in the same way as 
any other organisms, endowed with a ‘cognitive niche’ – a part of the world with which we 
coped in our evolutionary history and to which our perceptual  and cognitive  apparatus is 
adapted. This niche in which we find ourselves, or this ‘umwelt’,  to use Uexküll’s (1909) 
term, is referred to by Vollmer as ‘mesocosm’. Evolutionary psychologists, on the other hand, 
argue  that  we  are  endowed  with  a  ‘stone-age  mind’,  often  very  poorly  adapted  to 
contemporary,  modern  living  conditions.  They  claim  that  much  of  human  behavioural 
dispositions and intuitions about the world are the outcome of psychological and cognitive 
mechanisms  adapted  to  our  ancestor’s  way of  life.  (Barkow,  Tooby  & Cosmides,  1992; 
Pinker, 1997, 2002). 
A) Vollmer’s mesocosm
Vollmer (1975, 1984) states that human sensory and cognitive abilities are adapted to cope 
with a particular section of the external world: the world of medium dimensions. This part of 
the world, which he calls ‘mesocosm’, is best described as the realm of dimensions – relative 
to  physical  quantities  such as  spatial  extension,  time and mass  – that  are  relevant  in our 
interaction with the environment. For instance, we can ‘visualise’ or gauge stretches of time 
reaching from a mere second to decennia, distances from millimetres to kilometres or mass 
from grams to tons, but beyond these dimensions our intuition fails us. (Vollmer, 1984:88-
89). Both the microscopic and the macroscopic world completely elude us on an intuitive 
level.  We have,  indeed,  been adapted to  the particular  realm of dimensions  in which our 
organism – in virtue of its size, speed, lifespan and environment – is encapsulated. Besides 
15 This, as Gibson (1979) is fully aware, is not a denial that all species on our planet share a set of affordances – 
such  as,  for  instance,  oxygen,  water,  gravity or  light  –  which  explains  the  similarity  of  sensory  and  other  
adaptations widely diverging species often share. The point I want to make here, is only that an environment 
does not unequivocally shape organisms in a uniform way, but merely provides one side of a relationship that 
constitutes a niche, and can therefore be met in very different ways.    
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micro- and macroscopic dimensions, our mesocosm also excludes aspects of the world that do 
not carry significant information for us, such as, for instance,  magnetic fields,  ultra-violet 
wavelengths and other potential stimuli for which we haven’t evolved sensory receptors. 
While Vollmer argues that natural selection has endowed us with an intuitive grasp of the 
world that provides us with an accurate representation only within the mesocosm, I would, 
however, radicalise this statement. Natural selection has not shaped our cognitive apparatus to 
yield an accurate representation of the environment – even within the realm of meaningful 
dimensions  –  but  to  provide  us  with  a  framework  that  enables  us  to  interact  with  our 
mesocosm in appropriate ways. Indeed, as shown in the previous chapter, the scientifically 
mistaken assumptions about the world to which we intuitively adhere in our folk physics and 
biology can nevertheless allow us to interact with our environment in very efficient ways with 
regard to biological fitness (cf. Chapter 1 – 3.2.3 Species-specificity). 
In this regard, even the most basic assumptions about the planet we live on can be false, but  
nevertheless  harmless  when  it  comes  to  surviving  and  reproducing.  Indeed,  the  radically 
mistaken view that the earth is flat or that the sun orbits around the earth, commonly accepted 
in  the  pre-scientific  era,  did  not  impair  our  ancestors’  reproductive  chances,  even  in  the 
slightest. While it is important for our perceptual and cognitive apparatuses to enable us to 
predict the probable outcomes and properties of the relevant elements in our environment, this 
does not entail the accuracy of the framework of underlying assumptions about the world in 
which  these  predictions  are  grounded.  A  flat  world  or  a  geocentric  universe  is  perfectly 
adequate to control our mesocosm, as is an ‘impetus theory’ or an essentialist conception of 
the  natural  world.  False  premises  can  indeed  produce  accurate  predictions  in  particular 
circumstances.  In this  sense,  Aristotelian physics  can function as a  suitable  framework to 
explain physical happenings on this planet, as can Newtonian physics. Both, however, have 
been proved wrong by Einstein’s theory of relativity. Nevertheless, assuming that the latter 
provides the correct framework – or at least the best approximation – and that the former two 
are mistaken, all of them could, however, predict equally well the movement of a stone cast 
from a cliff.
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B) A stone age mind 
Pinker (2002), on the other hand, points out that some of our current ordeals are the result of a  
‘mismatch’ between the source of our passions – which are adapted to our ancestral way of 
life – and modern day life. Our impulsive gorging of fatty food in anticipation of a possible 
famine, the male desire to engage in casual sexual encounters to maximise its chances for 
passing down its genes, or the shot of adrenalin whenever we are confronted with a stressful 
situation, are just a few examples (219). Nowadays, the outcomes of these impulses are not as 
beneficial  as they used to  be,  to say the least.  They saddle us with obesity and diabetes, 
unwanted children and abortions, and stress-related problems.
Pinker argues that this mismatch does not only apply to our emotions, but also to our intellect. 
Our cognitive faculties were designed to meet the needs of our stone-age ancestors, and are 
specialised  in  dealing  with  problems  humans  were  faced  with  over  the  course  of  their 
evolutionary  history.  Our  cognitive  apparatus  carves  up  reality  in  useful  ways,  and  has 
intuitive theories predicting probable outcomes, framing the world in ways that permitted pre-
historical human tribes to thrive in their natural environment.
Natural selection, therefore, cannot be said to model our cognitive apparatus in such a way 
that matches our representations to the world itself, but merely to particular elements of the 
world that were relevant to the survival and reproduction of human tribes in the Pleistocene 
era. As Pinker (2002) states, ‘[our] ways of knowing and core intuitions are suitable for the 
lifestyle of small groups of illiterate, stateless people who live off the land, survive by their 
wits,  and  depend  on  what  they  can  carry’  (221).  It  is  tailored,  in  other  words,  to  the 
requirements of a very particular niche that we occupied for most of our evolutionary history,  
not to yield a general, comprehensive understanding of the world. In this context, Tooby and 
Cosmides  (1992,  2003) point  out  that  our cognitive  apparatus  evolved to  solve particular 
adaptive problems. These problems are the result of both the environment and the particular 
way our ancestors met this environment to ensure their survival and reproduction (cf. Chapter 
1 – 4.2.2 Adaptive problems). This left us with a very particular way of viewing the world, 
since  evolution  provided  us  with  an  amalgam  of  innate  and  thoroughly  species-specific 
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cognitive  predispositions  as  the  outcome  of  a  set  of  survival  and  reproduction  related 
problems the environment held for hunter-gathering hominid tribes. 
 
3.3.5 Genetic drift and genetic hitch-hiking
Furthermore,  natural selection is  not the only architect  in town. Genetic drift  changes the 
gene-pool  of  a  species  in  a  completely  random  fashion.  In  other  words,  unlike  natural 
selection, it acts upon the genotypic frequencies in a particular population without any regard 
for their phenotypic effect. Indeed, because of this random drift, gene variants may disappear, 
not because they proved less adapted, but because they were lost in the random shuffle of 
genetic recombination. This is referred to as ‘the sampling problem’. Imagine a population of 
10 individuals: 5 have the genetic variant A and 5 have the genetic variant B. Both genes are 
different but more or less similar in terms of fitness. The offspring would most likely inherit  
both variants in equal amounts. However, since this new generation’s genetic constitution is a 
random sampling from the parental generation’s, it could well be that, for instance, 70% end 
up with A and only 30% with B, just as it would be possible to end up with seven heads and 
three tails after tossing a coin 10 times. This could end in the fixation of genetic variant A and 
the loss of variant B. Of course, the larger a population, the less chance there is that genetic  
variants or ‘alleles’ are going to drift out of existence by this process. If you flip a coin 4 
times, your chances of ending up with 3 heads and 1 tail are much higher than of ending up 
with 3000 heads and 1000 tails after flipping it 4000 times (Ridley, 1993:138-140).
Genetic hitch-hiking, on the other hand, happens when genetic changes at one locus entail 
related changes at linked loci,  because of their  proximity on the chromosome. The linked 
locus is, in other words, attached to the first locus, and is therefore unlikely to be detached in 
the process of genetic recombination from parent to offspring. Now, suppose natural selection 
favours allele A over B at one locus, but A is linked with allele C at another locus. Because of 
A spreading over the gene pool, C is going to ‘catch a free ride’ and spread equally, regardless 
of its phenotypic effect. In this process, genetic variants that are neutral or even deleterious 
with regards to the fitness of their phenotypic effect can spread through the gene-pool (Ridley, 
1993:210).
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3.3.6 Conclusion
The  mechanism  of  evolution  –  selecting  random  variation  in  the  light  of  particular 
environmental conditions – entails that the human mind is not an optimal organ, shaped to 
produce an accurate and complete representation of reality,  but ‘merely’  an imperfect and 
particular one, coping with the elements of the environment that mattered for the survival and 
successful reproduction of our ancestors.
On the one hand, our cognitive abilities are imperfect, because, like any other characteristic, 
they are the outcome of an undirected,  non-teleological  process, blindly selecting random 
variations that prove beneficial, without direction or foresight. Furthermore, they are the result 
of an evolutionary road that does not undo past acquisitions to start afresh, but merely solves 
the immediate problems the organism is confronted with, by selecting alterations of the basic 
building plan, resulting in non-optimal adaptations. Finally, natural selection is not the only 
evolutionary force. Both the process of genetic drift and genetic hitch-hiking can alter  the 
gene-pool of species in a completely random fashion.
On the other hand, our cognitive abilities are particular, because, firstly, they are shaped in the 
light of previously acquired traits (path-dependency) and, secondly, they have evolved to cope 
with a small part of the external world: the elements in our environment that mattered for the 
survival and reproduction of our ancestors. Vollmer (1975) argues that our intuitive grasp of 
the world is limited to ‘medium dimensions’, and evolutionary psychologists point out that 
our mental wiring – both on an emotional and cognitive level – was shaped to fit the needs of 
hunter-gathering tribes of the Pleistocene era. 
3.4 The lack of external perspective
3.4.1 How does the mind mirror the world?
When Lorenz (1941:124) states that ‘just as the hoof of the horses is adapted to the ground of 
the steppe which it copes with, so our central nervous apparatus for organizing our image of 
the world is adapted to the real world with which man has to cope’ and therefore claims that 
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we can trust our central nervous apparatus to yield an (approximately) accurate representation 
of the world, he overlooks one crucial element: the lack of external perspective. Indeed, while 
it  is  possible  for  us  to  see  the  way other  organisms’  characteristics  are  adapted  to  their 
environment,  we lose this  external  vantage  point  from which to appreciate  this  particular 
match when it concerns our own ability to mentally represent the world, since we are confined 
to our mental representation. 
We might see, for instance, how the hydrodynamic shape of fish or the front paws of moles, 
functioning as powerful digging tools, are adapted to their particular environment, but we are 
in the dark when it comes to assessing how our intuitive representation of the world is adapted 
to  the  (real)  world  we  live  in.  It  would,  indeed,  take  another  mind  to  understand  how 
particular characteristics in the world led us, through the process of natural selection, to our 
particular  way  of  representing  it.  Furthermore,  as  pointed  out  previously,  the  same 
environment  can lead to a wide variety of adaptations.  In this  sense,  Lorenz’s  claim that 
adaptations mirror the environment cannot be taken literally. Do both whale sharks and sea 
urchins mirror a marine environment? The evolution of our mental abilities might,  in this 
regard, have taken us in a radically different direction, coping in completely different ways 
with similar environmental conditions. 
Therefore, since we have no way of knowing how our minds are adapted to the world – how 
they ‘mirror’ the world – we cannot make any inference, from the particular view of the world 
that natural selection has provided us with, as to the states of the external world. We cannot, 
in other words, derive any knowledge of the Kantian noumenal world (i.e. the world in itself),  
by means of the phenomenal world (i.e. the world as it appears to us), based solely on the fact  
that this phenomenal world must be adapted to cope with the noumenal world. The connection 
between our view of the world and the external world, in this regard, even if we know it must  
exist, must remain irremediably hidden to us. 
Imagine,  in  this  context,  that  we  must  infer  how  a  ‘real’  tree  looks  based  solely  on  a 
representation of this tree. Being confined to the representation – let’s say a drawing on paper 
– how could we possibly infer the true qualities of the actual tree it represents? Indeed, what 
information would we have of its size, its physical properties or even its three-dimensionality? 
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Furthermore, we would have no means of knowing what elements of the representation are 
meaningful. In this light, it would be impossible to assess if the visual experience of it matters 
rather than the tactile experience of feeling the paper, or its smell or taste for that matter. And 
even if we knew it was a visual representation, we wouldn’t have any idea if the empty space 
around the ink is part of the tree or not, or if the tree corresponds only to the ink lines and not 
the space in between,  and so on.  Therefore,  being confined to  the representation  (i.e.  the 
picture of the world created by our perceptual and cognitive apparatuses), we have no way of 
inferring anything about its object (i.e. the world itself), even if we are guaranteed that there is 
a correspondence between them.
3.4.2 Analogy with other organisms
Now,  assume  that  some  foreign  intelligent  creature  –  an  ‘extraterrestrial  scientist’  – 
contemplates  our perceptual  and cognitive abilities  and the view of the world they yield. 
Benefiting  from  an  external  vantage  point,  this  creature  could  see  how  our  mental 
representation of the world is adapted to the external world. However, in doing so, could this 
‘scientist’ come to any conclusion other than that we are endowed with a particular way of 
understanding our surroundings? Just as we conclude, from an external vantage point, that the 
cognitive abilities of animal species yield a particular grasp of the world – which is certainly 
adapted to their biological needs and environment, but nevertheless particular – it bears no 
doubt that this creature too could reach no other conclusion. 
Indeed, viewed from an external point of view, our view of the world – our umwelt – would 
appear just as particular as those of animal species appear to us. Since the cognitive abilities  
of animal species are every bit as adapted to their ecological niche as ours, the argument that 
holds that since our cognitive abilities are shaped by natural selection,  they must yield an 
accurate understanding of the world, loses its ground. Adaptations – as pointed out before – 
do not mirror the world; they ‘mirror’ very particular aspects of the world in a very particular, 
contingent way. Nothing suggests that this does not apply to our senses and cognitive faculties 
responsible for our intuitive representation of the world.  
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4. Conclusion
Konrad Lorenz (1941, 1973) claims that we can trust our representation of the world to be (at  
least  approximately)  accurate,  since  it  is  the  product  of  abilities  that  evolved  by natural 
selection.  Indeed, he argues,  natural  selection cannot do otherwise than to select  faculties 
producing accurate representations over mistaken ones, as the former undoubtedly provide us 
with a better chance for survival and successful reproduction.
This  argument,  however,  is  mistaken.  First  of all,  as Plantinga  (1993) points  out,  natural 
selection only shapes cognition to yield appropriate behaviour. False ways of forming beliefs 
that nevertheless lead the organism to act in appropriate ways will obviously not be selected 
against. In this context, Stich (1990) argues that natural selection will not automatically yield 
rational thinking. Quite the contrary. Not only will cognitive systems be sub-optimal due to 
cost/overall fitness trade-offs (cf. Elliot’s concept of internal fitness), but even optimally well-
designed systems would not automatically be the most rational ones. A less reliable system 
can indeed provide the organism with a better chance for survival and reproduction due to a 
discrepancy in costs that different kinds of mistakes entail. This leads to systematic cognitive 
biases that our minds appear to be subject to, yielding a larger number of mistakes in order to 
reduce the total cost of mistakes. Munz (1993), on the other hand, points out non-cognitive 
functions that our belief forming abilities serve. False beliefs, in this light, might prove fitness 
enhancing  in  virtue  of,  for  instance,  their  ability  to  delimit  social  groups,  providing  its 
members  with  a  clear  identity.  Irrationality,  seen  from  this  perspective,  is  not  failing 
rationality, but a separate cognitive ‘mode’ with a purpose of its own.
Moreover, considering the mechanism of evolution, we cannot but conclude that our cognitive 
abilities are both imperfect and particular. They are, indeed, the result of an undirected, blind 
process without any foresight that can only select randomly produced variations, on the one 
hand, and of other random evolutionary forces, namely genetic drift and the process of genetic 
hitch-hiking, on the other hand. Furthermore, natural selection is path-dependent, building on 
what has previously been acquired, and adapting organisms to the particular relevant aspects 
of their particular environment.  This leaves them with thoroughly particular characteristics 
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and abilities, as the outcome of both their evolutionary past and the selective forces acting 
upon them, adapting them to a small subset of elements in the world. 
Finally,  the  Lorenzian  argument  fails  in  principle.  Indeed,  whereas  we  can  see  how 
characteristics and abilities of other organisms are adapted to their ecological niche, we lose 
this external perspective when it comes to our own cognitive abilities. Not knowing how our 
mind is adapted to cope with the world, we cannot infer anything about the external world 
based on our representation of the world.  Furthermore,  just  as we consider other species’ 
perception of the world to be irremediably particular, so – we must admit – would a foreign 
intelligent creature consider our view of the world as irredeemably particular. Like any other 
organism’s, it is adapted to cope with a particular part of the world in a particular way. 
Therefore,  through  the  criticism of  the  Lorenzian  argument  provided  in  this  chapter,  the 
conclusion  of  the  previous  chapter  –  namely,  that  natural  selection  endowed  us  with  a 
particular (non necessary and non universal) view of the world – is reinforced. Indeed, from 
these counterarguments, the conclusion emerges clearly that we cannot infer the truthfulness16 
of our representation of the world from its functionality in terms of survival and reproduction.  
Furthermore,  both  the  mechanics  of  evolution  and  the  analogy  with  other  species  point 
towards  the  constitution  of  perceptual  and  cognitive  abilities  that  generate  a  thoroughly 
particular representation.  This,  however  –  as  pointed  out  –  does  not  entail  that  natural 
selection  only  endowed  us  with  false  representations,  merely  that  we  cannot  infer  their 
truthfulness solely on the basis of the fact that natural selection shaped our perceptual and 
cognitive faculties. 
16 True, accurate or truthful beliefs or representations are, in this context, synonyms. I'm using these terms 
interchangeably to point out an appropriate relationship between representation and its (external) object, without 
committing to any theory of truth in particular.
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Chapter 3: Transgressing our biological bias
1. Introduction
In chapter 1, I concluded that we are endowed with a particular, species-specific view of the 
world as the result of our perceptual and cognitive wiring. In chapter 2, I concluded that the 
fact that these perceptual and cognitive abilities are the product of natural selection does not 
entail that the view of the world they cause us to have is (even approximately) accurate. This 
reinforces the conclusion that – in the same way as any other species – we are endowed with a 
non-universal,  non-necessary grasp of the world, as the product of a blind and contingent 
process. Nevertheless, we are not confined to this particular, species-specific grasp. We can, 
indeed, ‘transgress’ the particular commonsense representations yielded by our perception and 
cognition. We can substitute them with alternative and often contradictory representations that 
we perceive as more accurate.
In this chapter I enquire about this possibility of going beyond and against our biological bias. 
How do we do it? What is the source of this epistemic feat? Once this is established, I will 
look at the scope of these transgressing theories and ask whether, and – if so – to what extent 
they are limited by our perceptual and cognitive architecture. That will be the subject of the 
next chapter. 
There are three possibilities as to what enables us to transgress our biologically determined 
view, as opposed to all other animal creatures we are acquainted with. The first possibility is 
that we are not hard-wired. Nothing is innate in humans and therefore we are not bound to 
view the  world  in  a  particular  species-specific  way.  The  second  possibility  is  that  those 
transgressing theories have an innate basis. We have, in other words, much more innate ways 
of viewing the world than other creatures, which provide us with this distinctive cognitive 
flexibility.  The third and final possibility is that we have similarly biologically constrained 
views of the world as some other nonhuman animals (as the result of perception and cognitive 
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predispositions),  but  can  perform  different  cognitive  operations  on  these  genetically 
determined views, enabling us to transgress them. 
I  will  argue  that  the  last  possibility  is  the  right  one.  This,  however,  presents  us  with  an 
apparent contradiction. How, indeed, can the mind both be predisposed to view the world in a 
particular way and at the same time be able to overcome these views? Several theories have 
been proposed to reconcile innate predisposition and cognitive flexibility. The main proposals 
of cognitive faculties enabling us to transgress the commonsensical views we hold in virtue of 
our nature are: mapping across domains, reasoning by analogy, metarepresentational thought, 
and explicit and conscious representation. 
While all these faculties are relevant to the issue at hand, taken individually, however, they 
fail  to  account  for our  ability  to  transgress  our commonsense  representations  and lead  to 
confusion by covering similar faculties from different perspectives. Therefore, I propose to go 
about it the other way around. Instead of fitting salient cognitive faculties to human epistemic 
achievements – and their characteristic feature of transgression – I reason from the ability to 
transgress in general,  and ask what cognitive faculties are required.  In doing so, I aim to 
integrate and complete those proposed cognitive faculties in a framework constituted by the 
necessary conditions for transgressing innate predispositions, providing an unequivocal and 
sound  account  of  the  distinctive  human  cognitive  ability  to  go  beyond  and  against  its 
biological bias. However, the questions as to what other faculties underlie these faculties, and 
how they evolved  or  how they are  physically  realised,  remain  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
chapter.
2. The unique human ability to transgress its biological bias
As discussed in detail in the previous chapters, human beings – in the same way as any other  
species – are endowed with a particular window on the world, as the result of their nature. We 
are, in other words, biologically biased to view the world in a particular way. This intuitive 
view is the result of both our perceptual and cognitive architecture, providing us respectively 
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with an incomplete input dressed in a species-specific phenomenal coat and a predisposition 
to interpret  this input through a framework of innate cognitive ‘modules’,  carving up this 
phenomenal  experience  of  the  world  and  applying  modes  of  reasoning  to  it  that  are 
notoriously scientifically inaccurate.  Natural  selection did not,  indeed,  provide us with an 
accurate view of the world – as the Lorenzian epistemologists would have it – but, quite to the 
contrary, with a thoroughly incomplete and particular one, fit for survival and reproduction in 
particular  environments  and  shaped  by  a  blind  process  of  path-dependent  and  gradual 
alterations of previous building plans.
Is  it  then  safe  to  conclude  that  we are  forever  and irremediably  trapped  in  this  species-
specific, particular representation of the world, with every attempt to represent the world in a 
more objective fashion doomed to failure? Not exactly. While there is no way around the fact 
that we perceive and are predisposed to conceptualise the world in this particular way, the rich 
history of human thought proves that we are somehow able to transgress these commonsense 
representations. We are, in other words, able to substitute the representations we hold in virtue 
of our nature,  with alternative and often contradictory representations  that  we consider as 
more  accurate.  How else,  indeed,  could we assert  that  our  intuitive  view of  the world is 
flawed? 
Homo sapiens, in this regard, is the only species on this planet that goes beyond its ‘cognitive 
niche’17 or as Uexküll (1909) calls it: its ‘umwelt’. We are not bound by the commonsensical, 
uncritical view of the world that our perceptual and cognitive architecture provides us with. 
Indeed, we overcome our innate predispositions, come up with different representations and 
thereby  escape  this  biological  determinism  that  all  other  creatures  are  –  at  least  to  an 
important extent – subject to. This ability to go beyond the limits of its given niche is the true 
wonder of human cognition and the origin of culture, underlying typical human activities and 
institutions ranging from art to society and from religion to science. Every account of human 
cognition should therefore account for its characteristic ability to transgress its biologically 
determined scope on the world. 
17 The term ‘cognitive niche’,  in this context, does not refer  to Tooby and Devore’s  (1987) use of it  – i.e.  
deploying information and inferences rather than particular features of physics in the struggle of life – but to the 
particular cognitive relation of an organism to its environment as the result of natural selection. 
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The human mind, in this context, is able to transgress both the input it receives through the 
senses  and its  predispositions  to  conceptualise  this  input  in  a  particular  way.  Indeed,  we 
conjecture that the world is not made up of colours and shapes, sounds, odours and tastes, but  
of atoms which cause us to  perceive these qualities  in virtue of the particularities  of our 
senses. As pointed out in chapter 1, vision – according to modern science – is caused by 
photon particles reflecting (or not) off other atoms and hearing is caused by a change in air-
pressure.  Moreover,  both  colour  and  sound  are  conceptualised  as  waves:  the  first  as 
electromagnetic waves and the second as a mechanical wave of air pressure. Furthermore, we 
infer  the  existence  of  unperceivable  ranges  of  potential  visual  and  auditory  stimuli.  For 
example, while we can only see light with wavelengths between 375 and 750 nanometer, we 
have  the  whole  spectrum  mapped.  Similarly,  we  are  aware  of  the  existence  of  sound 
vibrations beyond the audible range of 20 Hz to 20 kHz. 
As pointed out, we also transgress our commonsense conceptualisations, explaining entities 
and events in the world in ways that go against our predispositions. Indeed, contrary to what 
our commonsense dictates, we conjecture that animate organisms are composed out of purely 
physical particles and even that mind and consciousness are nothing more than the products of 
atomic interaction. Moreover, Newtonian physics tells us that moving objects are not moving 
because of a force acting upon them and are immobile without such an impetus, but that, quite 
to the contrary, objects will keep going on their trajectory indefinitely unless a force acts upon 
it. Similarly, Darwinism rejects our essentialist intuition, arguing that all species change over 
time and are all ultimately descendent from one and the same organism at some point in the 
history of life. Even more radically, Einstein overthrew our deeply rooted intuition that space 
and time are two absolute, independent entities in his distinctively counter-intuitive theory of 
relativity.
Therefore,  in  order  to  gauge  the  scope  of  human  cognition,  as  I  set  out  to  do  in  this 
dissertation,  it  is  imperative  to  analyse  this  ability  to  transgress  our  innately  grounded 
commonsense representations.  Indeed, an answer to the question as to what the source of 
these transgressions is – how, in other words, our mind can reach beyond its intuitive views – 
will provide us with the necessary tools to tackle the question at the origin of this undertaking: 
what can we hope to know about the world? While the scope and the eventual limits of these 
78
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
transgressions will be the subject of the next chapter, this chapter is committed to uncovering 
the cognitive source(s) underlying this distinct human ability to go beyond and against its 
biological bias.
3. What enables us to ‘transgress’?
To what  does Homo sapiens owe its  distinctive ability to go beyond its  cognitive niche? 
What, in other words, enables us to overcome the view of the world we are predisposed to 
have in  virtue  of  our  nature?  There seem to be three possible  accounts  of  our  ability  to 
transgress our commonsense representations. The first possibility is that we owe this cognitive 
flexibility to a lack of innate predispositions. Our minds, under this view, are free of inborn 
restrictions  or predispositions  and can therefore produce an unlimited realm of novel and 
unbounded  representations.  In  contrast  with  our  fellow  animal  creatures’  minds,  this 
hypothesis argues that we are not bound by instincts and come to this world as blank slates on 
which cultural elements can then be impressed. Under this view, humans – both in the way 
they represent the world and in the way they generally behave – are all culture, no nature.  
This hypothesis was put forward by empiricists and, according to Pinker (2002), still prevails 
in the social sciences. Let’s call it the ‘blank slate model’.
The second possibility is that our cognitive flexibility is the product, not of a lack of innate 
predispositions but, on the contrary, of an excess of these predispositions. Flexibility, in this 
sense,  is  the  result  of  having  a  massive  amount  of  different  and  often  contradictory 
predispositions,  yielding  unpredictable  and  diverse  representations.  Transgressing 
representations, therefore – i.e. representations departing from commonsense – are themselves 
the product of innate, content-rich modules (meaning that the content of these representations 
is determined by those modules). We are, in other words, predisposed to view the world in a 
very broad realm of different ways, whereas other animal species, being endowed with less 
modules, view the world through a less ‘kaleidoscopic’ lens. This hypothesis was proposed by 
William James (1890), arguing that humans are actually endowed with more rather than less 
79
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
instincts  than  nonhuman  animals  and  are  therefore  less  conditioned  in  their  behavioural 
responses. I shall refer to it as the ‘Jamesian model’.
The third and final possibility is that our cognitive flexibility is not the result of either a lack 
or an excess of content-rich modules, but of distinctive cognitive performances. We are, in 
this light, endowed with a basic set of innate predispositions (as are other nonhuman animals) 
– resulting in our uncritical,  commonsense representations  of the world – but are  able to 
overcome these representations, not in virtue of other content-rich modules, but by means of 
cognitive  operations  we  perform  on  those  representations.  Flexibility  and  creativity  in 
representing the world, from this perspective, is not the result of a lack of restrictions or an 
excess of starting knowledge, but of how the mind handles its representations. I will call this 
hypothesis, the ‘operational model’. 
3.1 The blank slate model
The blank slate model is rooted in the empirical doctrine. Locke (1690:61) famously claimed 
that ‘no proposition can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, which it never yet 
was conscious of’. The mind, therefore, from an empiricist point of view, is empty at birth 
and gradually filled with ideas through experience.  It does not contain any kind of innate 
knowledge  or  domain  specific  modules,  but  merely  functions  as  a  container  for  ideas 
originated in experience.  It is, in other words, a sponge, not a computer running different 
programs. 
This empiricist hypothesis of the human mind corresponds with our commonsensical view of 
knowledge acquisition.  Infants are thought to be born with no preconceptions,  and during 
development,  their little heads are gradually filled with information they pick up from the 
environment. They acquire a language and all kinds of beliefs from the people around them 
and grow up to be members of a particular culture. How they come to see the world, how they 
behave and even what  moral  values  they adhere  to,  in  this  sense,  is  (almost)  purely the 
product of the culture in which they are born, not their (human) nature. This view is what 
Pinker (2002) refers to as the ‘standard social science model’. 
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Today, however, this model is largely discarded. It is now commonly accepted, at least in the 
sciences preoccupied with understanding the working of the human mind, that the mind is not 
an empty container but contains a number of special  purpose programs. This radical turn, 
known as the cognitive revolution, owes a great deal to Chomsky’s work in linguistics and his 
ground-breaking review of Skinner’s (1957) ‘Verbal behavior’. While Skinner argues within 
the  paradigm  of  behaviourism  –  reducing  all  mental  activity  to  a  set  of  behavioural 
dispositions  – that  language acquisition  is  the product  of conditioning,  much as  Pavlov’s 
dogs’ reaction to the bell, Chomsky (1959:42) counters that children cannot learn language 
simply through meticulous care on the part of adults, shaping their verbal repertoire through 
differential reinforcing. Why? Because the linguistic data the child is exposed to can never 
account  for  its  knowledge  of  the  language.  Language  mastery,  therefore,  cannot  be  the 
product  of  having  a  set  of  behavioural  dispositions  –  it  presupposes  the  existence  of  a 
‘language module’, an innate set of grammatical rules and constraints or, as Chomsky calls it,  
a ‘generative grammar’, enabling the child to make inferences about the construction of new 
sentences it has never encountered before. The mind, therefore, cannot be a general purpose 
processor, but must – at least with respect to language acquisition – be endowed with domain-
specific modules.
This new paradigm of human cognition was soon confirmed by empirical evidence from areas 
such as  developmental  psychology and cognitive  anthropology.  Indeed,  as  pointed  out  in 
chapter 1, developmental psychologists Spelke (1991) and Baillargeon (1991) tested 3 to 8 
month old infants with regards to their conception of objects and the physical laws governing 
them and concluded that infants expect objects to be impenetrable by each other, to move 
along continuous trajectories and to be cohesive. Anthropological research, on the other hand, 
shows  that  the  human  mind  is  predisposed  to  think  about  fauna  and  flora  in  a  highly 
structured way.  All  cultures  appear to divide the natural  world into a complex taxonomy 
which  incorporates  different  groups,  each  further  defined in  different  levels  of  subgroups 
(Atran, 1998). Other probable candidates for domains of innately constrained representations 
are: a sense of numeracy and natural geometry (Spelke 2003), a domain for psychology or 
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theory of mind (Pinker 1997), a domain for facial recognition, and a cheater-detection module 
(Tooby and Cosmides 1992).18
Besides this empirical evidence rejecting the blank slate model, the latter also fails to account 
for knowledge acquisition in principle. Indeed, as the Latin adage has it: ‘ex nihilo, nihil fit’.  
Nothing can come out of nothing. Therefore, in order for mental representations to take form, 
we  need  to  presuppose  a  processing  apparatus,  or  at  the  very  least,  an  ability  to  detect 
similarities.  In  this  regard,  Popper  (1957)  criticises  Hume’s  account  of  induction.  Hume 
(1739) argues that we believe in law-like regularities in the world based on induction or the 
repeated experience of similar instances (such as, for instance, the belief that a billiard ball 
will  move when another  ball  collides  with it).  Therefore,  Hume claims,  since there is  no 
guarantee that these experiences will repeat themselves,  we cannot be justified in holding 
these beliefs.  While Popper agrees with the conclusion,  he rejects the premise.  Repetition 
based on similarity cannot be something ‘in vacuo’, he claims, it has to be similarity for us. 
Instances can only be similar from a certain point of view. Its recognition presupposes a prior 
interpretation. Therefore, Popper argues, theory must come before observation. There must, in 
other words, be a prior framework in which observation can be interpreted, or at the very 
least, a propensity to expect regularities. An empty mind, in this regard, could never form 
beliefs, since beliefs can never start with observation alone.   
Furthermore, how is a child ever to acquire a linguistic concept such as, for instance, ‘cow’ or 
‘house’, if it does not have the proper cognitive predisposition to connect the utterance of 
these words with the objects that are pointed at and not some part of it or some other aspect  
and,  even  more  importantly,  generalise  the  applicability  of  these  concepts  on  all  similar 
objects  it  encounters  (the  assessment  of  which  already  requires  a  theory,  as  Popper  has 
shown)? As Quine’s (1960) famous ‘gavagai’ example shows, we can never infer from mere 
ostention the proper reference with absolute certainty. Indeed, when a tribesman – speaking a 
tongue we have no knowledge of – exclaims ‘gavagai’, pointing at a running rabbit, how are 
we to infer whether he refers to a whole rabbit, some undetached part of it, the colour of its 
18 Whether  all  of these proposed domains constitute separate and autonomous modules, however,  is not my 
concern. My only aim is to illustrate the generally accepted claim in cognitive and evolutionary psychology that 
the human mind is endowed with domain-specific knowledge systems, predisposing it to view the world in a  
particular way. 
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fur,  the  temporal  presence  of  rabitness,  or  so  on.19 The  child  needs,  in  other  words,  a 
predisposition to zone in on the way natural languages carve up the world in order to acquire 
concepts. Knowledge acquisition, therefore, presupposes the existence of prior theories, all 
the  way down to  a  set  of  cognitive  predispositions  the  newborn  child  is  equipped  with, 
allowing him to couch his experiences in a proper framework. 
Finally, the argument that the human mind is endowed with innately constrained ways to view 
the world becomes obvious when put in an evolutionary perspective. Indeed, since all non-
human animals  are  endowed with  such cognitive  modules,  it  is  very unlikely  that  Homo 
sapiens is the only species which is not. This would mean that in those six million years – not 
a very extensive stretch of time in evolutionary terms – that separate us from other apes on the 
evolutionary tree, all these cognitive acquisitions would have been undone. This is extremely 
improbable.  As  pointed  out  before  (cf.  chapter  2,  3.3.3  Path-dependency),  evolution  by 
natural selection does, indeed, not erase previous acquisitions to start from scratch, but can 
only gradually alter the existing blue-print to fit new requirements. It is, in this regard, beyond 
any reasonable doubt that our minds still bear the marks of our primate ancestors. 
3.2 The Jamesian model
William James (1890) notoriously rejected the traditional view opposing animal behaviour as 
guided by instincts, and human behaviour as guided by reason. While it is true that humans 
show more hesitation, reflection and choice in their course of action than animals, he argues 
that this is, however, not the result of a lack of instincts. Indeed, instincts do not automatically 
result in invariable motor-reflexes triggered by a particular perceptual stimulus, but can lead 
to  occasional  irregularities  in  behaviour  in  any animal  having a  large  enough number  of 
separate instincts, which therefore can inhibit the activity of opposite impulses (391). The 
more  instincts,  in  other  words,  the  more  flexible  and unpredictable  the  behaviour  of  the 
organism will be. Man, in this light, with its unprecedented variety of behaviour, has – as 
James put it – ‘a far greater variety of impulses than any lower animal’ (390). 
19 Quine’s example is intended to illustrate the inscrutability of reference or extension - an ontological matter - 
but can be used for our purposes - the epistemological necessity of innate ‘theories’ for knowledge acquisition.
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A similar position, known as the ‘massive modularity of mind hypothesis’, has been proposed 
more recently by the evolutionary psychologists Tooby and Cosmides (1992). They argue that 
the adaptive problems guiding the evolution of the mind of our ancestors are solved more 
quickly, efficiently and more reliably by a modular system than by a general purpose system. 
Indeed, different problems require different solutions, which can be realised much more easily 
by different modules each coping with one problem, than by a single information-processing 
design having to cope with all of them (110). Natural selection, therefore, must have pushed 
for a modular  organisation.  Our mind,  in this  light,  is  best  seen as a ‘Swiss army knife’, 
consisting of a set of separate, domain specific information processing mechanisms shaped by 
natural selection to cope with adaptive problems. Flexible human behaviour and cognition, 
according to Tooby and Cosmides, is the result of a great number of these single purpose 
modules, not of some general purpose, higher form of cognition. 
This, however, cannot be the whole story of the human mind. Indeed, as Fodor (1983) points 
out,  a  purely  modular  mind  cannot  account  for  the  obvious  holistic  character  of  human 
cognition. This entails that information from the different modules is accessed by the ‘central 
system’ of the mind (103). This holistic nature of cognition – this creativity and passion for 
the analogical – as Fodor puts it (1985:4), is precisely what provides human cognition with its 
ability to transgress its biological bias. This transgression cannot be accounted for by Tooby 
and Cosmides’ massively modular mind, which would entail that we can only represent the 
world in ways determined by those very modules. This would leave cognition void of any 
form of flexibility, let alone creativity.20 
As  Mithen  (1996)  points  out,  the  modern  human  mind  does  precisely  what  Tooby  and 
Cosmides say that it  shouldn’t  do – it  applies reasoning patterns from one module to the 
subject matter of another. While it is true, Mithen argues, that the human mind is composed of 
a set of innate, content-rich mental modules – providing us with an intuitive grasp of domains 
like  physics,  psychology  and  natural  history  –  these  modules  are,  however,  not  isolated. 
Hunter-gatherers  typically  reason  about  the  natural  world  as  if  it  were  a  social  being, 
20 Carruthers (2006), however, defends the massive modularity of mind hypothesis against this critical point, but,  
in doing so, has to drop the characteristic encapsulation of the modules in his model of mind. In doing so, he  
backhandedly confirms that cognitive flexibility entails the flow of information across the boundaries of the 
different modules.
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conceiving of the forest as a parent and animals as kin, hereby imbuing the world with human 
qualities  such as will  and purpose (47). Similarly,  scientists  view biological  organisms as 
mere physical objects, composed out of atoms, rather than distinguishing sharply between 
animated and inanimate substances, applying the reasoning pattern of the module of biology 
to the former and that of physics to the latter. In short, although our mind is composed of 
different ‘blades’ shaped by natural selection, we do not necessarily apply the blades to their 
fitting problem, as Tooby and Cosmides would have it. 
The argument that our cognitive flexibility and creativity is not the product of our innate 
endowment is also supported by empirical evidence from a different angle.  Spelke (2003) 
compares the innate modules, or core knowledge systems, as she refers to them, of humans 
and nonhuman animals.  The first  is our core system for representing material  objects.  As 
pointed out, infants represent objects as cohesive bodies, moving along continuous trajectories 
and interacting with each other only by contact. This intuitive grasp of objects, however, is 
also found in a variety of nonhuman animals such as monkeys and even newly hatched chicks 
(282). Similarly, our sense of natural geometry, enabling us to navigate through spatial layout, 
and our sense of numeracy, enabling us to represent small numbers and estimate approximal 
numerical magnitudes, is found both in infants and in other primates (297). The considerable 
cognitive gulf between human and nonhuman animals, therefore, cannot be the product of 
different  sets  of  starting  knowledge.  The  distinctively  human  ability  to  go  beyond  its 
biological bias, in this regard, cannot be the product of its innate endowment.  
Finally, an evolutionary argument can be brought to bear here. As Tomasello (1999) points 
out, the 6 million years that separate human beings from their primate cousins is a very short 
time in evolutionary terms  – not  enough,  Tomasello  argues,  for natural  selection  to  have 
produced a whole different suite of cognitive modules one by one. Moreover, he continues, 
paleoanthropological  research suggests that  for all  but the last  2 million  years  the human 
lineage showed no signs of anything other than typical great ape cognitive skills, and the first 
dramatic signs of species-unique skills only entered the scene in the last quarter of a million 
years  with modern Homo sapiens (4). This reinforces the argument  that the source of the 
cognitive divide between human and nonhuman does not reside in a radical difference in their 
innate, content-rich cognitive endowment. This brings us to the final hypothesis.
85
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.3 The operational model
Since our cognitive ability to transgress our commonsense representation is not the product of 
our innate endowment – since, in other words, we have no more information to start with than 
some nonhuman animals  who do not transgress their  innate  representations  – we have to 
account  for this  ability  in terms of operational  cognitive  faculties  rather  than content-rich 
modules (either by postulating the absence of restrictions or the excessive presence of those 
modules).  This  is  what  the  operational  model  proposes.  According  to  this  model,  our 
biological bias is the product of our innate endowment, i.e. our senses and cognitive wiring. 
This innate endowment saddles us with particular intuitive theories. Nevertheless, we are the 
only species on this planet which is not bound by these representations. We can alter them, 
developing new ways of viewing the world and escaping our cognitive niche as the result of 
cognitive operations the mind performs on its representations.
The  hypothesis  set  forward  by  the  operational  model  allows  for  the  co-existence  of  the 
necessity  of  epistemic  constraints  for  learning  (cf.  Popper’s  argument  that  theory  must 
precede observation  and that  the evolution  of knowledge must  eventually by grounded in 
innate  dispositions)  and the characteristic  flexibility and holism of human knowledge (cf. 
Fodor’s argument against the massive modularity of mind hypothesis). Furthermore, it agrees 
with  both  the  empirical  evidence  from  developmental  psychology  and  anthropology, 
uncovering the existence of innately determined representations of the world, and the obvious 
transgression of these representations in the history of human knowledge. Finally, it is on par 
with evolutionary considerations, allowing our cognitive architecture to still bear the marks of 
our primate ancestors,  and not requiring the independent evolution of a whole new set of 
content-rich modules in the short period of time (in evolutionary terms, that is) that separates 
the human lineage from other apes. Human cognition, therefore, is characterised both by a 
starting set of innate predispositions, and an ability to transgress the representations shaped by 
these predispositions.
How is this possible? How can the mind both be predetermined to yield a particular set of  
representations, and at the same time able to overcome those restrictions and conceptualise 
the  world  in  (radically)  different  ways?  How,  in  other  words,  can  we  transgress  the 
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representations we are bound to have in virtue of our biological nature? This question has led 
to a wide variety of theories, reasoning from a nativist stance – claiming, as I do, that the 
human mind possesses a variety of special purpose, domain-specific knowledge systems – and 
proposing cognitive faculties that enable human beings to conceptualise the world in ways 
that go beyond and against their innate predispositions. These theories about ‘what makes us 
smart’ take up the challenge to reconcile the premise that human cognition is based on innate 
knowledge  systems  or  modules  and  the  obvious  flexibility  displayed  by  the  mind  in  its 
conceptualisations. Let’s have a look at the main proposals.
4. Theories about what makes us smart
4.1 Mapping across domains
Carey  and  Spelke  (1994)  attempt  to  explain  conceptual  change  in  cognitive  domains,  as 
evident from the history of science, within a framework of domain-specific cognition. Human 
minds,  they  argue,  are  endowed with  innate  systems  of  knowledge,  each  pertaining  to  a 
particular  domain  –  such  as,  for  example,  other  minds,  physical  objects  or  numbers. 
According to these authors, such domains comprise a distinct set of entities and phenomena 
(e.g. the innate knowledge system of physics applies to material bodies and their behaviour) 
and a number of core principles (in the case of physical objects: cohesion, continuity and 
contact). Learning, from this perspective, consists of an enrichment of those core principles 
through  experience.  Therefore,  a  high  degree  of  universality  in  representations  is  to  be 
expected  in  the  domains  for  which  humans  possess  innate  core  knowledge  systems. 
Nevertheless, scientific theories demonstrate that conceptual change in those domains is both 
possible and actual (Carey and Spelke, 1994:169). Core principles are overridden and new 
principles adopted, leading to widely diverging theories. 
According to Carey and Spelke (1994), conceptual  change in those innate  domains is the 
result  of  ‘mapping across  domains’  (180).  This  happens when the  core principles  of  one 
system are applied to the set of entities of another system, thereby escaping the principles that 
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naturally – i.e. in virtue of our nature – fit these entities. By devising and using systems of  
measurement  in  physics,  for  example,  scientists  create  ‘a  mapping’  between  the  core 
knowledge system of numeracy and that of physics. Therefore, the principles governing the 
behaviour of physical bodies are no longer those of cohesion, continuity and contact but the 
core principles of the system of numeracy, such as 1-to-1 correspondence, succession and the 
like. 
Mithen (1996) takes on a similar viewpoint from a different perspective. Reasoning from an 
archaeological  background,  he attempts  to  explain  the  cultural  explosion  in  the  transition 
between the upper and middle Palaeolithic eras (approximately between 60 and 30 000 years 
ago). According to Mithen, this ‘big bang of human culture’, featuring the birth of art, religion 
and complex hunting strategies,  is  the product of a final,  major  re-design of the mind in 
human evolution (153). Whereas our human ancestors evolved encapsulated, domain-specific 
knowledge  systems  in  areas  such  as  social  intelligence,  natural  history  or  biology,  and 
technical intelligence, these specialised intelligences were now no longer working in isolation. 
The resulting  cognitive  fluidity  or  mapping  across  domains,  characteristic  of  the  modern 
human mind, provides – according to Mithen – the foundation of scientific endeavours and 
the  distinctive  human  ability  to  transgress  the  contents  of  its  innate,  domain-specific 
knowledge systems. 
The view that the human mind integrates the content of different domains, underlying Carey 
and  Spelke’s  (1994)  and  Mithen’s  (1996)  account,  is  a  recurring  theme  in  the  cognitive 
sciences. According to Fodor (1983), the mind consists of fast, mandatory, encapsulated and 
domain-specific input systems or modules, on the one hand and a central system which is 
slow,  non-mandatory,  non-encapsulated  and  domain-general,  on  the  other.  This  system 
integrates the outputs of the modules and provides human cognition with its characteristic 
holism and creativity. As to the nature of this system, Fodor remains mute, considering it an 
irresolvable mystery.  Carruthers (2006), on the other hand, postulates a massively modular 
mind. He accounts for its flexibility and creativity by distinguishing between two reasoning 
systems. The first corresponds to the processing of the modules: it is arranged in parallel and 
operates swiftly and unconsciously. The second supervenes on the activity of those systems: it 
is realised by mental rehearsal in general and inner speech in particular and operates more 
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slowly  and  consciously.  It  integrates,  in  other  words,  the  content  outputs  of  the  various 
modules,  overriding  the  results  of  the  first  system  (254).  Boeckx  (2010:128),  finally, 
compares  the  cognitive  ability  to  cross  the  boundaries  of  modules  –  underlying  our 
rudimentary theories of the world around us – to mixing apples and oranges to form what he 
calls  ‘delightful  cognitive  cocktails’.  Like  Carruthers,  he  points  to  natural  language  as  a 
content integrator of the different outputs of the modules.  
4.2 Analogy and metaphor
Gentner (2003) argues that higher-order cognition is the product of our capacity for analogy. 
In this regard, our ability to draw abstractions from particulars, to maintain hierarchies of 
abstraction, to reason outside the current context, to compare and contrast representations and 
to project further inferences, among other distinctively human abilities, is seen as the product 
of our ability to learn by analogy. This inborn faculty is, according to Gentner, multiplied by 
the possession of relational language, which both invites the learning of relational concepts, 
and  provides  cognitive  stability  once  they  are  acquired  (195-196).  Therefore,  while  we 
possess – in the same way as other animal species – a basic set of cognitive constraints in the  
form of attentional biases and learning propensities, we also have the possibility to go beyond 
these biases by means of what Gentner calls ‘structure-sensitive comparison processes’. In 
other words, the capacity to detect similarities in abstract relational structures enables us to 
make inferences that transgress our innate set of starting knowledge (227-228).  
This process of abstraction by analogy becomes evident when considered from a different 
angle: the pervasiveness of metaphor in language. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) point out, 
metaphor is not just a device of poetic and rhetorical flourish, nor even a purely linguistic 
matter, but is at the core of our everyday thought and action (3). Language, in this context, is 
merely a body of evidence for the way we think, showing us that human thought processes are 
largely metaphorical.  The concept  of ‘argument’,  for  example,  is  structured,  according to 
Lakoff and Johnson, by the metaphor ‘argument is war’. We call some claims indefensible, 
we attack weak points of an argument, we can be right on target, demolish an argument and, 
of course, win or lose it. Similarly, ‘time is money’: we waste, spend and save time, chores  
cost time, we invest time in each other, and we run out of time (5-8). 
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Furthermore,  on  a  more  fundamental  level,  spatial  orientation  metaphors  organise  entire 
systems of concepts with respect to one another. More is up, less is down (e.g. numbers go up 
and down); happy is up, sad is down; good is up, bad is down (e.g. it’s going downhill or it’s 
going up, he’s rising to the top or tumbling to the bottom); virtue is up, depravity is down 
(e.g. having high or low standards), and so on. The same goes for front-back, on-off, in-out, 
centre-periphery,  and near-far.  Similarly,  the metaphor  of physical  objects  and substances 
structures a whole realm of concepts. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980:25) point out, this allows 
us to pick out parts of experiences and treat them as discrete entities or substances. Events, 
activities, emotions and ideas are conceptualised as entities, allowing us to quantify them (e.g. 
I feel too much anger), identify aspects (e.g. the ugly side of his personality), identify causes 
(e.g. the pressure of his responsibility caused him to resign) and set goals (e.g. he went off in 
search of fame and fortune). Moreover, even our most basic concepts are often metaphorically 
structured. Our concept of time, for example, is structured by the metaphor of space – e.g.: he 
arrived at 1:30, worked through the night, looks forward to tomorrow, leaves the past behind, 
and so on (St Clair 2007, Pinker 2007).21
Pinker  (2007:233)  argues  that  the  concepts  of  substance,  space  and  time  (rooted  in  the 
metaphor of space) and causation (rooted in the metaphor of force) are ‘the substrate of our 
conscious experience’. They are, in other words, the building blocks of our reasoning, giving 
us the tools to conceptualise about the physical and social world, and, most importantly, they 
are the source of the metaphors by which other spheres of life are comprehended. Metaphors 
in language, in this regard, are proof of the way our mind co-opts reasoning patterns that are 
grounded in our innate knowledge systems to reason about other, abstract domains. 
Johnson (2007), in this context, grounds meaning and the nature of abstract thought in image 
schemas, arising in our perception and bodily movement. Abstract concepts and thought do 
not constitute a wholly different kind of logic, but are an extension of spatial-bodily concepts. 
Thought  is  not  disembodied,  Johnson  argues,  with  Lakoff  (1980),  but  structured  by  our 
sensorimotor schemas and extended by means of conceptual metaphor (Johnson, 2007:180-
181).  Precisely this ability, grounded in our innate cognitive architecture or bodily generated 
21 This, however,  does not imply that  space and time cannot  be represented independently in the brain,  but  
merely that they are structured by the brain in a similar fashion (cf. Kemmerer, 2005).
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schemas  – as  Lakoff  and Johnson (1980,  2007) argue  –  to  extend reasoning patterns  by 
conceptual metaphor to abstract domains for which we have no knowledge-system, enables us 
to grasp the latter in terms of the former. This process, as pointed out, leaves metaphors as a 
tangible trace in language. For, as Pinker (2007) puts it, language is the mirror of thought.  
4.3 Explicit and conscious representations
Karmiloff-Smith (1992), studying the human mind from a developmental perspective, argues 
that  we  can  go  beyond  domain-specific  constraints  by  a  process  called  ‘representational 
redescription’.  In  this  process,  ‘information  already  present  in  the  form  of  implicit 
information  in the mind, becomes explicit  knowledge  to the mind’ (18, her italics). While 
implicit  information is embedded in procedures, isolated from other parts of the cognitive 
system, and merely enabling us to respond to the environment, explicit representations are 
available to consciousness. 
In this light,  the innate, intuitive grasp of objects and the physical laws governing them - 
which Spelke (1991) and Baillargeon (1991) discovered in infants – are present, according to 
Karmiloff-Smith,  in the form of procedures triggering responses to environmental  stimuli. 
They  are  implicit  representations.  When  this  embedded  information  becomes  accessible 
through the  process  of  representational  redescription,  children  become –  in  the  words  of 
Karmiloff-Smith – ‘little  theorists’  (78). The core principles  (i.e.  cohesion,  continuity and 
contact)  are  now  represented  explicitly,  encoded  in  a  format  usable  outside  normal 
input/output relations and available to verbal explanation. Karmiloff-Smith argues that this 
does not happen exclusively through conventional learning, by acquiring the representations 
in linguistic form from parents and educators. While some of the representations might be 
acquired this way, other theory building occurs by this internal process of representational 
redescription. The human mind is, in other words, endowed with a mechanism that can bring 
implicit representations to consciousness, taking them as objects of cognitive attention and 
therefore enabling it to manipulate them. This, Karmiloff-Smith concludes, permits the mind 
to extend well beyond its environment and underlies its distinctive creativity (192-193). 
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Similarly, in recent work, Carey (2009) invokes the mechanism of ‘Quinean bootstrapping’ to 
account for the conceptualisation of genuinely new representations. According to Carey, new 
and ‘richer’  representations  can  arise  out  of  representations  with more  limited  expressive 
power. Invoking the case of a child's acquisition of the concepts of natural numeracy – which 
exceeds  the  content  of  the  core  knowledge-systems  at  our  disposition  –  she  argues  that 
memorisation of the counting sequence by rote eventually enables children to correlate these 
number words with matching number sets, making them ‘cardinal principle knowers’. In this 
regard,  the  acquisition  of  number  words,  which  explicitly  represent  numerical  values, 
provides the child with a richer representational medium than the core knowledge systems it 
started out with. 
According  to  Karmiloff-Smith  (1992),  explicit  representations  are  intrinsically  linked  to 
conscious  accessibility.  Schacter  (1989)  draws a  distinction  between  implicit  and explicit 
along this line, with regards to memory,  and elaborates upon it.  Memories,  he argues, are 
implicit when they facilitate performance of a particular task that does not require conscious 
recollection of previous experiences, and explicit when performance does require conscious 
recollection.  Consciousness,  in  this  context,  refers  to  ‘a  person’s  ongoing  awareness  of 
specific  mental  activity’  (356).  Therefore,  explicit  representations  are  representations  of 
which the beholder is aware. In virtue of this awareness, he or she explicitly represents this 
representation. This brings us to the final proposal of humankind’s ability to go beyond its 
commonsense representations.
4.4 Metarepresentational thought
A metarepresentation is a representation of a representation. We can, however, distinguish 
between two different  kinds of  metarepresentation.  The first  comes  from psychology and 
refers  to  the  possession  of  a  theory  of  mind.  From  this  perspective,  a  person  holds  a 
metarepresentation by representing another person’s representation. For example, Mary holds 
a metarepresentation when she sees Tom looking for his coat in the closet and infers that he 
believes his coat is in the closet. In doing so, she forms a representation of Tom’s belief or 
representation, i.e., that the coat is in the closet. The second kind of metarepresentation refers 
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to  a  representation  of one’s  own representations.22 This  is  the kind of  metarepresentation 
relevant to the question as to ‘what makes us smart’.  According to Stanovich (2004), the 
possession of the ability to represent one's own representations is what separates human from 
nonhuman animals. It gives rise to the self-critical stances that are a unique aspect of human 
cognition (1264). It enables us, in other words, to form beliefs about our own beliefs. How 
reliable are they; upon what are they grounded, etc? 
Sperber (2000) agrees with Stanovich that the ability to form metarepresentations is one of the 
distinctive human cognitive abilities. Like echolocation for bats, he argues, the capacity to 
metarepresent is both unique to humans and crucial in explaining their behaviour (117). While 
animals may have some rudimentary capacity to metarepresent in the psychological use of the 
term  (e.g.  detecting  that  a  conspecific  wants  to  mate  or  fight),  these  forms  of 
metarepresentation, according to Sperber, lack both compositionality and recursion. They can 
only metarepresent a short and fixed list of representations. Humans, on the other hand, can 
metarepresent an unlimited amount of representations. According to Sperber, this requires a 
whole new level of cognition.  The mental ability to represent does, indeed, not imply the 
ability to represent those representations. They would remain hidden to the beholder, unless 
there is something that renders them tractable and therefore cognitively accessible (118-121). 
According to Dennett (2000), this something is provided by the encoding of representations in 
language or other tangible media of representation (e.g. drawings, writings, etc.). The obvious 
route to true, genuine metarepresentation – in this case, the self-conscious representing of 
one’s own representations, which Dennett calls ‘thinking about thinking’, not to be confused 
with the representation of another person’s beliefs (cf. the first kind of metarepresentations) – 
is,  he  argues,  from the  outside  in.  It  begins  with  overt  use  of  public  symbols  –  i.e.  the 
acquisition of natural language – and creates practices that can later be internalised, providing 
us with the necessary tools to think about thinking (21). Indeed, our possession of a medium 
in which representations can be couched (such as that provided by natural language) enables 
us to form what Dennett calls ‘florid representations’ as opposed to ‘pastel representations’. 
22 It is very plausible that the ability to metarepresent in this second sense evolved from the previously acquired  
ability to metarepresent in the psychological sense – i.e. the possession of a theory of mind. Selective pressure on 
social intelligence is, as Mithen (1996) points out, suspected to be the motor behind the evolution of human 
intelligence. A discussion on the origin of our ability to metarepresent, however, is beyond the scope of this  
chapter.
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While  the  latter  are  merely  unconscious  guides  to  behaviour,  the  former  are  deliberate, 
knowing and even self-conscious  ways  of  representing.  In  the  terminology of  Karmiloff-
Smith (1992), they are explicit representations.  These florid representations then, according 
to Dennett (2000), are truly metarepresentational in kind, prompting him to exclaim that there 
can be ‘no florid representation without metarepresentation’ (19).
5. Necessary conditions for transgressing 
While all of the proposed accounts of what distinguishes human cognition from other forms 
of cognition, with its characteristic flexibility and non-encapsulation – underlying its ability to 
transgress innately grounded core intuitions about the world – indicate important aspects of 
human cognition, I argue that taken individually they cannot account for it. Furthermore, they 
lead to confusion by highlighting similar faculties from different angles and depicting them 
via different terminology. In order to bring this incompleteness to light and dispose of the 
terminological  confusion,  I  propose  to  reverse  the  sequence  of  reasoning.  Rather  than 
analysing human cognition and fitting salient faculties to our ability to produce theories which 
depart from our innate predispositions, I will take this ability to transgress our biologically 
based views as the starting point and analyse what faculties are required to achieve this. 
My aim,  in  other  words,  is  to uncover  the  necessary and jointly sufficient  conditions  for 
transgression.  Based  on  this  analysis,  I  will  then  point  out  that  the  proposed  cognitive 
faculties of ‘what makes us smart’ are not sufficient to account for this ability to transgress. 
My analysis, in this regard, takes a non-empirical approach, since its goal is to elucidate what 
is necessary for transgression in general, not merely how humans achieve this cognitive feat. 
To put it in another way, I consider the task at hand and ask what is logically presupposed to 
achieve  this.   This  ‘external’  analysis,  uncovering  the  necessary  and  jointly  sufficient 
conditions to form transgressing representations, will then yield a framework in which the 
current (empirical) accounts of cognitive faculties that ‘make us smart’ can be integrated and 
completed  where  necessary.  This,  I  hope,  will  provide  us  with  a  more  complete  and 
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unequivocal account of the distinctively human ability to transgress the core intuitions it holds 
in virtue of its cognitive nature.
For exposition’s sake, I will illustrate my argument with a thought experiment. My use of a 
thought experiment, in this regard, is not necessary, but serves an illustrative purpose.  Its goal 
is  to provide  the  reader  with  a  vivid  and clear  illustration  of  what  it  takes  to  transgress 
biologically based views of the world. I could, in other words, bypass the story-telling in my 
analysis. In my opinion, however, the following thought experiment both enhances the clarity 
of an otherwise rather abstract exposition and enables the reader to engage intuitively with the 
matter at hand. 
5.1 E.T.s on an icy planet
Imagine extraterrestrial organisms living on a planet at some constant distance from a star, 
their sun. The planet revolves in such a way around its axis and around the star that the same 
side  is  always  exposed to  the  light,  while  the  other  is  always  couched  in  darkness.  Our 
extraterrestrials live on the side exposed to the sunlight and heat and, therefore, in constant 
daylight.  Furthermore,  there are  no climatic  changes whatsoever:  the temperature  remains 
constant at 5° Celsius and the sun is never obscured by clouds. The landscape of this planet is 
filled with huge ice caps. Because the temperature is always above melting point, those ice 
caps  are  slowly melting.  How the ice  got  there  in  the  first  place  can,  of  course,  for  the  
purposes of this thought-experiment, be ignored. 
These extraterrestrial organisms – let’s call them E.T.s – are endowed with a sense of vision. 
Furthermore, they possess a concept of time and causality similar to ours. Based on this input 
(their  visual  apprehension  of  ice  becoming  water)  and  their  cognitive  architecture  (their 
predisposition  to  situate  this  event  in  time  and  look  for  a  causal  explanation),  they  are 
predisposed to think that ice has an inherent quality of becoming water over a certain amount 
of time. This representation or belief is, in other words, part of their folk physics. Not once, 
given the climatic conditions of this planet, has this expectation been violated. However, over 
time a bright E.T. comes up with an alternative explanation: it is not the inherent nature of ice 
that  causes  it  to  become water,  but  it  is  the  sun which  causes  ice  to  become water.  My 
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question now is: what cognitive faculties does it take to allow for this radical transgression of 
the commonsense representation of the E.T.s? How, in other words, can our bright E.T. come 
up with this ‘Copernican revolution’, given its input (vision) and conceptualisation faculties (a 
notion of time in which melting takes place, and a notion of causality)? 
5.2 What cognitive faculties would E.T. need to transgress its commonsense view?
First  of  all,  since  transgressing  its  commonsense  view not  only implies  that  this  view is 
substituted by an alternative view, but that the latter is perceived as ‘better’, or epistemically 
more desirable than the former, our E.T. would have to represent both its commonsense view 
– i.e. that ice becomes water because of its inherent nature – and its transgressing view – i.e.  
that ice becomes water because of the sun – in order to compare both. If this representation is  
implicit – i.e. not represented itself, but merely underlying its expectations – E.T. will never 
be able to assert that one representation is better than the other, nor even be aware of the two 
distinct representations, for that matter. 
Furthermore,  E.T. would need an epistemic goal:  a disposition to look for truth or for an 
accurate description of its external environment; in this case, the transformation of ice into 
water.  Without  this  epistemic  goal,  transgression  is  not  possible. Indeed,  remember  that 
transgression entails not merely a shift in belief – which could occur without the cognitive 
creature being aware of it  and without an epistemic orientation – but a perception of the 
transgressing representation as ‘better’ than the commonsense view, entailing a comparison of 
both representations in virtue of an epistemic goal. 
Thirdly, short of divine inspiration, E.T. must come up with a different representation based 
on the input it receives and the conceptual tools it possesses. As I have outlined, it possesses a 
visual  input:  it  sees  the  ice,  the  water  and  the  sun;  and  it  has  a  conceptual  architecture 
representing these entities in a framework of time and causality. This has led it to believe that 
ice  becomes  water  because of  its  own nature  over  a  certain  amount  of  time.  In  order  to 
produce the alternative representation that properties of the sun, instead of the ice itself, cause 
the ice to become water over a certain period of time, it has to combine the representations 
drawn from its visual and conceptual resources in a different way. In this case, the causal 
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connection between the perceptual input of ice and water has to be attributed to a foreign 
element – the sun – instead of ice, the object of transformation itself. 
This ability to recombine elements from input and conceptualisation into a new representation 
further  requires  that  E.T.  not  only  represents  its  commonsense  representation  and  its 
transgressing representation as such, but represents the parts of this representation as well. It 
has  to  hold  the  representation  of  ‘ice’,  ‘water’  and  ‘causation  in  virtue  of’  as  separate 
conceptual  building  blocks  in  its  mind.  This  allows  E.T.  to  divorce  its  representation  of 
‘causing to become water’, from its representation of ‘the nature of ice’, on the one hand. and 
to form a new representation by reassembling elements from its input (ice, water, sun) and 
elements from its conceptual resources (in this case, the causal connection), on the other hand. 
Indeed,  since  it  represented  the  parts  of  its  commonsense  representation,  driving  the 
proverbial wedge between them, these parts can now be reattached with another element it 
represents (i.e. the sun).
Finally, E.T. will need a way to assess whether its new representation (i.e. ice becomes water 
because of properties of the sun) is preferable in terms of its epistemic goal (i.e.  truth or 
accuracy of description) than its previous commonsense representation (i.e. ice becomes water 
because of properties of the ice itself). To make this assessment, E.T. needs two things: data 
demarcating both representations, and epistemic criteria in virtue of which one representation 
accounts for the demarcating data in a better way than the other (in terms of the epistemic  
goal, that is). 
In this case, our bright E.T. could have noticed that when casting shade over the ice, the ice 
stopped melting (remember the constant temperature on the planet in the exposure of the sun 
is 5° C; when the sunrays are blocked, however, the temperature tumbles to – 5° C).23 This 
leaves the choice of sticking to the old representation while accommodating the new finding 
(i.e. ice becomes water because of properties of the ice itself; however, shaded ice does not 
become water) or accommodating these findings in the new representation (i.e. ice becomes 
water because of some properties of the sun; therefore, when the sunlight is blocked, so are 
23 Let’s assume that there isn’t anything casting a constant shadow on the ice caps, and therefore that the effect of 
shade on ice was never revealed before.
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those properties of the sun, which causes their causal effect to vanish).24 How can E.T. assess 
wheher the latter representation fits its epistemic goal of accurate description better? 
To make this assessment, E.T. would need an epistemic orientation. Such an orientation is 
provided by a set of values or criteria which can rank different representations on a scale 
determined  by  its  epistemic  goal  (i.e.  a  scale  ranking  from  less  to  more  accuracy  of 
description). Those values, in this case, could be explanatory scope (the latter representation 
explains more since it offers a causal reason why non-shaded ice does not become water, 
whereas the former does not); simplicity (rather than attributing causal powers to one state of 
ice  –  i.e.  non-shaded  ice  –  and  not  to  another  –  i.e.  shaded  ice  –  E.T.  can  attribute  an 
unchanging causal power to the sun); and coherence (while the commonsense representation 
entails that the nature of ice both causes and does not cause it to melt depending on it being  
shaded or not, the transgressing representation does not harbour such a contradiction).25 
5.3 Framework of necessary cognitive faculties for transgressing
There seem to be three major cognitive faculties at play which enable E.T. to come up with a 
transgressing representation of what turns ice into water. The first is the ability to represent 
representations and their parts. Indeed, in order to compare both representations, E.T. needs to 
represent  both.  Furthermore,  it  has  to  represent  the  different  parts  of  this  representation 
separately.  In  this  case,  these parts  are:  ‘ice  becomes  water’,  ‘because of’,  and ‘qualities 
belonging to ice’. This, as pointed out, is necessary for E.T. to recombine these parts in a 
different fashion, allowing it to conceptualise a different explanation of the subject matter (cf. 
the second condition). 
A second necessary condition  for E.T. to come up with a  representation  transgressing its 
commonsense  representation  is  the  possession  of  a  way  to  recombine  the  information  it 
24 Typically, these data will be at the start of the exploration leading to a new representation, fuelling doubt and 
directing  the  conceptual  recombination  of  the  available  building  blocks.  This  account,  however,  is  not  a  
chronological account of how new representations are typically formed. Its sole aim is to provide us with a clear 
overview  of  what  cognitive  operations  are  needed  to  transgress  a  representation  anchored  in  innate  pre-
dispositions.
25 Those values are human epistemic values. Transgression, however, by no means entails the application of  
these particular values or criteria, but merely the possession of an epistemic orientation – i.e. an epistemic goal  
and criteria for realising this goal.
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gathers,  through  its  visual  input  and the  conceptual  resources  at  its  disposal,  into  a  new 
representation. Indeed, as pointed out, E.T.’s new representation has to be composed out of 
elements it gathers from its input and the conceptual tools it possesses. Since representations 
don’t materialise out of thin air, any new representation has to be accounted for in terms of 
the information that can be drawn from the world, and the ways in which this information can 
be processed. 
A third and final necessary condition is the possession of an epistemic goal and epistemic 
values  or  criteria.  Without  an  epistemic  goal  –  a  view  of  what  makes  a  representation 
desirable,  such  as  truth  or  accuracy  of  description  –  one  cannot  propose  alternative 
representations  which are perceived as epistemically more desirable.  This goal or ideal is, 
indeed, necessary to provide an axis on which different representations can be compared – 
necessary, but not sufficient. For this comparison to take place, there need to be epistemic 
values or criteria determining the relative proximity of the two representations with regards to 
this ideal.  A disposition to look for true representations is, indeed, vacuous without some 
criteria that make a representation more or less truthful. 
In the case of our bright E.T., those values were explanatory value, simplicity and coherence. 
As pointed out above, it could only apply those after integrating demarcating data into the 
equation. This, however, since it was gathered by its visual input, can be accounted for by the 
previous faculty enabling it to represent information gathered from its input, and to recombine 
it with representations drawn from its conceptual framework. Moreover, one can imagine a 
case in which there would be no need for empirical data demarcating both representations; 
one representation being preferable merely in virtue of epistemic values. For instance, when 
two  representations  account  for  the  same  phenomenon,  but  one  does  so  in  a  more 
parsimonious way, this representation can be seen as better, yielding to Occam’s razor and 
satisfying  the  value  of  simplicity.  The better  representation,  in  this  case,  would  typically 
contain fewer elements and not require additional data but, on the contrary, would erase data 
from the equation.
Without  this  last,  crucial  condition  –  i.e.  the  possession  of  an  epistemic  value  system – 
alternative  representations  would merely be random proposals,  with nothing to  determine 
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whether  one  representation  is  more  desirable  than  another.  Indeed,  the  very  concept  of 
transgression  presupposes  the  existence  of  such  a  system.  A  representation  can  only  be 
perceived  as  transgressing  commonsense  when it  is  perceived  as  more  desirable  than  its 
commonsense counterpart. For our E.T.s, just as for us, this increased desirability comes from 
a sense of increased accuracy or truthfulness. In this context, except for extreme cases of 
scientific relativism, it is commonly accepted that scientific accounts present us with better 
descriptions  of  the  world  than  uncritical  commonsense  assumptions.  They  are  either 
considered as more truthful (scientific realism), or at least as more useful (instrumentalism).
6. Integrating human cognitive faculties in the framework
6.1 Representing the representation and its parts
As  pointed  out,  in  order  to  compare  two  representations,  we  need  to  represent  those 
representations. If our representations are merely implicit, underlying our behaviour without 
us representing the representations themselves, how could we assert that one representation is 
more accurate than the other? Moreover, as pointed out, if representations cannot be carved 
up into different parts, each represented individually, we have no means of representing the 
subject matter differently by recombining the different parts.
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argues that we have the ability to bring implicit representations to 
consciousness,  representing  them  explicitly.  Explicit,  in  this  sense,  means  available  to 
conscious  awareness.26  The  question  remains,  however,  as  to  what  exactly  is  available. 
Dienes  and  Perner  (1999)  distinguish  different  kinds  –  or  as  I  would  put  it:  levels  –  of 
explicitness. The content alone of a representation can be represented explicitly (the cat is on 
the mat); both the content and the attitude can be represented (knowing or believing that the 
cat is on the mat); and finally the content, the attitude and the holder of the representation can 
be represented (it is me who believes that the cat is on the mat) (737). Nevertheless, they 
argue,  under a common understanding of the term ‘conscious’,  a representation counts as 
26 At least, this is the case in its ultimate stage, because Karmiloff-Smith conjectures about several stages of 
gradually increasing explicitness. 
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conscious  only  when  its  content,  the  attitude  and  the  holder  or  self  can  be  represented 
consciously (740). How, indeed, can one be said to be aware of having the representation that 
the cat is on the mat, without being aware that one knows, sees or believes this, and that, quite 
obviously, it is oneself who holds this representation? An explicit representation, therefore – 
in  the  sense  of  a  consciously  available  representation  –  is  a  representation  of  oneself 
representing a content in virtue of a certain attitude. It is thinking about thinking, as Dennett 
(2000:21) puts it; it is thoroughly metarepresentational in kind.27 
In  this  sense,  Karmiloff-Smith’s  (1992)  explicit  representations  and  Stanovich’s  (2004), 
Sperber’s (2000) and Dennett’s (2000) metarepresentations refer to one and the same ability 
of  representing  one’s  own  representations.28 They  are  representations  of  a  higher  order 
because their object is a representation and not something external to the mind. This higher-
order cognition, representing the representations we hold in virtue of our biological nature 
(i.e. our senses and our cognitive architecture), is a first major step towards transgressing the 
commonsense beliefs we hold. As Stanovich (2004) points out, this ability is distinctively 
human.  While  other  animals  might  be  able  to  metarepresent  to  a  certain  degree  in  the 
psychological use of the term (cf. 3.2 Metarepresentational thought), they cannot be said to 
represent  their  own representations.  They do not,  in  Dennett’s  (2000)  terms,  think  about 
thinking.
Moreover, when representing one’s own representations, the parts of those representations are 
necessarily represented as well, for how are we going to represent the visual representation 
‘the cat is on the mat’, without being able to represent ‘cat’, ‘mat’ and ‘on’ as separate aspects 
of  this  representation?  Indeed,  while,  for  example,  the  implicit  visual  representation  ‘the 
clouds are dark’ will simply trigger the instinctive reaction of an organism to seek shelter 
from the coming rain,  its  explicit  counterpart  ‘the clouds are dark,  therefore it  will  rain’, 
obviously requires us to represent all  elements  gathered from input:  clouds,  dark and the 
inference from conceptualisation: ‘therefore it will rain’, individually. 
27 It  is metarepresentational  in the sense of representing one’s own beliefs,  not  representing someone else’s 
beliefs or possessing a theory of mind (cf. the different kinds outlined above – 3.4 Metarepresentational thought). 
28 This  does  not,  however,  entail  that  they  agree  on  which  faculties  underlie  the  ability  to  form 
metarepresentations, merely that all these accounts point to the ability to represent one’s own representations. 
The question as to which faculty underlies the human ability to form metarepresentations, or how this faculty 
evolved, is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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While  Dennett  (2000)  argues  that  these  ‘florid  representations’  are  couched  in  natural 
language,  Karmiloff-Smith  (1992:15)  points  towards  the  redescription  of  implicit 
representations  in  different  representational  formats  that  are  ultimately available  to  verbal 
report. Explicit representations, on both accounts, therefore, can in principle be encoded in 
natural language,29 a system which constructs representations based on the combination of 
explicit  units  of  meaning.  This  provides  an  explanation  as  to  why,  when  we  represent 
explicitly,  we necessarily do so by representing the parts  explicitly.  Indeed, either  natural 
language itself functions as the system in which representations can be couched, and therefore 
made explicit,  as Dennett  suggests, or these representations are encoded in a format close 
enough to natural languages to be verbalisable, which entails that this format shares its basic 
structure with language, as Karmiloff-Smith suggests. This aspect of explicit representation 
underlies  the  possibility  of  reassembling  those  separately  tagged  elements  in  different 
configurations, as I will discuss  the next section. 
6.2 Variation through recombination
Merely  representing  representations  does  not  by  itself  enable  us  to  transgress  these 
representations. This requires a cognitive faculty that can produce variation. Since we cannot 
access different ways of drawing input from the world or different ways of conceptualising 
this input, we can only come up with alternative representations by recombining elements we 
gather from input and from our conceptual modules in different ways, to form – as Boeckx 
(2010:128)  calls  them –  ‘delightful  cognitive  cocktails’.  We  can  both  explain  a  familiar 
subject matter in terms of the principles governing conceptual domains other than the one that 
we are predisposed to apply to the subject matter, and direct our mind to new subject matters 
(for which we have no predisposed conceptual grasp), understanding them in terms of familiar 
domains. 
This ability, referred to as ‘mapping across domains’ or ‘reasoning by analogy’, enables us to 
apply our sense of numeracy to the domain of space and time, representing delimited parts of 
29 Karmiloff-Smith (1992:22-23), however, allows for levels of explicitness of representations which are not yet  
available to verbalisability. She does not, therefore, reduce consciousness to verbal reportability. However, at the 
ultimate level  of  explicitness,  the representation  is  encoded into a  format  which,  she hypothesises,  is  close 
enough to natural language for easy translation into communicable form.
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space and stretches of time with numbers, or to apply our module for reasoning about animate 
creatures to inanimate objects, investing rocks, trees and the like with spiritual essences, as is 
the case in animistic religions. Furthermore, it enables us, or rather Harvey in this case, to 
conceive of the heart  as some sort  of mechanical,  pump-like device,  or Bohr to view the 
structure of an atom as that of a solar system (De Cruz and De Smedt 2007), or, even more  
fundamentally, it enables us to view time in terms of space, or causation in terms of force, as  
St. Clair (2007) and Pinker (2007) point out. It allows us, in other words, to think differently 
about  subject  matters  and  to  think  about  different  subject  matters  than  the  ones  we  are 
predisposed to think about.
Language, I have argued, following Lakoff, Johnson (1980) and Pinker (2007), provides us 
with  tangible  proof  of  these  cognitive  operations.  This  ability  to  produce  variation  by 
recombination  becomes  evident  when  we look at  language’s  compositional  character.  By 
recombining  words  to  form new sentences,  there  are  indeed  no  limits  to  the  amount  of 
sentences with distinct meaning that we can create. This implies that there are no limits to the 
amount  of  representations  the  human  mind  can  come  up  with.  We can,  in  other  words, 
endlessly recombine those building blocks we gather from perception and conceptualisation 
into  new  representations.  Moreover,  our  ability  to  extend  representations  to  previously 
unknown domains is evident when we look at the metaphorical character of language.  As 
shown by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, Johnson, 2007), our language is pervaded by metaphors, 
pointing towards our ability to map body-based, sensory-motor source domains – i.e. innate 
reasoning patterns  – onto new abstract  target  domains,  by means of conceptual  metaphor 
(Johnson, 2007:177).
6.3 Epistemic value system
As argued above, without an epistemic value system – i.e. an epistemic goal and values or 
criteria for realising this goal – there can be no transgression of  biologically based views, 
since this entails not only the substitution of commonsense  views with alternative ones, but 
also the perception of the latter as epistemically better than the former. Therefore, the human 
mind has to possess an epistemic goal and epistemic values in order to rise above its uncritical 
assumptions. 
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Such a goal, it bears no doubt, is our predisposition to look for truth. Papineau (2000) argues 
that the search for truth is an innate drive, much like hunger and the desire for sex. It is, in 
other words, part of our innate endowment: a product of natural selection that increases our 
chances of success in our practical projects and thereby boosts our biological fitness (202). 
This  drive  underlies  the  remarkable  curiosity  we  exhibit  as  a  species,  our  hunger  for 
knowledge,  and our  need for  justification  before  adopting  a  belief.  We are,  in  this  light, 
cognitively predisposed to judge beliefs in terms of their truthfulness. Truth – or the concept 
of justified beliefs – however, remains vacuous without criteria in terms of which it can be 
realised or in terms of which these beliefs can be justified.
These criteria are epistemic values. They enable us to compare different representations and 
infer  which  one  offers  the  best  explanation  -  which  representation,  in  other  words,  best 
approximates  ‘truth’  and  most  justifies  belief.  According  to  Kuhn  (1977:321-322),  such 
values  include:  accuracy30 (predicting  all  or  most  data  and  explaining  away  the  rest), 
consistency  (both  internal  and  with  other  relevant  and  accepted  theories),  scope  (the 
consequences of a theory should extend as much as possible beyond the data it is required to 
explain),  simplicity (explaining the data as economically as possible) and fruitfulness (the 
degree to which a theory permits one to make new predictions).31 More basically, they boil 
down to: predictive accuracy (a representation should be confirmed in its predictions by states 
of the world),  coherence  (the elements  within a  representation should not  contradict  each 
other, nor should the representation be in contradiction with other representations), scope (a 
representation should ideally explain all data) and, more controversially, a sense of aesthetics 
(between two theories explaining the same amount of data in a coherent way, the most elegant 
formulation – i.e. the most economical one – carries away our preference). Longino (1990:4) 
refers to these criteria as constitutive values. They are values ‘by which to judge competing 
explanations’ and are ‘generated from an understanding of the goals of science’. They can be 
contrasted to contextual values, which are ‘personal, social and cultural values’. The latter 
30 Kuhn uses the term 'accuracy' to point out the predictive accuracy of a representation. This is not to be 
confused with my use of the term, which – as pointed out earlier – refers to an appropriate relationship between 
representation and its object. 
31 Kuhn claims that  these five  criteria  provide  the  shared  basis  for  acceptance  of  one theory over  another.  
However,  he  argues,  this  shared  basis  is  not  sufficient  to  determine  scientific  choice,  i.e.  to  eradicate  the  
incommensurability that governs over competing paradigms (Kuhn, 1977:331).
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depend on the particular cultural context in which science is conducted, while the former are 
derived from the very enterprise of scientific enquiry itself. 
Carruthers (2006:347) argues that those epistemic values – i.e. Longino’s constitutive values 
– are most probably innate, for they seem universal to human cultures, from hunter-gatherer 
societies to western scientific communities. Those values underlie, in other words, not just 
modern  scientific  reasoning,  but  all  of  human  kind’s  belief  forming  about  the  world. 
Furthermore, Carruthers points out, they are not – at least among hunter-gatherers – explicitly 
taught. Therefore, these epistemic values must be part of our cognitive endowment, much as 
our innate drive to search for truth. 
I agree with this analysis on a more principled basis. How, indeed, would humans ever have 
transgressed their biological bias, if were they not already endowed with an epistemic value 
system  inciting  them  to  question  their  assumptions  and  look  for  alternative,  preferred 
representations? Without these values or epistemic guidelines there could be no preference for 
one representation over another, and, without this preference, there could be no motivation 
for, or meaning in, producing alternative – i.e. transgressing – views. Therefore, just like our 
predisposition to look for truth, at least some of those values must be anchored in our innate 
cognitive make-up and cannot be purely cultural products, since culture itself depends on the 
transgression of our biologically constrained view of the world. Indeed, without the ability to 
transgress its innately predisposed ways of viewing the world, humanity would never have 
entered the cultural realm, in which the world comes to be viewed through a rich tapestry of 
diverse spatio-temporal perspectives instead of a singular species-specific view. 
Furthermore, the claim that epistemic values have an innate basis is supported by empirical 
research on simplicity.  Lombrozo’s  (2007:233-235) experiments  point  to  a  preference  for 
simpler  explanations  (i.e.  explanations  invoking less causes) and the role  of  simplicity  in 
probabilistic  reasoning.  Finally,  it  seems  hard  to  conceive  of  the  possibility  that  we  are 
predisposed towards truth without possessing epistemic criteria.  Indeed, how could we be 
endowed with an innate drive to represent the world truthfully, without the necessary tools to 
respond to this drive? 
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7. Conclusion
I set out to uncover the cognitive abilities that enable us to go beyond and against the view of 
the world we are predisposed to have in virtue of the particular architecture of our senses and 
cognitive wiring. I argued that this ability is not the result of either a lack or excess of innate 
predispositions, but of cognitive operations we perform on the species-specific representations 
yielded by our sensory and cognitive apparatuses. More precisely, there are three cognitive 
abilities that enable us to transgress our commonsense representations. 
The first is our ability to metarepresent, representing the representations we hold and their 
parts.  The  second  is  our  ability  to  produce  alternative  representations  by  recombining 
elements  we  gather  from input  and  conceptual  domains  unlimitedly  and  transferring  our 
modes  of  representing  to  other  previously  non-conceptualised  domains.  The  third  is  our 
possession of an epistemic value system, enabling us to rank representations with regard to 
epistemic desirability. 
These three abilities are the cornerstones of the human ability to transgress its biological bias, 
and are therefore the source of the unique cognitive achievements  that  characterise  homo 
sapiens and distinguish it from all other creatures on this planet. They provide us with the 
cognitive flexibility and creativity that enables us to overcome the outputs of our ‘hard-wired 
modules’, parting with our nature into this awe-inspiring diversity of human culture. 
This, of course, does not imply that all transgressing theories can be accounted for merely in 
terms of these three cognitive faculties. Indeed, quite obviously, someone living in 5000 B.C. 
could not have come up with the theory of relativity. To do this, he or she would have to have 
stumbled upon a number of crucial astronomic discoveries (not the least of which is that the 
earth  is  round  and  orbits  the  sun),  developed  mathematics  to  a  breath-taking  degree  of 
complexity, and developed the proper technology for all these astronomical discoveries (at the 
very least, a powerful telescope). Einstein's ability to formulate his transgressing view of the 
universe, in this light, is not the just the product of his own cognitive abilities but – to a very 
important  extent  –  of  the  impressive  body of  accumulated  knowledge  he  was  born  into. 
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Indeed, theories do not originate from nothing – they are built upon previous theories, which 
again are founded on an older set of theories. However, the very possibility of embarking 
upon this chain of theories – transgressing its species-specific set of uncritical representations, 
as homo sapiens has done – is grounded in this three-fold ability to take representations as 
objects  of  cognitive  attention,  to  produce  alternative  representations  with  the  available 
resources, and to give these representations an epistemic orientation. 
These operations enable us to produce an unlimited amount  of representations,  to divorce 
subject matters from the reasoning patterns we are predisposed to apply to them, and to think 
about subject matters for which we have no innate reasoning module at all. This opens up a 
radically different epistemic relation to the world other than the particular relation determined 
by our nature. It does, indeed, endow us with an ‘open’ epistemic relation, not yielding a fixed 
set of representations, but representations which are both unlimited in number and subject to 
change. In the following chapter,  I will  gauge the scope and limits  of these transgressing 
theories, bringing to bear the question that fuelled this dissertation: what can we know about 
the world? 
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Chapter 4: Scope and limits of transgression
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that we can transgress our biologically based views of the 
world. We can, in other words, represent the world in ways that go beyond and against the 
representations we are predisposed to have in virtue of our nature. In this chapter, I will gauge 
the scope and limits of these transgressing representations.
Arguing that we can both shape an infinite amount of possible representations and that we are 
not bound to represent any subject matter in a particular way,  I characterise the cognitive 
relation  we  entertain  with  the  world  as  an  open  cognitive  relation.  Indeed,  while  other 
organisms on this planet are forced to represent their environment in a particular set of ways, 
entertaining a closed cognitive relation with the world, we exhibit no such constraints. 
This, however, does not imply that there are no limits to the representations the human mind 
can produce. From the fact that we entertain an open cognitive relation with the world, it does 
not follow that we can represent the world in any (theoretically) possible way. In this regard, 
we cannot represent any possible subject matter in any possible way, merely in an unlimited 
amount of ways within the limits imposed by our nature. Those limits, I argue, are set by the 
particular senses and cognitive reasoning patterns that evolution has provided us with. 
Our perceptual and cognitive nature limits  the ways we can represent the world either by 
biasing us against representing the world in a certain way, or by straightforwardly closing us 
off to certain possible representations. With regards to bias, I argue that due to the nature of 
our senses,  some entities  and properties  of the world are easy to  detect,  while  others are 
almost impossible. We are, in other words, biased against detecting some aspects of the world 
because of the particular nature of our senses. Furthermore, while we are able to transgress 
our commonsense representations, our intuitive grasp of the world still  plays  a role in the 
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transgressing representations we produce. In this light, we are biased against representations 
which depart too radically from our intuitive understanding. 
With  regards  to  closure,  I  argue  that  when conceptualising  about  the physical  world,  we 
(necessarily)  engage our  perception  based imagination.  This  entails  that  we are bound to 
model  the  world  by  means  of  the  sensory  resources  at  our  disposal.  Representations, 
therefore,  which resist  being grasped by those resources,  remain  forever  beyond our ken. 
Furthermore,  since  we  transgress  our  commonsense  representations  not  by  applying  new 
reasoning  patterns,  but  by  recombining  the  perceptual  and  conceptual  resources  at  our 
disposal  (cf.  Chapter  3  -  6.2  Variation  through  recombination),  we  are  closed  off  to 
representations  which  cannot  be  deconstructed  in  the  ‘cognitive  building  blocks’  that 
evolution has provided us with. We are, in other words, closed off to representations which 
cannot be reached through the particular cognitive reasoning patterns we possess. 
2. Scope of transgression
2.1 Productivity of thought
One of the main features of natural languages is their combinatorial nature. The meaning of a 
sentence  is  derived  from  the  meaning  of  its  constituents  –  i.e.  the  words  –  and  the 
grammatical rules underlying the ways in which these constituents are combined. This enables 
us to understand sentences we’ve never encountered before, by grasping the meaning of the 
words and the combinatorial rules. Consider, for example, the sentence: ‘all young goldfish 
like  the  sound of  the  wind blowing when staring  at  the  moon’.  This  sentence  has  most 
probably never been encountered before by the reader, but this doesn’t prevent him or her 
from understanding it. Indeed, the only condition for something to be intelligible is the ability 
to understand the parts and the grammatical construction. This allows us to conceive of and 
understand an endless series of new meaningful expressions – i.e. new thoughts – with finite  
means – i.e. the memorisation of a finite set of words and rules.
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As Pinker (2002:37) points out, even with a few thousand nouns and verbs, there are already 
several million correct grammatical ways to open up a sentence. Add prepositions, adverbs 
and adjectives  to that,  and the combinations  quickly multiply to an astronomical  number. 
Moreover, because of the possibility of recursion – phrases containing other phrases – the 
number of possible, grammatically correct sentences (and therefore meaningful sentences) is 
in principle infinite. Consider the phrase: ‘I heard that you think that she fears that he knows 
that …’. 
From this productivity of language, yielding an endless possibility of different sentences, we 
can derive the productivity of thought. Since every meaningful sentence expresses a thought, 
there must be an infinite amount of different possible thoughts the human mind can entertain. 
We can, in this regard, produce an infinite amount of distinct and meaningful representations 
of the world.
2.2 Representational flexibility
Another characteristic feature of human cognition is – as discussed at length in the previous 
chapter – our ability to represent subject matters differently from the way in which we are 
predisposed to represent them. Indeed, while any other organism on this planet will represent 
its surroundings in a particular species-specific way, showing no, or very limited, flexibility, 
human beings come up with a rich and inexhaustible  variety of conjectures in explaining 
subject matters. 
Greek astronomers overthrew our spontaneous assumption that the earth is flat; Copernicus’s 
heliocentric model placed the sun in the centre of the universe, affirming that the earth is in 
constant motion; and Einstein’s theory of relativity contradicts our deeply rooted intuition that 
time and space are two independent realms, predicting that time is dependent on velocity. 
Moreover, atomism postulates that matter is constituted out of tiny particles floating around in 
ether, and string theory conjectures that the electrons and quarks making up these atoms are 
one-dimensional oscillating lines. 
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This  intellectual  creativity  that  humankind  displays  in  conceptualising  the  world  is  not, 
however, restricted to scientific theories alone. Since the dawn of humanity,  societies have 
produced  an  astonishing  variety  of  mythological  stories  accounting  for  the  origin  of  the 
universe. In ancient Greece, Gaia (the earth) was said to have emerged from chaos, giving 
birth to the sky. Cherokee Native Americans believe that the earth was created when a water 
beetle coming from the sky dived to the bottom of the endless pool of water bringing up some 
soft mud to the surface. Taoism, on the other hand, conceptualises the origin of the universe 
as the breaking of a cosmic egg, releasing  sky and earth,  which both expanded,  growing 
further apart, and the African Bantu tribes invoke a vomiting God (Leeming, D & Leeming, 
M, 2009). Moreover, different cultures represent humanity and its environment in different 
ways. Hinduism tells us that all living creatures are temporary vehicles for souls caught in a 
cycle of reincarnations. Animistic religions, on the other hand, claim that the whole world is 
imbued with soul, while the Judeo-Christian tradition reserves the possession of a soul to 
humankind alone. Furthermore, genesis tells us that humans are created in the image of God, 
while Darwinism postulates that we are but a particular species in the primate family. Finally, 
some philosophers have claimed that nothing exists but in the eye of the beholder and that we 
might well be stimulated brains in vats. In short, there seem to be no limits as to how we come 
to conceptualise the world, ourselves and everything else in it.
This inexhaustible creativity is the true hallmark of human cognition. Our ability to transgress 
our predisposed views of the world opened up an endless variety of possible representations. 
Cutting loose from biological determinism, the human mind entered the kaleidoscopic realm 
of culture, representing the world in a myriad of different (and contingent) fashions. Indeed, 
while  we  share  species-specific  knowledge  systems  that  we  are  inclined  to  apply  to  our 
environment, we obviously go beyond (i.e. we think about different subject matters than the 
ones  we  are  predisposed  to  think  about)  and  even  against  these  predispositions  (i.e.  we 
contradict our universal commonsense representations).
2.3 Open cognitive relation
The  fact  that  we  can  produce  an  infinite  amount  of  meaningful  representations  (cf. 
productivity  of  thought)  and  are  not  bound  to  represent  any  given  subject  matter  in  a 
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particular way (cf. flexibility of representation), endows us with a different cognitive relation 
to the world from that of any other organism on this planet. Indeed, since all our intuitive 
representations can in principle be rejected and substituted by an infinite amount of possible 
representations, the human mind is not forced to represent the world in a particular way, or 
even a particular set of ways. It is, in other words, not bound to view the world according to 
any of its intuitive core beliefs, and is able to generate an infinite amount of theories about the 
world.  The  cognitive  relation  humankind  entertains  with  the  world,  therefore,  can  be 
characterised as ‘an open cognitive relation’, as opposed to the closed cognitive relation other 
species on this planet entertain with the world. 
An  open  cognitive  relation  entails  that  every  belief  about  the  world  can  in  principle  be 
rejected and replaced by another representation. There is, in this regard, a contingent relation 
between representing subject and represented object. The objects of representations are, in 
other words, not necessarily represented in a particular way, nor are the ways in which those 
objects can be represented (i.e. the amount of possible representations that can be generated) 
exhaustible. This makes human representations of the world radically unpredictable. There is 
no way of deducing the representation that will be shaped in human minds, based upon the 
object it represents and its cognitive apparatus.
Indeed, while a gosling will  invariably represent the first moving object it  perceives after 
hatching the egg as its mother (Lorenz, 1935), or a tick an object of 37° C which exudes 
buteric acid as a food source (Uexküll, 1909), human beings can represent their environment 
in an unlimited number of contingent ways. Humans both represent their environment as the 
expression of metaphysical forces, or as a closed causal chain of events governed by universal 
laws. They attribute supernatural essences to the natural world – as is the case in animism – or 
reduce all life to lifeless atomic interaction. They can even view themselves as either radically 
different creatures from all other organisms on this planet – rational beings, as Aristotle has it  
– or as merely another species within the primate genus. Finally,  humans both explain the 
origin of the world as the intentional creation of a divine being or as the result of the sudden 
expansion of an extremely dense ‘singularity’. 
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This, however, does not mean that there is no common ground to be found when comparing 
the  ways  in  which  different  cultures  represent  the  world.  As  pointed  out  in  chapter  1, 
comparative  anthropology  and  developmental  psychology  reveal  universal  cognitive 
predispositions to represent aspects of the world in particular ways (cf. folk physics and folk 
biology). It only means that, while these cognitive universals underlie all human thought, they 
do not produce an invariable set of representations shared by all human beings, and this is  
precisely because the human mind is able to transgress the commonsense representations it 
holds in virtue of these universals. 
In this light,  human culture cannot be reduced to human nature, nor can it  be completely 
dissociated from it. This is at the basis of Wilson and Lumsden’s (1981) ‘leash principle’. 
Human culture,  in  all  its  mind-blowing diversity,  ultimately remains  connected to  human 
nature.  Similarly,  Ruse (1995:158)  claims  that  culture ‘sits  on top of  a bed of  biological 
constraints and dispositions’ - it is ‘the flesh which adheres to the skeleton of biology’. This, 
however,  as  Ruse  points  out,  does  not  imply  that  culture  is  completely  controlled  by 
biological forces (158). Indeed, while our biology undoubtedly underlies the ways in which 
we come to view the world, it does not straightforwardly determine it. Culture, in other words, 
wanders ‘freely’ within the boundaries set by nature. 
2.4 Conceptual spaces: reconciling openness and closure
The fact that we entertain an open cognitive relation with the world does not entail that there 
are no limits to the ways we can represent the world. As pointed out, nature still  imposes 
boundaries on our cultural expressions. Human thought, therefore, while able to produce an 
infinite  amount  of  representations  of the world,  is  still  constrained by both the particular 
perceptual and cognitive abilities producing these representations. We can, in other words, not 
represent any possible subject matter in any possible way, merely in an infinite  amount of 
ways within the limits imposed by our nature. 
Boden’s (1990:89-91) concept of a ‘conceptual space’ is enlightening in this context. Drawing 
from research in Artificial  Intelligence,  Boden defines a conceptual  space as the space of 
computational possibilities a system can generate. Such a ‘generative system’, as Boden puts 
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it, is composed out of data and action rules, enabling the system to generate a number of 
locations. Chess, for example, allows for a number of possible board-positions based on the 
particular data – i.e. the different pieces and the structure of the board – and action rules – the 
rules by which those pawns can be moved across the board. Based on these data and rules, all  
possible board positions can be generated. 
The number of locations within a conceptual space is dependent on the data and rules of the 
generative  system.  The possible  locations  that  can be yielded  by a  game of  noughts  and 
crosses are obviously fewer than those of a game of chess, where the total amount of locations 
reaches astronomical proportions. Other generative systems even yield an infinite amount of 
possible locations within their particular conceptual space. As pointed out, natural languages 
can express an infinite amount of intelligible sentences based on a finite set of words (i.e. 
data) and grammatical rules (i.e. action rules). 
Conceptual spaces,  therefore,  can both contain an infinite  amount of locations,  and at the 
same time be contained within particular limits. In much the same way as there are an infinite 
number of cardinal values between the number two and three, there can be an infinite number 
of locations in a particular conceptual space. This is the case for human thought. Endowed 
with an open cognitive relation to the world, we can produce (in principle) an infinite amount 
of  representations  of  the  world,  within  the  limits  set  by  our  perceptual  and  cognitive 
apparatus. 
When exploring its conceptual space, the human mind does not visit locations in a random 
fashion. It is predisposed to apply certain reasoning patterns (action rules) to certain subject 
matters (data) and, therefore, is drawn towards certain locations within the conceptual space, 
while ignoring other locations. Just as a chess player will use certain guidelines – such as, for 
instance, ‘protect the queen’ – and will not try any permissible move at random, our mind 
does not wander blindly in its conceptual space, but selectively, yielding particular locations.
Boden (1990:89) refers to these guidelines as heuristics. They enable any cognitive system to 
move  ‘insightfully’  through the  conceptual  space  generated  by  the  system.  Heuristics,  in 
Boden’s words, ‘prune the search tree’ (91). They save the problem solver from having to 
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visit  every location  in  the  conceptual  space,  by ignoring  parts  of  it.  These  heuristics  are 
necessary  when  you  are  dealing  with  an  extensive  and,  a  fortiori,  an  infinite  amount  of 
locations  in  a  conceptual  space,  as  is  the  case  for  the  space  containing  human  thought 
processes. While a successful game of noughts and crosses might still be played by selecting 
the  proper  move  through  testing  every  possible  move  by  trial  and  error,  this  becomes 
impossible when the set of locations within a conceptual spaces is increased exponentially. 
Indeed, while a computer with enormous computational power might still use trial and error in 
chess, processing astronomical numbers of potential moves per second, the human mind is 
forced to ‘prune the search tree’ and to use pathways in exploring the conceptual space.
In this regard, when it comes to representing our environment, natural selection has provided 
us with a number of heuristics. These heuristics yield a particular set of locations – referred to 
by Carey and Spelke  (1994) as  innate  knowledge systems,  by Mithen (1996) as  domain-
specific knowledge systems, and by Carruthers (2006) as modules – which determine the way 
we are predisposed to conceptualise about particular aspects of the world (cf. chapter 3 – 4. 
Mapping  across  domains).  Without  these  heuristics,  it  would  be  virtually  impossible  to 
stumble upon useful representations – i.e. representations which boost an organism’s chances 
of survival and reproduction – leaving the organism at the mercy of blind trial and error. In 
other words, natural selection has provided us with pathways within our conceptual space, 
zoning in on locations that boost our fitness, while ignoring other parts. 
However, as pointed out, we can transgress those innately based representations – i.e. we can 
explore different locations in our conceptual space other than those which natural selection 
has led us to. The human mind has, indeed, the distinctive ability to forge new pathways in its  
conceptual space, exploring new locations and therefore representing the world in ways that 
go beyond and against its predisposed views. Transgressing representations, in this regard, are 
the  result  of  changing  heuristics.  They can’t,  however,  take  us  beyond  the  limits  of  our 
conceptual space. A conceptual space, as pointed out, is defined by a generative system that 
comprises a particular set of data and a particular set of action-rules. Together they yield all 
the possible locations a cognitive system can generate. In this light, we are endowed with a 
particular set of data – i.e. the input we gather from the world – and a particular set of action-
rules – i.e. the cognitive operations we can perform on these data. Based on this, we can 
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generate a particular set of representations. The fact, however, that these representations are 
not limited in number,  does not – as pointed out above – entail that our conceptual space 
contains all possible locations.
In the next section, I will investigate the ways in which our sensory and cognitive apparatuses 
limit the transgressing representations that the human mind can yield. Drawing from this view 
of human cognition as a generative system, defining a conceptual space and endowed with 
heuristics to explore that space, I will argue that we are both biased against producing some 
representations,  and  straightforwardly  closed  off  to  the  possibility  of  shaping  some 
representations. A bias exists when, due to the nature of our perceptual and cognitive abilities, 
we are unlikely to reach certain locations within our conceptual space, while closure refers to 
the locations outside our conceptual space.
3. Limits of transgression
While  we  can  transgress  our  commonsense  representations,  endowing  us  with  an  open 
cognitive relation to the world, our sensory and cognitive faculties do, nevertheless, restrict 
the possible representations we can produce. Indeed, as pointed out above, we can both be 
biased against  representing the world in a certain way due to the particular  nature of our 
senses and cognitive apparatus, and closed off to certain representations. In terms of Boden’s 
(1990) conceptual space, the representations we are biased against shaping remain within our 
conceptual space, but require pathways we are unlikely to employ, while the representations 
that we are closed off from shaping are located outside the limits of our conceptual space. 
3.1 Bias from representing the world in a particular way
3.1.1 Sensory input
We represent the world based on the input we gather from it. Through the senses that we have 
evolved,  we receive  a  particular  set  of  input  from the  world.  These sensory data  are  the 
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objects of our representations. When we see a stone falling to the ground, we explain this by 
referring to its innate tendency to be on the ground, or by referring to the law of gravity, 
according to which a greater mass attracts a smaller one. Similarly, we explain thunder and 
lightning in terms of the intentional action of an angry god, or as the electrical discharge from 
colliding clouds. Every theory about the world, in this light, is constructed from the data we 
gather from the world.
However,  as  pointed  out  in  chapter  1  (cf.  2.4.1  Perceptual  closure),  we  only  perceive 
particular aspects of the world. Only a small part of the available stimuli trigger our senses. 
Indeed, we perceive stimuli only within particular ranges, and endowed only with a certain 
level of resolution; and, most importantly, there are vast realms of potential data in the world 
for which we simply have not evolved the appropriate sensory receptors. This leaves us with a 
narrow scope on the world. 
Nevertheless,  we  extend  the  reach  of  our  senses  through  ‘artificial  detecting  devices’, 
allowing us to gather input from the world that falls beyond the scope of our naked senses. 
We create telescopes, microscopes, antennas and stethoscopes, enabling us to detect otherwise 
unperceivable entities both in the macro- and microscopic realm. Furthermore, rather than just 
increasing the resolution of our senses, we possess devices that detect ranges of phenomena 
we cannot perceive, such as, for instance, the invisible part of the electromagnetic spectrum, 
and the inaudible frequencies of sound. Finally, we even detect phenomena for which we have 
no sensory receptors at all, such as air pressure, through barometers and magnetic fields. 
In this regard, assuming that the physical world is causally closed – i.e. that all entities exert a 
causal effect on other entities – we could, in principle, detect every entity and property in the 
world. Indeed, while we might not be able to observe some aspects of reality, if these aspects 
influence other aspects, which again change others ad infinitum, all elements in the world 
must  eventually  leave  a  trace  that  we can gather  through observation  and its  mechanical 
extensions.  Physical  entities  do  not,  indeed,  have  to  be  detected  by  a  particular  sense 
‘designed’ to detect it. Light, for instance, can yield auditory stimuli, just as sound can be 
translated into graphs by a computer. In this context, interestingly enough, the theory of the 
big bang was first confirmed by the accidental recording of a persistent low noise by a six 
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meter horn antenna originally built to detect radio waves bounced off echo balloon satellites. 
This mysterious sound turned out to be caused by radiation released by the big bang (Dycke, 
et al, 1965). In other words, light wavelengths originating from the blast at the birth of the 
universe interfered with this hyper sensitive antenna, causing it to produce a faint, constant 
noise. In this regard, all physical phenomena could, in principle, be detected, as long as they 
exert even the tiniest influence in the causal chain of physical events.
Nevertheless, some entities or properties of the world are easier to detect than others. The 
existence of the sun is much easier to detect than the existence of Jupiter’s moons, since we 
are able to detect the former with the naked eye and the latter only with telescopes. Similarly,  
the existence of Jupiter’s moons is easier to detect than the existence of the above mentioned 
radiation caused by the big bang, since the latter cannot be detected by a ‘simple’ telescope, 
but requires high-tech radar equipment and the proper scientific hypothesis – i.e. the birth of 
the universe in a big bang – to explain the particular recording. Therefore, while it might be 
the case that no physical entities are impossible to detect in principle, the detection of some 
entities is rendered much easier than the detection of others by the nature of our particular 
senses.
In this context, imagine that human beings did not possess the sense of vision. All other things 
being equal, they could feel, smell, taste and hear, as well as apply all our cognitive abilities  
to this input. Their blind scientists, it seems, would have to overcome enormous odds to detect 
some of the physical entities and properties we observe without much trouble through our 
sense of vision and its extensions.  Indeed, being aware of shapes by touch, they could come 
up with  a  similar  spatial  representation  (objects  dispersed  in  space).  Assuming  that  they 
invented some orientation device based on magnetism, they could, by crossing the earth in 
straight lines, even come to represent the planet earth as round. This discovery would lead 
them to conceptualise their planet as a round sphere surrounded by ether. Furthermore, they 
would  be  aware  of  a  regular  alternation  of  day  and  night  by  the  obvious  difference  in 
temperature, and could conceive of a heat source that crosses the surface of the earth during a 
certain period of time from one side to the other.
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However, the conceptualising of this heat source as a celestial body at some distance from the 
earth, and the movement of this heat source as the result of the spinning motion described by 
the earth,  would be anything but evident.  Furthermore,  knowledge of the existence of the 
other planets in our galaxy, let alone the existence of other galaxies and stars, would have 
been almost impossible to achieve without vision (and its extensions), which offers all these 
entities  in  plain sight.  The discovery of planets  (literally:  wandering stars),  and later,  the 
heliocentric  model  of  the universe,  are,  in this  context,  the  product  of careful  stargazing. 
Without vision, it bears no doubt that scientists would have to overcome enormous odds to 
zone in on these basic insights into our universe. They would need to capture all this input  
from the universe, which is currently simply given to us at the end of a telescope or even by 
plain sight, by other means. While light radiation can, as pointed out above, yield an auditory 
signal, it  seems, however, a Herculean task to unravel the layout of our galaxy and other 
nearby galaxies from mere auditory signals. 
Furthermore, awareness of the existence of microscopic entities seems equally problematic. 
Undoubtedly, our blind scientists would have enormous difficulties in detecting the existence 
of microscopic organisms or the cells that make up all organic bodies on this planet. While 
they could have basic ecological and anatomical knowledge, representing the interaction of 
organisms on this planet and mapping organs and tracing their function, it would be extremely 
difficult  for  those  blind  biologists  and  anatomists  to  form  an  accurate  and  precise 
representation of either microscopic organisms (as microbes) or the microscopic structure of 
organic tissue – i.e. cells. They might make conjectures of such entities fulfilling the function 
that they do, much as we conjecture about atoms, electrons and quarks without observing 
them, but without receiving any sensory input from these entities, it is very unlikely that these 
hypotheses would represent these microscopic entities as precisely.
Finally, distinctions we draw in our environment based on visual data alone would obviously 
be problematic to make. This could lead their zoologists to mistakenly group different kinds 
of butterflies (which only differ in the patterns on their wings) under the same species, their 
botanists to fail to distinguish red from white roses (granted they only differ in colour), and 
their evolutionists to ignore the adaptive feature of camouflage in animals. Similarly,  their 
geneticists would be much more likely to overlook the heredity of hair and eye colour, and 
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their ethologists the cause of some animal behaviour, granted that it is triggered by vision 
alone. 
In this regard, due to the nature of their sensory input, our blind scientists would be biased 
against discovering the existence of some physical entities and properties.  They would, in 
other words, have enormous difficulties in discovering elements we gather by merely opening 
our eyes.  Therefore,  while we are not restricted to the data we access through our naked 
senses and can – in principle – extend our perceptual reach to possibly all physical entities  
and properties,  the detection  of  some becomes  an extremely difficult  task because of the 
particular nature of our senses. Indeed, we could very well be those blind scientists for some 
other species which has more senses and can therefore access entities without any problem for 
which we would need a whole arsenal of complex technological support. 
Detecting mechanisms,  in this sense, are better  described as extension devices of existing 
senses than radically new and different artificial senses. In discovering data from the physical 
world, we start from what we gather through our naked senses, and extend our reach from 
there.  We  do  not  delve  into  completely  different  realms  of  data  with  these  artificial  
mechanisms at once, but gradually work our way up to more and more inaccessible data.  
Indeed,  how could  we construct  a  mechanism that  measures  something  of  which  we are 
totally ignorant? We can only direct our gaze to entities we know or at least have reason to 
suppose exist. This ‘sharpened gaze’ through mechanical detection devices then opens up the 
existence of new entities, which again enables us to focus our gaze, providing us with a new 
set of bearings to further direct our detection of aspects of the world. 
Therefore,  while  we  might  not  be  irremediably  closed  off  to  some  physical  entities  and 
properties,  we are still  biased against detecting some aspects of the world because of the 
particular nature of our senses. This entails that some representations, requiring the detection 
of such aspects, could very well be nearly impossible to reach, like macro- and microscopic 
structures  to  our  blind  scientists.  Indeed,  we  extend  our  reach  to  unobservable  entities, 
transgressing the subset of input  data our senses provide us with,  but can only do so by 
gradually  departing  from the  data  that  are  already  given  to  us.  This  provides  us  with  a 
perceptual  bias:  some  elements  will  be  (relatively)  easy  to  discover,  because  of  their 
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proximity to elements we already observe, while others might be extremely hard for us to 
gather. More or different senses, in this regard, would provide us with a different set of input 
that  we  observe  through  our  senses  and,  therefore,  a  different  perceptual  bias,  making 
different elements of the world more accessible. 
3.1.2 Intuitive grasp
While  we  can  transgress  our  intuitive  or  commonsense  representations  of  the  world  (cf. 
chapter 3), these intuitive grasps of the world still underlie to an important extent the way we 
come to represent the world in our scientific – i.e. transgressing – attempts to explain the 
world. As De Cruz and De Smedt (2007) point out, although science has parted ways with 
intuitively based folk theories, we can nevertheless expect that they will continue to play a 
role in scientific enquiry, since the human mind is evolved to understand objects in the world 
according to these intuitive categories. 
Considering the case of scientific theories about human evolution, De Cruz and De Smedt 
(2007) argue that  not  only do intuitive  ontologies32 (i.e.  the intuitive  categories  and their 
respective modes of inferences underlying our folk theories) shape intuitions about human 
evolution, but they also guide the direction and topics of interest in the research programmes. 
In  exploring  the  relationship  between  intuitive  ontologies  and  the  scientific  discourse 
surrounding human evolution, De Cruz and De Smedt point to two distinct intuitive modes of 
understanding  that  are  relevant  to  the  issue  of  human  evolution;  namely,  the  human-
nonhuman distinction and psychological essentialism. The first is a psychological mechanism 
enabling us to distinguish conspecifics from nonconspecifics, an adaptation we share with 
most species, helping us to, among other things, recognise potential mates. The second, on the 
other  hand,  makes  it  possible  to  override  perceptual  differences,  enabling  us  to  make 
inductive inferences about food, predators and other ecological features relevant for survival 
and reproduction. While the first intuitive ontology – i.e. the human-nonhuman distinction – 
leads  us  to  consider  human  evolution  as  exceptional,  the  second  –  i.e.  psychological 
essentialism – leads us to derive from the extensive similarities between humans and apes that 
32 Boyer (2000:277), from whom De Cruz and De Smedt borrowed the term ‘intuitive ontologies’, describes it as 
‘a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ‘natural metaphysics’.’
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they share the same essence, minimising the difference in psychological abilities that both 
species are endowed with (358). 
The tacit  assumption that  the human species  is  unique has led palaeoanthropologists  to a 
unilineal  view  of  human  evolution.  Mayr  (1950:115-116),  for  instance,  argued  that  all 
hominids can be grouped in a single lineage from australopithecines through homo habilis to 
homo  sapiens.  This,  however,  is  in  sharp  contrast  with  the  usual  branching  pattern  of 
evolution,  and was  explained  away by Mayr  by invoking  the  fact  that  hominids  did  not 
speciate because,  possessing culture,  they occupied more ecological niches than any other 
species (De Cruz and De Smedt, 2007:359). In other words, because they entered the cultural 
realm, human beings are part of a unique evolutionary process. Recently, however, the finding 
of homo floresiensis, a small hominid with the brain size of an australopithecine, dated at 
18  000  years  B.C.,  completely  overthrew  this  unilineal  view  on  human  evolution. 
Nevertheless, despite the discovery of many more genera within the hominid linea in the last 
decades, palaeoanthropologists still attempt to prune the tree of human evolution (De Cruz 
and De Smedt, 2007:361).  
Essentialism, on the other hand, leads us to minimise the difference between humankind and 
its  evolutionary  cousins.  As  De  Cruz  and  De  Smedt  (2007)  point  out,  from  a  radical  
separation between human and nonhuman, we often succumb to the opposite temptation of 
eradicating  the  difference  altogether.  In  this  context,  Diamond  (1992)  argues  that  an 
extraterrestrial  observer  would  objectively  classify  humankind  as  the  ‘third  chimpanzee’, 
thereby overlooking the blatant fact that this third chimpanzee writes about the two others in 
fluent grammatical language (De Cruz and De Smedt, 2007:363)! Moreover, much of current 
research in comparative psychology is directed at finding similarities between humans and 
nonhuman  primates.  Not  surprisingly,  the  interpretation  of  experiments  aimed  at  gauging 
primate  possession  of  a  theory  of  mind,  for  instance,  often  betrays  a  bias  towards 
anthropomorphising the apes (364). 
Furthermore, more than just directing and biasing scientific research, intuitive ontologies also 
exert a limiting function upon the extent to which they can be transgressed. We are, indeed, 
biased against representations which depart (too) radically from our predisposed views of the 
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world. Such counter-intuitive hypotheses about the world often fail to convince us, and incite 
us to produce representations which are more in line with our intuitive understanding of the 
world. As De Cruz and De Smedt (2007) point out, without intuitive notions to guide them, 
scientists often fail to agree on even the most basic foundations of their field. In this regard, 
evolutionary biologists still disagree over what constitutes the basic unit of selection, what 
constitutes  a  species  and how evolution  takes  place  (i.e.  as  a  gradual  process  or  one  of 
punctuated equilibriums) (357). Even more so, in physics, research fields such as quantum 
theory  and M-theory,  better  known as  string theory,  remain  highly  speculative,  and their 
distinctively counter-intuitive implications cause wide-spread criticism and disagreement. In 
these cases, without a conceptual grip provided by our intuitive notions, we are doomed to 
remain cognitively unsatisfied. Indeed, when these speculative conjectures violate our sense 
of causality or our basic intuitions about space and time (stating, for instance, that a particle 
can both be in space A and B at the same time T) – as is the case in quantum theory – we 
cannot  easily  accept  them.  This  leads  to  a  situation  where  science  is  either  in  line  with 
intuitive ontologies, and can therefore be suspected to be biased, or departs radically from 
these ontologies, but strikes us as distinctly unrealistic. 
In this regard, while we are able to transgress our commonsense representations, the intuitive 
ontologies  at  the  core  of  these  representations  still  play  a  role  in  the  transgressing 
representations we produce. As shown by De Cruz and De Smedt (2007), intuitive ontologies 
are  pervasive  in  scientific  discourse,  directing  research  and  biasing  the  interpretation  of 
experimental results. When science, on the other hands, departs radically from our intuitive 
grasp of the world, violating some core intuitions, we cannot invest the same amount of belief 
in these representations and find our minds turning away from these conjectures, looking for 
alternatives which are more in agreement with our guiding intuitions.   
Therefore, much as our senses bias us against detecting certain elements of the world, our 
cognitive  nature  biases  us  against  interpreting  the  world  in  certain  ways.  Transgressing 
representations, in this context, start from intuition and extend from there. The further away 
we move from our intuitive grasp of the world, the fewer guiding notions we have, and the 
more difficulty we have in accepting those representations. In this context, just as we can 
transgress the particular data yielded by our sensory apparatuses, but are still biased towards 
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discovering  data  in  the  proximity  of  these  data,  we  can  transgress  our  commonsense 
representations of the world, but are biased towards producing theories which are still centred 
around these particular intuitive notions. Some representations, therefore, either because they 
require input data we are not likely to detect, or because they require us to overthrow our 
intuitive grasp of the world too radically,  are situated at the outer limits of our conceptual 
space. While we are not closed off to those representations in principle, the pathways they 
require  through our conceptual  space in order  to be reached are unlikely to be employed 
because of the working of our senses and our cognitive predispositions. There are, however, 
representations which are not merely unlikely to be shaped, but which are straightforwardly 
impossible to be conceived by the human mind. These are the locations situated outside our 
conceptual space and the subject of our next section. 
3.2 Closure from representing the world in a particular way
3.2.1 Sensory resources
When conceptualising about physical entities, we engage our sensory based imagination. We 
reduce  the  physical  world  to  basic  elements  such  as  water,  air,  earth  and  fire,  we 
conceptualise it as atoms hovering in ether, and we even conjecture that those basic elements 
are waves or strings rather than particles. However far those models take us away from the 
way the world appears to us in perception, they nevertheless still yield to a sensory grasp. In  
this  sense,  when conceptualising sound as propagated  waves and light  as electromagnetic 
wavelengths – thereby transgressing the commonsensical confusion of the physical cause of 
these perceptions with their phenomenal qualities – we do so by reconceptualising them by 
means of the sensory resources at our disposal.
McGinn (1989:358) argues that the theoretical concepts we use to describe the physical world 
are formed by an analogical extension of what we observe. He refers to this as a ‘principle of 
homogeneity’  operating  in  our  introduction  of  theoretical  concepts  on  the  basis  of 
observation. This, according to McGinn, is at the basis of the insolubility of the mind-body 
problem, since inference to the best explanation of physical data (i.e. physiological data of the 
brain), will never take us outside the physical realm (i.e. the realm that can be conceptualised 
124
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
in  sensory terms),  leaving consciousness  out  of the equation.  The core of the mind-body 
problem, in other words, according to McGinn, is that theoretical concepts about brain states 
will always be perception based or ‘imagible’ as Krellenstein (1995:235) puts it, and therefore 
unable to connect with consciousness, i.e. unobservable subjective experiences. 
In this sense, McGinn (1989:358) argues, we arrive at the concept of a molecule based on our 
perceptual representations of macroscopic objects, conceiving of smaller scale objects of the 
same kind. Unobservable material  objects,  in  other  words,  are  conceptualised based upon 
observation  based  imagination.  Such  a  theory  of  concept  formation,  as  Krellenstein 
(1995:242) points out, does not pertain to all abstract concepts, but only to concepts providing 
causal explanations of physical entities and properties. Numbers or numerical relations, for 
instance, are not grasped by means of perception based models. 
McGinn's  case  for  this  homogeneity  constraint,  however,  is  subject  to  critique.  Kukla 
(2005:69) argues that this principle of homogeneity can either be considered normative – i.e. 
theories should conform to this principle – or descriptive – i.e. our mental apparatus  cannot 
explain the world without this analogical extension of the senses. The interesting case here, 
and the one McGinn needs to prove,  is the latter.  This descriptive principle,  according to 
Kukla,  can 'easily'  be shown to be false.  It  is,  he continues,  disproved by the intentional  
concepts of folk psychology, on the one hand, and by the concepts of quantum mechanics, on 
the other hand. In folk psychology, as he points out, we introduce intentions, desires and so 
on,  based on our  observation  of  human  behaviour.  These  intentions  cannot,  according to 
Kukla,  be  seen  as  analogical  extensions  of  perceptual  concepts  (69-70).  This  counter 
argument, however, does not concern us, since I only made the case for a perception based 
introduction of theoretical concepts pertaining to physical entities and properties. 
The second counter argument, however, needs answering. The quantum mechanical concept 
of superposition of states can, according to Kukla (2005), hardly be regarded as an analogical 
extension of observational  concepts.  While  this  can still  seen to  be the case for classical 
conceptions  of  atoms  and  electrons,  Kukla  argues,  it  no  longer  holds  for  the  quantum-
mechanical postulation of the ubiquitus electron, as it is not at one location at a specific time. 
This according to Kukla, overthrows the descriptive principle of homogeneity, since we can 
125
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
not imagine an electron being at more than one location at a time, yet we are still able to 
postulate it (70).
With the replacement of Bohr’s atom as a miniature solar system by Heisenberg’s quantum 
mechanics, in which particles could not be visualised because they have purely mathematical 
meaning,  the observational  basis  (or imaginability)  of the physical  theory describing sub-
atomic interactions was indeed lost. This, however, as Miller (2000) points out, does not mean 
that the role of visual imagination in modelling the physical world came to an end. As he 
points out, Heisenberg, and later Feynman, strove towards a new form of visual imagination, 
resulting in the Feynman diagrams. These diagrams, rather than reflecting the actual physical 
processes, enable scientists to think imaginatively about the underlying mathematics. In other 
words, rather than reflecting the structure of the physical world – which as Kukla (2005) 
rightly points out, can no longer be visually reflected – they reflect the structure of the theory.  
Miller (2000), in this regard, distinguishes between visualisation and visualisability.  While 
visualisation refers to visual imagery which is abstracted from phenomena given in perception 
(e.g. Bohr’s atom as a miniature solar system), enabling scientists to imagine outcomes in 
their ‘mind’s eye’,  visualisability refers to this new form of visual imagination, where the 
scientist  no  longer  attempts  to  visualise  sub-atomic  entities  but  nevertheless  uses  visual 
imagery to represent the mathematical structure of the theory. 
 
Furthermore, quantum-mechanics still conceptualises the interaction of matter and energy as 
both particle and wave-like behaviour, thereby using visually graspable concepts. In this light, 
the visual factor remains present in this 'extremely transgressing’ theory, both as a support for 
scientists to grasp the mathematical structure of the theory (cf. Miller's visualisability), and, 
more importantly,  in order to conceptualise the physical entities themselves – i.e. the sub-
atomic entities viewed as both particle and wave-like. 
In  this  sense,  there  are  different  levels  of  perception  based  representations.  On  a 
commonsense level, we equate what we perceive with what is. The second level transgresses 
these  representations  by  reconceptualising  physical  entities  and  properties  with  their 
perception based imagination. The third and final level throws this imaginability overboard, 
theorising about physical entities in such a way that it can no longer be visualised. This level, 
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nonetheless, does not do away with the perceptual base of the model as such, but merely with 
the possibility of playing it out in our ‘mind’s eye’. As Krellenstein (1995) points out, the 
more perceptually remote and – he argues – therefore less satisfying concepts, must still be 
‘imagable’, i.e. they must still be perception based (albeit not yielding to visualisation) (247). 
There is, in other words, a bias – a decreasing cognitive satisfaction the more perceptually 
remote the model becomes – ending in closure, that all models must still be ‘imagable’ – they 
must still draw on perceptual resources. 
Indeed, we cannot reduce our models of the physical world to mathematical equations or other 
non perceptual  models  alone.  Barbour (1974:29-30),  in  this  regard,  distinguishes  between 
different  kinds  of scientific  models.  The first  are  experimental  models,  designed to solve 
practical problems such as, for instance, wind-tunnels that are used to gauge the lifting force 
of a particular wing structure of an airplane. The second, at the opposite extreme, are logical 
models  –  formal  deductive  systems  based  on  axioms  and  theorems.  Those  models  deal 
entirely in the realm of ideas. The third kind of model is what Barbour calls mathematical  
models.  They are symbolic representations of quantitative variables in physical and social 
systems, such as, for instance, equations expressing the relation between supply and demand 
in economics. Those models mirror their object in formal structure. The fourth kind, finally, 
are  theoretical  models.  Rather  than  just  enabling  us  to  make  predictions  by  representing 
quantitative variables, those modules are aimed at understanding their object. Their intent is to 
represent the underlying structure of the world. In order to do so, they postulate imaginative 
mental constructs accounting for the observed phenomena. 
According to Barbour (1974), these mental constructs are shaped by analogy with familiar 
mechanisms and processes. Theoretical models, such as, for instance the billiard-ball model of 
gas, which postulates that gas is composed of tiny spheres bouncing around like colliding 
billiard-balls, then enable the development of theories, involving equations interrelating (in 
the given example) mass, velocity, energy and momentum of these hypothetical spheres (30-
31).  These  models,  Barbour  argues,  need  not  be  picturable  as  such.  We  can,  indeed, 
selectively  suppress  visual  features,  such  as  when  imagining  colourless  elastic  spheres. 
Nevertheless, they must be conceivable. They must, according to Barbour, be intelligible as 
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units, providing us with ‘a mental picture whose unity can be more readily understood than 
that of a set of abstract equations’. They do, therefore, make use of visual imagery (33).
Leaving  this  perceptual  basis  completely  behind  and  reducing  the  physical  world  to 
mathematical  equations,  in  this  light,  would  both  rob  us  of  the  framework  necessary  to 
develop theory, and – while still enabling us to make predictions (cf. mathematical models) – 
render us mute as to the nature of the objects of our study. Indeed, as Barbour (1974) argues,  
theoretical models in science account for observed phenomena, not just by predicting them, 
but also by explaining them: ‘representing the underlying structures of the world’ (30). Their 
subject is the (physical) object or phenomenon itself, not just the quantitative variables those 
phenomena are governed by. Theoretical models, in this sense, cannot be reduced to purely 
formal  or mathematical  models.  According to Barbour,  in opposition to an instrumentalist 
view of science,  it  is  now increasingly accepted  that  explanation  cannot  be equated  with 
prediction (41). Toulmin (1961), in this regard, cites the fact that Babylonians could predict 
eclipses from time tables, but could offer no reasons for this occurrence. Not possessing a 
heliocentric view of the universe, one can hardly say they understood the phenomenon. 
Moreover,  as  Barbour  (1974)  points  out,  scientists  report  that  visual  imagery  often 
predominates over verbal and mathematical thinking in scientific discovery (33-34). Visual 
models,  in  other  words,  drive  the  development  of  new  theories.  Furthermore,  different 
(perception based) models yield different theories, defining different rules of correspondence 
between a set  of postulated terms and observable variables  (31).  Our grasp of the world, 
therefore, is dependent on the perception based models we have at our disposal. This entails 
that we would be closed to representations of the world which resist being grasped through 
the perception based models we can shape. 
Those  models  are  the  product  of  our  sensory apparatus.  The fact  that  mental  imagery  is 
connected  with  our  sense  of  vision  is  –  next  to  being  supported  by  our  commonsense 
observation – confirmed by extensive empirical evidence (cf. Kosslyn, 1980).  Therefore, the 
particular  senses  we have  evolved provide grounding to  the perception  based models  we 
produce in theorising about the world. This entails that different senses would have provided 
128
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
us with a different substrate to model the world, and would therefore have yielded different 
representations of the world, which are now irremediably beyond our ken. 
Moreover, rather than being restricted to our five senses in modelling physical entities and 
properties,  we  are  restricted  to  vision  alone.  Evolution  did,  indeed,  provide  us  with  a 
dominant sense. As pointed out in chapter 1 (cf. 4.1.3 Human perception), as primates we rely 
primarily on our sense of vision. This entails that our representation of the world is mainly a 
visual one, as opposed to many other mammal species who rely more on their olfactory and/or 
auditory sense. This dominant sense, I argue, rather than just providing us with the set of data  
upon which we rely the most in our interaction with the environment, also underlies the way 
in which we – as cognitively highly developed primates – come to conceptualise the physical 
world. 
Indeed, as shown above, all physical entities are conceptualised in a visual way by human 
beings. The physical cause of sound is viewed as waves, and that of taste and smell is viewed 
as particular molecules, which – like all molecules and sub-molecular parts, for that matter – 
are conceptualised visually. Similarly, heat is explained in terms of the movement of atoms, 
as are the three states of solid, liquid and gas. Finally, matter itself is conceptualised in terms 
of molecules consisting of atoms which consist of electrons circling neutrons and protons, 
which  again  are  conceptualised  as  quarks,  etc.  Whether  matter  is  ultimately  reduced  to 
particles or waves or even strings, we always model it in a visual way.
 
Evidence for this role of vision in cognition can be found in language. As pointed out in the 
previous chapter, language can be seen as a mirror of thought (cf. chapter 3 – 4.2 Analogy and 
metaphor), externalising our thought processes. In this context, interestingly enough, natural 
languages boost an impressive set of visual metaphors for cognition. We exclaim ‘I see’ to 
indicate that we understand something, ask someone to ‘clarify’ a concept, or point out that 
something is ‘clear’. Moreover, when having a new understanding of something, we refer to 
this  as  an  ‘insight’,  and  when  we  can’t  remember  something,  we  have  a  blank.  Finally, 
somebody’s opinion is often phrased as a ‘view’, and a great idea as a ‘vision’. Seeing and 
thinking seem to be inextricably linked for homo sapiens, and when conceptualising about the 
(physical)  world,  the  limits  of  our  models  are  set  by  the  limits  of  our  vision  based 
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imagination. In this light, it is no coincidence that even the very concept of ‘imagination’ is a 
visual metaphor. 
Therefore, if evolution provided us with different senses or even just a different dominant 
sense, we would have been endowed with a radically different substrate for these conceptual 
activities.  We would,  in other words, represent the world with a radically different  set  of 
conceptual tools, not confining our models to visual imagery (as particles, wavelengths or 
strings) but to a whole different set of modelling tools. The fact that it is impossible for us to 
think about physical entities and properties outside this visual framework shows that we are 
irremediably confined in our conceptual  imagination to use visually graspable data.  How, 
indeed, could we make sense of atoms, electrons or quarks with olfactory or auditory models? 
Considering that our grasp of the world depends on the modelling tools at our disposal (cf. 
Barbour,  1974),  there  is  no  escaping  the  conclusion  that  we  are  irremediably  closed  to 
representations of the world which resist being grasped through the visually based models we 
must apply to physical entities and properties.
3.2.2 Cognitive resources
As pointed out in the previous chapter (cf. 6.2 Variation through recombination), we can only 
transgress our predisposed views of the world by recombining the elements we gather from 
our perceptual input and the cognitive tools at our disposal. Creativity, as Boden (1990:29) 
puts it, must be produced by the mind’s own resources. Indeed, we produce representations 
transgressing our biologically biased views not by applying new reasoning patterns to subject 
matters,  but  by  applying  different  but  familiar  reasoning  patterns  to  the  ones  we  are 
predisposed to apply to those subject matters. We can, in other words, only form new and 
transgressing  representations  by  changing  the  mix  of  ingredients  at  our  disposal,  not  by 
introducing new ingredients.
In this sense, Ruse (1986) argues that while the products of science (i.e. the representations or 
theories  it  produces) transcend their  organic origin,  the methods science employs  and the 
principles it adheres to are still firmly rooted in our biology. Our scientific endeavours, in 
other words, as far as they can take us away from our uncritical commonsense assumptions, 
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still  flow through biologically  channelled  modes  of  thinking imposed  on us  by evolution 
(149).  How else,  indeed,  could  we think  about  the  world,  other  than  with  the  particular  
reasoning abilities we possess? 
Ruse  (1986)  refers  to  these  innate  reasoning  patterns  underlying  all  human  thought  as 
epigenetic  rules.  This  term,  borrowed  from  Wilson  (1981),  designates  the  biological 
constraints on human cognition and behaviour as having their origin in evolutionary needs 
(Ruse 1986:143). A good example of such rules is the universal human classificatory schema 
into  which  colours  are  broken up (143-144),  or  the  incest  barriers  we find in  all  human 
cultures  (145-146).  Culture,  in this  context,  I  argue in agreement  with Ruse,  is  not some 
special disembodied phenomenon but ‘the flesh on a biological skeleton’, where the bones of 
that skeleton are epigenetic rules, controlled by our genetic constitution and fashioned by the 
hand of natural selection (147). 
Those epigenetic rules include the cognitive ingredients at our disposal; the building blocks of 
human reasoning. According to Ruse, they are the basic logical principles we adhere to in our 
reasoning, such as the law of the excluded middle (either it is raining or it is not raining) and 
of non-contradiction (it cannot both rain and not rain at the same time), the rule of modus 
ponens (if it rains we stay at home; it rains so we stay at home) and alternation (either we go 
out  or  we  stay  at  home;  we  don’t  go  out  so  we  stay  at  home)  (Ruse,  1986:156-157). 
Furthermore,  they include the basic premises and principles of mathematical thinking, our 
ability to draw causal relations, inductive and deductive reasoning, and so on. (158).  Pinker 
(2007), on the other hand, points to our reasoning patterns about space, time, substance and 
causality as the substrate of human thought (cf. Chapter 3 – 4.2 Analogy and metaphor).  
All human thinking, from the uncritical folk sciences we produce to the most advanced and 
counter-intuitive scientific conjectures, employs these basic ‘cognitive building blocks’. In the 
same way,  we cannot  experience  the  world  other  than  through  our  particular  senses;  we 
cannot think other than through those reasoning patterns evolution has provided us with. Once 
again delving into Boden’s (1990) A.I. jargon, those cognitive building blocks can be viewed 
as the action-rules which are applied to the data. Transgressing theories, as pointed out above 
(cf. 2.4 Reconciling openness and closure) do not employ different action rules, but rather 
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different  heuristics,  recombining  data  and  action  rules  in  novel  ways.  The  conceptual 
locations yielded by those transgressing theories remain, indeed, within our conceptual space, 
since it  contains all  logically possible  combinations  of the data  and rules we have at  our 
disposal. All the possible cocktails, in other words, which are based on the set of ingredients  
we possess.
Being the products of a blind process, the cognitive building blocks at the basis of human 
reasoning are contingent in much the same way as the experiential  realms yielded by our 
senses are contingent. In this regard, just as we could perceive the world differently, we could 
conceptualise it differently. As Ruse (1986) points out, the epigenetic rules underlying human 
sciences in particular and human reasoning in general are definitely adaptive and therefore the 
product of natural  selection.  Those reasoning patterns,  in other words, have been selected 
because they boosted the chances for survival and reproduction of our hominid ancestors in 
their environment. The proto-human, in this light, seeing three tigers enter a cave and two 
leaving, and inferring that there must still be one inside, was obviously more likely to be our 
ancestor than the one not endowed with these basic arithmetic skills, who thinks that the cave 
is now empty and enters it to set up camp (162-163). However, as argued in chapter 2, the fact 
that natural selection has fashioned our perceptual and cognitive abilities does not entail that 
they provide us with a complete and accurate representation of the world.
The  way  we  (can)  represent  the  world,  therefore,  is  highly  dependent  on  the  particular 
evolutionary road we have taken. Imagine, in this light, that we did not possess the innate 
faculty to represent numerical information, According to Spelke (2003) there are two distinct 
innate systems at the basis of our ability to represent numbers. With respect to small numbers 
(up to about 3) we are endowed with the innate faculty to represent the numerical identity 
exactly,  as well as the effects of adding or subtracting one. With respect to larger sets of  
numbers, we represent their approximate numerical magnitudes, enabling us for instance to 
gauge that a set of 50 is larger than a set of 25 (but not that a set of 31 is larger than a set of 
30) (297). These two distinct systems of representation are then combined by the human mind 
(cf.  Chapter  3  – 4.1 Mapping across  domains),  underlying  our  ability  to  represent  larger 
numbers exactly and therefore to count and engage in more complex mathematics (302).  
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Without these innate faculties underlying our sense of numeracy, therefore, not only could we 
never have developed mathematics,  but  all  modern scientific  representations  of the world 
would  be  unreachable.  Indeed,  as  science  relies  heavily  on  mathematics,  we could  never 
produce those theories. Furthermore, if we were unable to subdivide space and time into units, 
those basic frameworks through which we represent the world (we locate everything in the 
world in space and time) would be conceptualised in a radically different way, changing our 
representations at their very core. We wouldn’t,  for instance,  be aware – at least not in a 
quantifiable way – of the time we lived, the time we can expect to live, the distances we cross 
and the time it takes to cross them. 
Therefore,  lacking  such  a  cognitive  ability  or  set  of  epigenetic  rules,  a  whole  series  of 
representations  would  fall  outside  our  conceptual  space.  We  could  never  produce  these 
representations simply because we lack the appropriate action-rules to be performed on the 
data.  Similarly,  we can imagine a creature endowed with more cognitive building blocks; 
more  action-rules  it  can  apply  to  its  input.  This  would  yield  entire  new  realms  of 
representations  that  are  now  inaccessible  to  human  beings.  A  creature  with  such  extra 
reasoning patterns would look upon us in much the same way as we would look upon those 
numeracy-lacking  humans:  as  hopelessly  closed  off  to  some  fundamental  ways  of 
representing the world. Indeed, just as there are more data in the world than can be perceived 
by our contingently evolved senses, there must be more ways of conceptualising this input 
than can be done by our contingently evolved cognitive abilities. 
In this sense, the particular cognitive abilities that evolution has endowed us with limit the 
possible representations the human mind can produce, by providing us with a set of cognitive 
building blocks or innately grounded reasoning patterns that underlie all our representations. 
Lacking any of those building blocks would exclude a whole series of representations we now 
hold. Conversely, having more or different reasoning patterns would open up new realms of 
ways  to  represent  the  world,  which are  now irremediably  beyond  our  ken.  We could,  as 
pointed out above, very well be those a-numerical beings for some other cognitive creatures 
with a more extensive set of ‘epigenetic rules’. 
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Furthermore, rather than merely limiting the representations we can produce, our particular 
cognitive abilities also limit the possible representations we can grasp. In this sense, not only 
does  our  cognitive  apparatus  restrict  our  creative  ability  to  represent  the  world,  it  also 
determines the kind of representations that are intelligible to us. Imagine we attempted to 
explain basic mathematics to those a-numerical mind. Wouldn’t it simply be impossible for 
them to make sense of it? It would be an utterly hopeless endeavour, it seems: like trying to 
teach other primates to communicate in flawless English. 
Learning,  indeed,  is  not  merely  a  passive  process  of  acquiring  new  representations,  but 
requires the proper cognitive structures to couch the information one is exposed to. In this 
regard, we might have a harder time grasping relativity theory than subtraction and addition, 
or the grammatical structure of our mother tongue, but we can still extend our grasp to include 
it  by  applying  our  cognitive  building  blocks.  Indeed,  relativity  theory  uses  advanced 
mathematics,  which  can  ultimately  be  broken  down  into  reasoning  patterns  that  we  are 
endowed with, such as, for instance, the rules underlying logic and arithmetic (cf. epigenetic 
rules). A theory requiring radically different reasoning patterns, however, would simply be 
beyond our grasp, because we wouldn’t possess the proper cognitive structure to couch these 
representations. 
Therefore,  even if  we were handed representations  outside  of  our  conceptual  space  on  a 
platter  by some intelligent aliens, we would simply not have the tools to grasp them. We 
would  be  like  those  language  learning chimps  -  unable  to  grasp  the  correct  grammatical 
structures underlying human languages, no matter how hard our tutors try to teach us. It is, 
indeed, absurd – as Pinker (1994) points out – to try to have a different species emulate our 
instinctive form of communication.  How could they succeed without the proper cognitive 
module to acquire human language? Similarly, it would be absurd for these aliens to try to 
teach us sciences for which we do not have the proper cognitive tools – as absurd as trying to 
teach a creature to perceive the world in a different way than its senses permit. 
Indeed, as pointed out, transgressing theories overcome our commonsense representations. 
They do not, however, overcome our innately grounded reasoning patterns. We can, in other 
words, alter our beliefs about the world, but cannot alter the cognitive tools we apply to reach 
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those beliefs. As Ruse (1986:149) puts it, while the products of our scientific enquiry may 
transcend their biological origin – meaning that those theories transgress our folk theories 
which are shaped by natural selection to provide us with a useful framework to guide our 
interaction with the environment (cf. Chapter 1 – 3.2.3 Species-specificity) – its methods and 
principles  are  still  firmly  rooted  in  biology.  Therefore,  while  we  are  not  confined  to 
representing  the world in  a  particular  way or  even set  of  ways,  we are still  restricted  to 
representations  which  can  be  grasped through the  particular  set  of  reasoning patterns  we 
possess,  which  can,  in  other  words,  be  deconstructed  into  the  particular  set  of  cognitive 
building blocks we are endowed with. 
4. Conclusion
Gauging the scope and limits of the representations the human mind can produce, I argue that,  
while we are not restricted to representing the world in a particular way or set of ways, our 
perceptual and cognitive nature limits the representations we can produce. We can, as pointed 
out above, either be biased against or straightforwardly closed off to certain representations of 
the world. In terms of Boden’s (1990) notion of conceptual spaces, some representations are 
situated at  the outer edge of our conceptual  space, making them extremely hard to reach, 
while  others  are  simply outside this  space,  and cannot  possibly be conceptualised  by the 
human mind. 
This  tension  between openness  and closure and transgression and limits  characterises  the 
human mind.  We can represent  the world in  an inexhaustible  amount  of  ways,  yet  these 
representations constitute but a particular subset of all (theoretically) possible representations. 
We can transgress the views we are predisposed to hold in virtue of our biology, but can only 
do so based on reasoning patterns which remain firmly grounded in our cognitive nature. In 
this regard, there is no escaping a certain biological determinism in our attempts to theorise 
about the world. This, however, does not mean that we have to represent the world in a certain 
way. Indeed, we are endowed with an open epistemic relation to the world, and are able to 
conceptualise it in an unlimited amount of ways.
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This characterisation of the human mind as endowed with an open epistemic relation to the 
world, which is nevertheless comprised within a particular conceptual space, holds interesting 
implications  for  some  fundamental  epistemological  issues.  Can  we  represent  the  world 
accurately? Could two incommensurable representations both yield an accurate representation 
of the same world for the respective cognitive beings that hold them? Does a particular way of 
representing the world not imply an incomplete way of representing it? And finally, could the 
world (in principle) be represented in a universal way, or does the act of representing imply a 
particular perspective?
In the next chapter, I will attempt to give a comprehensive answer to those questions, turning 
to the main question around which this dissertation is centred: what can we know about the 
world, given the fact that our perceptual and cognitive faculties are the product of evolution? 
The  answers  to  these  questions  will  provide  a  basis  for  shedding  new  light  on  human 
knowledge - a fresh perspective with which to think about its status, which tackles the issue of 
realism,  and  looks  into  the  threat  of  biological  relativism  that  looms  heavily  over  this 
dissertation.
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Chapter 5: Implications for human knowledge
1. Introduction
In chapter 4, I established that while we can indefinitely mould new representations, which 
underlies the open cognitive relation we entertain with the world, we are nevertheless biased 
against and straightforwardly closed to certain theoretically possible representations of the 
world. In this chapter, I will look at the implications this ‘open cognitive relation within the 
boundaries of a particular conceptual space’ holds for our epistemic endeavours.
First  of  all,  I  will  ask  whether  the  fact  that  we  possess  only  a  particular  subset  of  all  
theoretically possible ways of representing the world entails that we can only represent the 
world to a limited extent. Does, in other words, the fact that we have only a particular set of  
cognitive grasps at our disposal entail  that we can only represent a limited portion of the 
world?
Arguing that  a particular  set  of cognitive grasps does not entail  – in principle  – that  our 
representations cannot correspond to external objects and properties, I will characterise this 
correspondence  as  a  particular  'fit'  determined  by  our  cognitive  nature.  Outlining  the 
consequences of our epistemic relation, where external objects are represented by means of 
particular  cognitive tools in  the light  of a  particular  cognitive  orientation,  I  will  then ask 
whether this forces relativism on us.
Finally, I will look at three potential sources of limitations to a successful epistemic relation 
to  the  world  –  i.e.  a  relation  where  our  representations  fit  external  objects:  firstly,  the 
fallibility of our epistemic endeavours; secondly, the limited computational capacity we can 
bring  to  the  task  and,  finally,  the  limited  scope  that  could  result  from  the  particular 
computational tools at our disposal. 
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2. What is the relation between our representations and the external world?
2.1 Saving epistemological realism: the distinction between grasp and content
In the previous chapter,  I established that our particular  perceptual  and cognitive abilities 
provide us with a particular and contingent set of possible representations we can hold about 
the world.  The representations  of  the world,  in  other  words,  which the human  mind  can 
possibly conceive of, are but a subset of all the theoretically possible representations about 
that same world. This raises the question as to whether our representations actually represent 
the external world and – if so – to what extent. How, indeed, one could question, can a limited 
and contingent set of available representations represent a mind-independent reality in more 
than a limited way? 
This  question as to whether  our  representations  of the world are  about  mind-independent 
properties and objects of the external world is at the core of the debate about epistemological  
realism.  Epistemological  realism  –  not  to  be  confused  with  metaphysical  or  ontological 
realism,  which  is  concerned  with  the  existence  of  an  external  world  –  holds  that  our 
representations  of  the  world  can  refer  to  mind-independent,  external  objects.33 
Epistemological  anti-realism,  on  the  other  hand,  holds  that  there  is  no  link  between  our 
conceptual grasp of the world (i.e. our representations of the world) and the external world. In 
this chapter, I will argue that epistemological realism is tenable, even though we are endowed 
with a particular set of contingent representations of the world.
From an evolutionary perspective – claiming that our perceptual and cognitive abilities are 
contingent products of a blind process – it  does, indeed, follow naturally that we have to 
admit  to  the  possibility  of  radically  different  representations,  which  would  be  utterly 
unintelligible  to  us.  In  this  context,  several  philosophers  have  argued  from evolutionary 
considerations that our grasp of the world is but a particular one. This point is often framed as 
the possibility of ‘alien scientists’. Clark (1986) points at the ‘interesting consequence’ that 
33 Epistemological realism is defined by the Theological and Philosophical dictionary as entailing that ‘the mind 
knows  independent  things  not  ideas  alone’.  Epistemological  realism,  in  other  words,  entails  that  our 
representations  refer  to  external,  independent  objects.  (Cf.  http://www.philosophy-
dictionary.org/Epistemological_realism).
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we must accept the possibility of alien epistemologists, working successfully with a different 
model of our ‘common reality’. Indeed, he argues, ‘the ideal limit of human scientific enquiry 
is still not the only possible ‘correct’ representation of reality even if relative to our cognitive 
constraints and observational access there are no visible alternatives’ (158).
Similarly, Rescher (1990) argues that ‘there is no categorical assurance that [alien] intelligent 
creatures will think alike in a common world, any more than they will act alike – that is, there 
is  no  reason  why  cognitive adaptations  should  be  any  more  uniform  than  behavioral 
adaptations’ (his italics, 92). Sciences, he continues, ‘are bound to vary with the cognitive 
instruments available in the physical constitution and mental equipment of their developers’ 
(95). Our sciences, in this regard, are but the intellectual product of one particular sort of 
cognitive life-form. They are ultimately species-relative (95). 
The most important reason that we cannot expect alien scientists to engage in our kind of 
science is, according to Rescher, that the possible sorts of natural science are almost endlessly 
diverse. Natural science – in the sense of ‘an inquiry into the ways of nature’ – is, Rescher 
argues, ‘endlessly plastic’ (94). Its development is bound to reflect ‘a historical course closely 
geared to the specific capacities, interest, environment, and opportunities of the creatures that 
develop it’ (94).  It is, in this regard, not a process that must follow a similar route to ours and 
end up with a similar product. In this context, Rescher concludes that ‘it would be grossly 
unimaginative to think that either the journey or the destination must be the same – or even 
substantially similar’  and that ‘unless we narrow our intellectual horizons in a parochially 
anthropomorphic  way,  we  must  be  prepared  to  recognize  the  great  likelihood  that  the 
‘science’ and ‘technology’ of a remote civilization would be something very different from 
science and technology as we know it’ (94). 
This crucial implication of bringing the theory of evolution to bear on the question of the 
limits and scope of human knowledge could lead us to think that we have no or only limited 
cognitive access to the external world. The main argument against epistemological realism is, 
indeed, what I’ll refer to as the conceptual screen argument. The conceptual screen argument 
starts  from  the  claim  that  we  can  only  grasp  the  world  through  our  own  particular 
conceptualisations. I fully agree with this claim – our grasp of the world is indeed the product 
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of the particular and contingent set of conceptual resources we have at our disposal. However, 
from this premise, the conceptual screen argument derives that it is impossible to ‘see’ the 
world as it really is. In other words, because we must grasp the world by means of a particular 
set of conceptual resources, we can never grasp it as it really is. Epistemological realism, 
therefore – this position claims – is untenable. This conclusion, I reject. 
Indeed, the conclusion drawn by the conceptual screen argument implies that true knowledge 
of the external, mind-independent world would require neutral access to the world, untainted 
by the subject’s perceptual and cognitive 'spectacles'. Whenever we view the world through 
our own conceptual frameworks, it argues, we do not view the world-in-itself but merely the 
Kantian phenomenal world - the world as it appears to us. This premise,  which I will  be 
challenging, is at the basis of the traditional epistemological project of foundationalism - the 
attempt  to  ground  all  knowledge  in  basic,  un-doubtable  (i.e.  untainted  by  the  cogniser's 
perceptual and conceptual framework) statements about the world. 
Foundationalism, however, is doomed to fail. The very possibility of direct epistemic access 
(i.e.  neutral,  unmediated  or  objective  access)  is  problematic.  Indeed,  either  we  take  this 
unmediated  ‘given’  as  arising  from perception  –  as  the  empiricists  did  – or  we take  the 
rationalist  approach  and  consider  cognition  as  the  origin  for  this  ‘given’.  From  an 
evolutionary perspective, however, both are untenable. As pointed out in chapter 1, perception 
does not yield a subject- or species-independent picture of the world – we perceive but a small 
part of the world in a particular way. Cognition, on the other hand, yields a set of possible 
ways of representing the world that are as equally contingent and particular as our perceptual 
abilities  (cf. Chapter 4). There is, in other words, no way to gain epistemic access to the 
world, other than through the particular ‘lens’ evolution has provided us with.
Furthermore,  as  Sellars  (1956)  objects,  the  very  idea  that  we  can  ground  knowledge  in 
cognitive states, which are in direct contact with reality, is problematic. This foundationalist 
picture, he argues, requires, on the one hand, that there must be basic cognitive states, in the 
sense that those states are independent of any epistemic relations to other cognitive states. On 
the other hand, it requires that all non-basic cognitive states are derived from those ‘given’ 
basic states.  Sellars’s argument  is  not aimed at  denying that  there can be basic cognitive 
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states, but in denying the possibility of a foundationalist structure of knowledge, because – he 
argues – the standard candidates for basic states (e.g. sense-data) either fail to be independent 
from other cognitive states (because they presuppose other knowledge) or, if they truly are 
independent, fail to support other cognitive states. 
Indeed,  to  satisfy  the  first  condition,  which  Sellars  labels  the  ‘Epistemic  Independence 
Requirement’,  the basic  cognitive  state  must  be  independent  of  inferential  connections  to 
other states. To satisfy the second condition – the ‘Epistemic Efficacy Requirement’ – basic 
cognitive states must,  on the contrary,  participate  in inferential  relations with other states. 
They must, therefore, possess propositional form and truth-value. According to Sellars (1956), 
however, ‘examination of multiple candidates for non-inferentially acquired, propositionally 
structured cognitive states indicates that their epistemic status presupposes the possession by 
the knowing subject of other empirical knowledge, both of particular and of general empirical 
truths’34 (cf.  de  Vries,  2011).  Since  it  presupposes  the  possession  of  other  empirical 
knowledge, it cannot be a basic cognitive state.
According to de Vries (2011), since ‘there is no exhaustive list of all possible candidates for 
the given, the argument is not a conclusive, once-and-for-all refutation of foundationalism, 
but it is a significant challenge to it, putting the burden of proof on the defenders of a given’. 
The very enterprise of foundationalism is, therefore, doomed to fail, not only because of the 
impossibility of having direct epistemic access to the world, but also because – even if this 
were possible  – it  is,  according to Sellars,  very unlikely that  we will  ever come up with 
cognitive states which are both basic and efficacious.
Does this  mean we have to  yield  to  the conceptual  screen argument  and give in  to anti-
realism,  accepting  that  we have no epistemic  access to the external  world?  I  argue – as 
signposted earlier – that we do not. The fact that we represent the world through a particular, 
species-specific  framework  does  not  entail  that  those  representations  do  not  represent 
elements of the external world. Claiming that it does is the result of what Nagel (1986:101) 
calls a confusion between form and content. As Nagel argues, we need to distinguish between 
34 Giving a full overview of Sellars’s examination of proposed basic, propositional cognitive states, however, is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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the content and the form of a thought. The content, in this regard, is quite independent from 
the  particular  form in  which  it  is  expressed;  independent,  for  instance,  of  the  particular 
language in which it is formulated. All thoughts, Nagel continues, must have a form which 
makes them accessible from a human perspective. This, however, does not entail that they are 
about our point of view. ‘What they are about depends not on their subjective form, but on 
what has to be referred to in any explanation of what makes them come true’ (101-102). Their 
content, in other words, is determined by  what they refer to in the world, not by  how they 
refer. 
The content  of  a  grasp (I  will  refer  to  Nagel’s  (1986) ‘form’  as  grasp),  therefore,  is  not 
necessarily  particular  or  species-specific  because  the grasp itself  is.  Different  (subjective) 
grasps can, indeed, grasp the same (external) thing – i.e. have the same content. Take, for 
instance, two different creatures, each with a particular ability to represent a point in space. 
The first represents a point in space by using numerically expressed coordinates on an axis 
system, defining a particular location in terms of the intersection of a numerical value on a 
horizontal  axis and one on a vertical  axis. The second, on the other hand, zooms in on a 
particular  point  by means  of  a  grid  system.  It  represents  space  in  terms  of  frames,  each 
subdivided in further frames. A particular point in space will then be represented in terms of 
the particular ‘sub-sub-sub… frame’ that corresponds with it. This second creature could very 
well be closed to the mode of representation of the first.  The fact,  however,  that it  has a 
different grasp of spatial locations at its disposition does not entail that it cannot represent the 
very same thing as the first, i.e. the same point in space to the same degree of precision. 
‘Grasp’, in this regard, refers to the particular way in which we access the world. The fact that 
these grasps are both particular and contingent – i.e. that there are other theoretically possible 
ways of representing the world and that the world does not need to be represented in this way 
in order for the representation to be accurate – does not, as I argued in the previous chapter,  
entail that the content of that grasp is ‘deformed’ by the conceptual apparatus of the cognitive 
creature.  Indeed,  as  pointed  out  in  the  example  above,  two  different  or  even  mutually 
unintelligible grasps can have the same content. The same point can, indeed, be represented 
on a numerical Cartesian axis system and in a grid system.
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In this regard, the fact that we have a particular grasp – i.e. a particular set of representational 
tools – at our disposal does not imply that this grasp cannot access elements in the external 
world. Nor does the possibility of unintelligible representations of the world – to the human 
mind, that is – which follows, as pointed out, from an evolutionary take on our perceptual and 
cognitive faculties (cf. the hypothesis  of the possibility of alien scientists),  entail  that our 
representations, at best, represent the world in a limited way. It is not because we look at the 
world from a particular vantage point (i.e. that other vantage points are theoretically possible) 
that we can’t have a clear view. 
2.2 The nature of cognitive grasps: impossibility of a God’s eye view
Thus far, I have established that although we have a particular set of grasps at our disposition,  
this does not entail  we have no epistemic access to the world. However, we can take the 
argument further by reflecting on the nature of cognitive grasps. In this regard, rather than 
merely  claiming  that  we  grasp  the  world  in  a  particular  way,  I  will  argue  that  every 
(theoretically) possible cognitive grasp (even a ‘perfect’ one) takes a particular perspective. In 
other words, the particularity of our perspective on the world is not merely a product of our 
(limited)  cognitive  nature,  but  follows  necessarily  from  the  very  act  of  representing. 
‘Representing’, in this regard, refers to the cognitive ability to ‘translate’ something through a 
particular medium. We can represent a tree, for instance, through a drawing, a statue or even a 
linguistic  description.  In  doing so,  we translate  the  features  of  that  tree  either  to  a  two-
dimensional  colour  arrangement  (a  drawing),  a  three-dimensional  matter  arrangement  (a 
statue), or a set of conventional symbols (a linguistic description).
A cognitive grasp is a representation. It ‘translates’ external elements into an internal, mental 
medium. In doing so, it re-presents them – i.e. makes them present again – in some medium. 
Any possible kind of cognitive grasp which provides epistemic access to the world requires 
such a translation. This follows from the fact that something external is represented internally. 
Features  and  properties  of  the  world,  whether  they  yield  sensory  impressions,  linguistic 
descriptions  or  mathematical  equations  are,  in  this  regard,  not  objectively  or  neutrally 
represented – i.e. without the mediation of any structuring framework of the cogniser – but are 
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'translated' in a particular way. There can, in this sense, be no such thing as a universal or 
objective grasp, since the very nature of a cognitive grasp entails that it provides a (particular) 
medium in which properties of external objects are represented. 
Furthermore,  as argued above, there is  no one-to-one correlation between a grasp and its 
object. Every grasp discloses a particular content (i.e. represents a particular external object or 
property) but external objects and properties do not require a singular grasp to be represented.  
They can be grasped in more than one way. Indeed, as the example shows, the same point in 
space can be represented or grasped either by means of a numerical Cartesian axis system or 
by  means  of  a  grid  system.  In  this  context,  I  would  like  to  cast  Quine's  (1951,  1975) 
underdetemination thesis in a broader perspective.
Underdetermination is formulated by Quine (1975:327) as the possibility that our postulated 
complete global theory of the world could have empirically equivalent alternatives that are 
incompatible  with  ours,  or  in  Quine's  words:  'with  no  translation  from one  to  the  other 
possible'. This possibility follows, indeed, from the fact that while a hypothesis (theory or 
representation) entails the existence of certain observable facts, those facts do not imply the 
particular hypothesis. As Quine (1975) phrases it: 
The hypotheses  are  related  to  observation  only by a  kind of  one-way implication; 
namely, the events we observe are what a belief in the hypotheses would have led us 
to expect. These observable consequences of the hypotheses do not, conversely, imply 
the  hypotheses.  Surely  there  are  alternative  hypothetical  substructures  that  would 
surface in the same observable ways (313).
While Quinean underdetermination holds that the world does not determine a single theory – 
i.e. that even within the framework of a singular set of grasps (human cognitive grasps, for 
instance) different theoretical constructs could still account for the data – I argue, given the 
aforementioned possibility of alien scientists, that the world does not determine a unique set 
of grasps. Since, as pointed out above, the same objects and properties of the world can be 
grasped in various ways, any possible grasp would have to allow for the existence of different, 
equally 'fitting'  grasps.  In  this  regard,  even a  perfect  theory of  the world – a  theory that 
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explains the cosmos both in its totality and in its every detail – would still have rival cognitive 
grasps accounting for at least parts of the data it explains. Indeed, since there is a one-way 
implication  between  grasp  and  object,  states  of  the  world  do  not  determine  singular 
representations corresponding to them, but allow for a variety of different cognitive constructs 
to be represented.
In this regard, the traditional epistemological ideal of viewing the world from nowhere – or 
from everywhere  for  that  matter,  if  we  take  a  God’s  eye  view to  comprise  all  possible 
(accurate) perspectives – is misguided. Epistemological realism (claiming that representations 
represent external  objects  accurately)  does not require ‘an impossible  attempt to view the 
world from nowhere’ (cf. Putnam, 1990:28), and nor does an accurate grasp of external reality 
entail that we shed the lenses through which we view the world. This neo-Kantian epistemic 
pessimism  is  the  result  of  what  Kaufman  (2002:343)  calls  ‘the  opaque  screen  view  of 
conceptual schemes’ – the view that the conceptual schemes we must employ shut us off from 
the true nature of the world. 
This view is at the core of epistemological anti-realism, or ‘quietism’, as Wright (1992) puts 
it,  which  claims  that  epistemic  access  to  the  world  is  prevented  by our  inability  to  look 
beyond our conceptual schemes. This, according to thinkers like Putnam (1990) and Rorty 
(1979), makes any claim about the external world impossible. There is, according to these 
philosophers,  no  sense  in  talk  that  looks  beyond  our  conceptual  frameworks  (Kaufman, 
2002:343). I propose a diametrically opposed position. Rather than shutting us off from the 
world, the conceptual schemes or the particular grasps – to use the terminology defined above 
– we have at our disposal are a necessary condition to gain epistemic access to the world. 
Indeed, as pointed out above, the nature of a cognitive grasp – i.e. the fact that it represents 
something external in a mental medium – implies that it is a particular grasp. Every possible 
way of grasping the world would involve conceptual schemes or frameworks of some sort, 
since they provide the medium in which external elements can be internalised. Without such 
particular  ways  of  representing  the  world,  there  simply  cannot  be  any kind  of  cognitive 
relation  between  an  organism  and  its  environment.  Therefore,  rather  than  being  opaque 
blindfolds shutting us off from the world, our particular cognitive grasps are actually windows 
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onto  an  otherwise  invisible  world.  Neo-Kantian  epistemic  pessimism,  ranging  from 
epistemological anti-realism (there in an outside world, but we have no epistemic access to it) 
to  outright  metaphysical  anti-realism  or  idealism  (there  is  nothing  outside  our  inner 
experience) is, in this regard, caused by a denial of the true nature of the act of representing.  
The particularity of the perspective through which we represent the world is not an obstacle, 
but, on the contrary constitutes the very nature of a (or any, for that matter) cognitive relation 
to the world.
2.3 The fallacy of correspondence as ‘mirroring’
This brings to light the core fallacy of the traditional epistemological view of knowledge. 
Knowledge, it is argued, should be an objective reflection of its object - it should mirror the 
external world. The mirror metaphor of true representations  entails  that every state of the 
world determines  a singular  corresponding representation.  For every state  of the world, it 
claims,  there  is  only one accurate  representation,  and the properties  of  the corresponding 
representation are – therefore – solely determined by the state of the world it represents. This 
often implicitly held 'mirror metaphor' is central to the traditional doctrine of correspondence. 
An influential version of the mirror metaphor of the doctrine of correspondence is, according 
to  Goldman  (1986:151),  developed  in  Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus  (1922).  The  ‘Tractarian 
version of correspondence’ states that the world is a totality of facts and that a proposition is 
true if and only if it corresponds with a fact. A true proposition, in this regard, is an objective 
depiction or a true reflection of an external state of affairs.
Nevertheless, as Goldman (1986) points out, this invites the objection that ‘the world does not 
contain  factlike  entities’.  It  does  not  contain  entities  which  would  correspond exactly  to 
sentences  or  propositions.  Language  and  thought,  Goldman  argues,  construct  disjunctive, 
existential,  conditional,  and universal statements,  and so on. Supposing, however,  that the 
world contains disjunctive, conditional, existential and universal structures, is misguided. The 
Tractarian version of the correspondence theory – portraying the world as being structured in 
truth-like entities –  is therefore, according to Goldman, an untenable doctrine (151).35
35 Whether Wittgentein committed to this view in the Tractatus is not entirely clear.  However,  I will follow 
Goldman  (1986)  by  referring  to  the  view  of  correspondence  as  mirroring  as  the  'Tractarian  version  of 
correspondence'.
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I fully agree with this analysis, based on the aforementioned point that we cannot confuse 
grasp and content. Arguing that our propositions mirror external facts and properties amounts 
to reducing the world to the particular grasp we have of it. Thought and language are the 
cognitive tools enabling us to grasp and represent elements of the external world. Deriving 
from this that the world must be structured identically to human thought and language is the 
wrong  way  of  looking  at  things.  It  is  like  arguing  that  trees  are  ultimately  colour 
arrangements, or that space must be ‘gridded’, because one is accustomed to represent trees in 
a drawing or points in space in a grid system. The world does not reflect the properties of our  
grasp, but our grasp constitutes a medium in which properties of the world can be represented. 
Confusing  this  one-directional  relation  between  external  objects  and  representations 
(representations express properties of the world, but the world does not harbour the structures 
of  the  representational  medium)  for  a  symmetrical  or  two-way relation  is  fundamentally 
mistaken.
This  problematic  character  of  this  criterion  of  correspondence  –  claiming  that  true 
propositions (must) mirror their objects – is often invoked as a persuasive argument against 
the possibility of any kind of correspondence between representations and the external world. 
Nevertheless, as Goldman (1986), argues, the mirror metaphor is only one possible metaphor 
for  correspondence  (152).  While  this  particular  criterion  for  correspondence  is  untenable, 
there is no reason to abandon correspondence altogether and sever all ties between internal 
representations and external objects. 
In this regard, Goldman (1986) substitutes the mirror metaphor of correspondence for what he 
considers to be the preferable metaphor of ‘fittingness’ – ‘fittingness’,  he explains,  in the 
‘sense in which clothes fit a body’. This metaphor allows for the ‘categorizing and statement-
creating activity of the cognizer-speaker’,  while – at the same time – ‘capturing the basic 
realist intuition that what makes a proposition or statement true is the way the world is’ (152). 
The subject does, in other words, capture the properties and elements of the world by means 
of its own (particular and contingent) cognising activity. Goldman expands on the theme:
There are indefinitely many sorts of apparel that might be designed for the human 
body, just as there are indefinitely many categories, principles of classification, and 
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propositional  forms that might  be used to describe the world.  […] Despite  all  this 
variety there is still the question, for any specified type of apparel, whether a specific  
token of that type fits a particular customer’s body. The question of fittingness is not 
just a question of style of garment. It depends specifically on that customer’s body. 
Similarly,  although  the  forms  of  mental  and  linguistic  representation  are  human 
products, not products of the world per se, whether any given sentence, thought sign, 
or proposition is true depends on something extra-human, namely,  the actual world 
itself (Goldman, 1986:152-153).
The  fact,  therefore,  that  the  world  can  be  interpreted  in  an  infinite  number  of  ways,  as 
Goldman argues, does not entail that a particular way cannot be right or wrong. There is, 
indeed, a connection between representation and its object: the representation is or should be 
‘moulded’ to fit the object. Much as we can use clay, stone or bronze to bring out the same 
shape in matter, there are various possible ways to represent the external world. While the 
world  itself  does  not  need  to  be  represented  in  any  particular  way,  any  particular 
representation needs to fit the world in order to be accurate.
Therefore, the fact that we are bound to a particular and contingent conceptual space does not 
entail  that  we  cannot  –  or  can  only  to  a  limited  extent  –  represent  the  world.  Our 
representations can fit their objects, just as both a drawing and a statue can depict an object. 
The claim that there can be no correspondence between representation and its external object 
rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  utterly  untenable  mirror  metaphor  is  the  only  possible 
criterion for correspondence. Goldman’s (1986) metaphor of correspondence as fittingness, 
however,  enables  us  to  ground  epistemological  realism  by  acknowledging  that  we  have 
epistemic  access  to  the  external  world,  while  admitting  that  the  human  cogniser  must 
represent  the  world  in  a  particular  and  contingent  set  of  ways.  One  question,  however, 
remains unanswered. What is the nature of this fit?
2.4 The nature of the fit
In chapter 3  I pointed out that we are endowed with an epistemic value system (cf. Chapter 3, 
6.3 Epistemic value system). This comprises both an epistemic goal and epistemic criteria for 
148
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
realising this goal. Such a goal, I argued, is our predisposition to look for truth. Indeed, as 
Papineau (2000) claims, our search for truth is an innate drive, characteristic of our species’ 
curiosity, our hunger for knowledge and our need for justification before adopting a belief. 
Truth or justification, however, as I pointed out, presuppose some criteria in the light of which 
they can be realised. Such criteria are the epistemic values we adhere to: predictive accuracy, 
coherence, scope and simplicity. Our epistemic value system or epistemic orientation, in this 
regard,  endows us with a set  of directives;  namely,  those epistemic values that guide our 
epistemic endeavours, drawing us towards certain representations while rejecting others. 
 Nevertheless, when representing the world, we often transgress some of those values. In this 
regard, we might, for instance, ignore the value of simplicity when it appears that those neat 
and simple hypotheses do not produce accurate predictions or lead to inconsistencies within 
the theory or – vice versa – we might ignore predictive accuracy to accommodate simplicity  
and scope.  Chalmers’s  (1976)  account  of  the  Copernican  revolution  is  interesting  in  this 
regard. Still  immersed in Aristotelian mechanical and cosmological thinking, Copernicus’s 
contemporaries  came up with some strong arguments  against  the Copernican  theory of  a 
moving earth. The main counter-argument is the so-called ‘tower argument’. If the earth spins 
on its  axis,  Copernicus’ contemporaries  argued,  a stone dropped from the top of a tower 
(erected on this spinning globe), should strike the ground at some distance from the tower, 
since the tower – sharing the spinning motion of the earth – will have moved by the time the 
stone  reaches  the  ground.  Copernicus  himself,  as  Chalmers  points  out,  had  no  adequate 
response to those arguments, which seemed to refute his theory. Nevertheless, his view was 
not simply dismissed,  precisely because it  offers such a neat way of explaining planetary 
motion. Whereas the Ptolemaic account of the universe needed to ascribe a whole series of 
complex motions to planets to account for the data we gather from them in observation (such 
as, for instance, planets retracing their path in opposite directions), Copernicus’s view could 
explain the observational data in a much simpler and neater way (95-96). Therefore, although 
the Copernican system failed in respect of predictive accuracy (the stone did not fall at some 
distance from the tower), it was however not dismissed, because of the simplicity it boasted in 
describing the planets’ motion.
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In  this  regard,  we  transgress  epistemic  criteria  in  the  light  of  other  criteria.  We  ignore 
simplicity  to  accommodate  coherence  or we ignore  coherence to  accommodate  predictive 
accuracy, but we cannot do away with all these values at once. This would – indeed – leave us 
utterly blind in our conceptual space, with no possible way of asserting that, for instance, the 
big bang is a better theory for the origin of the universe than the Cherokee beetle diving into 
the endless waters and pushing up some mud. 
This brings Neurath’s (1959:201) metaphor to mind of having to rebuild a ship while staying 
afloat. Arguing that we cannot reason from a tabula rasa, he famously exclaimed that ‘we are 
like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in dry-dock 
and  to  reconstruct  it  there  out  of  the  best  materials’.  Indeed,  we  can  only  criticise  and 
overcome parts of our knowledge about the world based on other knowledge. In this sense, 
when we transgress certain epistemic values we can only do so supported by the remaining 
bulk of those values. Dismantling them all at once would sweep the ground underneath our 
feet or – to endorse Neurath’s nautical metaphor – would take out the lower deck and sink the 
ship.
Furthermore, when partially transgressing our epistemic values, we do sacrifice the cognitive 
satisfaction that such a representation provides us with. Our mind, in other words, is biased 
against representations which do not fulfil all epistemic values we find ourselves endowed 
with. In this context, a lack of coherence, or the resistance to a simple and elegant solution, is 
often perceived as an obstacle to be removed in order to achieve a comprehensive theory. A 
good illustration of such an epistemic value transgressing representation is the wave-particle 
duality postulated in quantum mechanics. According to the Copenhagen interpretation,  the 
behaviour  of quantum scale  objects  cannot  be reduced to either  particle-like or wave-like 
behaviour.  The  phenomena  can  be  viewed  in  one  way  or  another,  but  not  in  both 
simultaneously. In this case, the value of coherence is sacrificed to accommodate the data (i.e. 
to accommodate the value of predictive accuracy). This, however, makes the theory imperfect 
for us, inviting widespread criticism since it is hard to accept that it could provide us with an 
entirely truthful and accurate representation of its subject matter.
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These values are, indeed, part of our innate endowment (cf. chapter 3, 6.3 Epistemic value 
system). As Carruthers (2006:347) points out, they are universal to all human cultures from 
hunter-gatherer  societies  to  Western  scientific  communities.  In  this  regard,  the  criteria  or 
values we adhere to for realising our epistemic goal, are firmly grounded in our cognitive 
nature.  They  are  –  like  any  other  genetically  determined  feature  –  the  particular  and 
contingent outcome of a blind evolutionary process. 
This brings us to the nature of the fit. We perceive representations as accurate in the light of  
those epistemic values. The way we fit representations to their (external) objects, therefore, is 
by means of a particular, innate set of values or criteria fulfilling a cognitive goal – i.e. truth  
or accuracy.  Therefore,  not only are  we endowed with a  particular  and contingent  set  of 
representational tools that we use to produce fitting representations of the external world, but 
the fit itself is also contingent and particular. In other words, when representing the world, we 
bring both a  particular  set  of tools to the task  and a particular  set  of rules by which the 
(external) object of representation is translated into the representation. Just as a painting (i.e. 
the representation) of a tree (i.e. the object of representation) requires both the use of a set of 
tools (paint, white canvas) and a set of rules (perspective, proportions, colour arrangement, 
etc.). 
Rescher  (1990),  in  this  context,  argues  that  we are  endowed with  a  particular  ‘cognitive 
project’ which is ‘the intellectual product characteristic of one particular sort of cognitive life-
form’  (95).   Indeed,  not  only  the  available  cognitive  tools  depend  on  the  biological 
endowment of their developers but also the purpose to which these tools are put to use. The 
set  of  epistemic  values  determining  which  representations  fit  the  world  for  the  human 
cogniser, in this regard, are as much a given as its perceptual and cognitive abilities. Both 
cognitive purpose and cognitive means are ultimately species-specific. 
From an evolutionary perspective, therefore, not only do we have to envisage the possibility 
of  (radically)  different  ways  of  representing  external  elements  (i.e.  other  representational 
tools) but also the possibility of different fits between representation and object. Our alien 
scientists could, therefore, represent the world in a radically different way, both because the 
‘fabric’  of  their  representations  is  different  and because  the  criteria  in  virtue  of  which 
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representations are desirable – i.e. are perceived to ‘fit’ their objects  – are different. The same 
object X could be represented by a cognitive being A by means of representational  tools 
C,D,E in the light of criteria F,G,H and by cognitive being B by means of I,J,K in the light of 
L,M,N. One cognitive being could, for instance, represent gravity by means of a mathematical 
equation in the light of the criterion of predictive accuracy (in what time an object of a certain 
mass will drop from a certain height) and another could represent it as a non-quantified latent 
force proportional to mass, in the light of the criterion of explanatory scope (accounting for 
the fact that objects are subject to the earth’s gravitation, the earth to the sun, our galaxy to 
other galaxies, and so on). 
In this context, with regard to the earlier statement that two different cognitive beings can 
represent the same object accurately in a radically different way, it is important to note that 
what makes both representations accurate – or rather ‘fit’ – is not some objective given, but is 
equally grounded in their respective cognitive make-up. A particular representation, therefore, 
can be said to correspond (i.e. fit) to an external element or property of the world for a certain 
cogniser, if the representation aligns with the epistemic orientation (i.e. the particular criteria 
determining the fit) of the cogniser, given the characteristics of the external object which is 
represented. To sum up, the epistemic correspondence between our representations and the 
world is a particular fit with particular tools.
3. What are the consequences of our epistemic relation?
3.1 The two-sided determination of knowledge
To recapitulate,  our (true) representations of the world are not objective reflections of the 
external world, but particular fittings – in the light of our epistemic orientation (i.e. the set of 
epistemic values or criteria  we are endowed with) – with available  representational  tools. 
These representations do, therefore, not represent the world in vacuo, but only in reference to 
the particular kind(s) of available representations and the epistemic orientation, both grounded 
in our cognitive nature. Our representation of the world, in this regard, is inexorably linked to 
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our biologically determined cognitive nature.  It is a representation of external  objects  and 
properties in the light of a given orientation by means of a given set of tools. 
Since what constitutes knowledge of the world for us is determined both by states of the 
world (it must fit the constraints of those external objects and properties) and by the nature of 
our cognising apparatus, it makes no sense to talk about knowledge independently of the type 
of  cognisers  we  are,  for  whom a  particular  set  of  available  representations  represent  an 
external object (accurately) in virtue of a particular epistemic orientation. Our knowledge of 
the world, in this regard, is not some outer-worldly, universal body of representations held by 
any creature that would be endowed with an inkling of thought, but a species-specific product 
determined by our cognitive apparatus. 
This  makes  sense  in  an  evolutionary  light,  where  our  perspective  on  the  world  can  be 
characterised as a view from within rather than a view from outside. As Munz (1993) phrases 
it: ‘in biological perspective, the knower is no longer an observer from outer space, looking 
upon a world in which there is nothing but swirling electrons or sub-atomic particles. The 
knower, is, on the contrary, an integral part of the known system’ (191). Looking at the world 
from within, we do not capture it in some neutral, objective or direct way, but in the particular 
way determined by our position within the ‘system’. 
To put  it  differently,  evolution stumbled upon cognitive  adaptations,  providing organisms 
with the ability to internalise external properties of the world, in the same way that evolution 
stumbled upon visual adaptation – i.e. eyes – enabling organisms to (among other things) 
‘navigate’ through space. Just as eyesight is not the only possible way to navigate through 
space – consider a bat’s echolocation – our cognitive apparatus does not provide us with the 
only possible way of understanding the world. Other cognitive apparatuses could entertain a 
radically different epistemic relation to the same world, or, to stay with the metaphor, other 
positions within the system are possible (cf. hypothesis of alien scientists). Furthermore, this 
entails – and this is the point I want to make – that the products of any given cognitive system 
only make  sense in  relation  to  the  cognitive  system that  produced them,  just  as  a  sound 
bouncing off walls only constitutes navigational information for bats, and photon particles 
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bouncing off surfaces only constitute navigational information for organisms relying on eye-
sight.  
3.2 The threat of relativism
This raises the threat of relativism. Since our knowledge of the world is inexorably linked to 
our cognitive nature, it can be said to be relative to that cognitive nature. What constitutes 
knowledge for us is – indeed – the product of our epistemic orientation. A representation,  
therefore, is true or false in virtue of our biologically determined epistemic orientation (i.e. 
our epistemic values or criteria), not in virtue of a framework that transcends our contingent 
cognitive nature. 
The fact, however, that the nature of the fit (between our representations and the world) is 
determined  by  our  innate  epistemic  orientation,  can  hardly  be  seen  as  undermining  the 
possibility  of  knowledge.  Indeed,  it  would  be  misguided  to  consider  our  particular  and 
contingent cognitive nature as a threat to the possibility of acquiring knowledge of the world, 
since the criteria determining whether a representation fits the world, and therefore constitutes 
knowledge for us, are rooted in our cognitive make-up. Knowledge, in this regard, is itself a 
contingent product of our evolved minds. It is defined in terms of the criteria grounded in our 
cognitive  apparatus.  Stating,  therefore,  that  true  knowledge  of  the  world  is  prevented  or 
limited by the ‘distorting perspective on the world’ that our cognitive nature provides us with 
makes no sense, since what constitutes knowledge for us is determined by our very cognitive 
nature. 
Making an even stronger point, I will argue that, rather than raising the threat of relativism, 
the biological determination of knowledge actually wards off relativism. Indeed, the fact that 
knowledge is rooted in our cognitive nature provides us with the necessary grounding to rebut 
the traditional forms of cultural relativism. Theories positing a form of epistemic relativism, 
stating  that  all  knowledge of  the  world  is  determined by or  relative  to  some framework, 
indeed typically take this framework to be a cultural product. The way we view the world,  
relativists claim, is the product of the particular beliefs of the culture we are raised in, the 
particular language we possess, or the particular scientific paradigm we adhere to. 
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Cultural  relativism  can  either  take  a  descriptive  or  normative  form.  While  descriptive 
relativism  consists  in  the  empirical  claim  that  different  cultures,  linguistic  or  scientific 
communities  have  different  core  beliefs,  modes  of  thought  or  standards  of  reasoning, 
normative relativism claims that core beliefs, modes of thought and standards of reasoning are 
only right or wrong in the light of those cultural factors. Normative relativism states, in other 
words, that there is no other (higher) framework determining whether our representations of 
the world are accurate,  other than the particular cultural  frameworks we possess (Swoyer, 
2003).  For  the  purposes  of  this  chapter,  I  am only  interested  in  this  stronger,  normative 
version.
Normative cultural relativism can take this determining framework to be a particular set of 
background beliefs, the particular language, or the scientific paradigm in which the cogniser is 
raised. In this regard, Franz Boas (1887:589) exclaimed that ‘our ideas and conceptions are 
true only insofar as our civilization goes’. There’s no epistemic measure, in other words, of 
the  way we represent  the  world,  outside  the  contingent  framework(s)  set  by a  particular 
culture.  Therefore,  knowledge itself  becomes an utterly contingent  product of a particular 
culture.
One of the historically most influential theories defending a cultural form of relativism is – 
without any doubt – linguistic relativism. This view holds that the structures (vocabulary and 
syntax) of a language determine – or at least affect to an important extent – the way speakers 
conceptualise  the  world.  While  the  theory  is  commonly  referred  to  as  the  ‘Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis’,  it  can be retraced  to  Wilhelm von Humboldt  (1820),  who declared  that  ‘the 
diversity of languages is not a diversity of signs and sounds but a diversity of views of the 
world’ (Trabant, 2000).
As pointed out, the most prominent defenders of the thesis that human thought is determined 
by the language of the cogniser are Sapir and Whorf. Whorf, Sapir’s pupil, was the first to  
base the hypothesis  that  language determines  thought  on empirical  findings.  Studying the 
native American Hopi language, Whorf (1956) argued that – among other differences – the 
Hopi language lacks any nouns referring to units of time (e.g. ‘hours’, ‘days’, ‘months’ and 
‘years’) and that, consequentially, the Hopi did not and could not treat the flow of time as a 
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sequence of different countable units. This is, of course, in stark contrast to English speakers 
and speakers of related ‘standard European languages’ – as Whorf referred to them – who, 
possessing nouns referring to units of time, view time as a sequence of countable units. This 
brought Whorf to conclude that:
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. The categories and 
types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they 
stare  every  observer  in  the  face;  on  the  contrary,  the  world  is  presented  in  a 
kaleidoscope flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds – and this 
means largely by the linguistic systems of our minds. We cut nature up, organize it 
into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an 
agreement to organize it in this way – an agreement that holds throughout our speech 
community and is codified in the patterns of our language. [...] All observers are not 
led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their 
linguistic  backgrounds  are  similar,  or  can  in  some  way  be  calibrated  (Whorf, 
1956:212-214).36
While strong linguistic  relativism and other strong forms of cultural  relativism have been 
largely abandoned, it remains widely accepted that any theory or view of the world is – to an 
important extent – the product of a given cultural perspective. This entails that there is no 
ultimate measure against which one view can be considered as better than another, since both 
are the product of contingent  factors such as historical  background, language or scientific 
paradigm.
Against these forms of relativism, I defend the view – at the basis of this dissertation – that 
humankind is endowed with an innately grounded cognitive nature. We possess, as pointed 
out, a set of cognitive tools that we apply in representing the world, as well as an epistemic 
orientation by which we fit our representations to the input we gather from the world. All 
36 The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, however, came under heavy criticism. Ekkehart Malotki’s (1983) study of the 
Hopi time expressions presented a number of compelling findings challenging Whorf’s characterisation of Hopi  
language and culture as being timeless. Furthermore, the Chomskyan universalist theory of language (Chomsky: 
1965) pointed at a ‘universal grammar’, shared by all natural languages. Languages, therefore, rather than being 
particular  cultural  artefacts  that  radically  differ  from one another,  came  to be  viewed as  sharing  the  same 
underlying  structure.  The perceived  differences  between languages,  in  this  regard,  are  argued  to be  merely 
surface differences which do not affect cognitive processes, which are universal to humankind.
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human  cognisers,  in  this  context,  have  a  common epistemic  project  which  they  strive  to 
realise with a common set of cognitive means. Theories about the world, therefore, are not 
fitted to some utterly contingent spatio-temporal framework – i.e. the framework determined 
by  the  particular  culture  in  which  they  are  articulated  –  but  are  ultimately  fitted  to  a 
framework which is grounded in our nature. There are, in other words, not a multitude of 
radically different possible perspectives on the world that humankind can adopt with equal 
cognitive satisfaction, but a biologically determined one that it is bound to cast on the world 
in virtue of its nature. 37
This, of course, does not imply that culture is not a factor in the way we come to view the 
world. Different cultures have radically different beliefs about the world and different areas of 
interest they pass on to the next generation. We obviously do not come into a world which is 
laid  out  in  front  of  us  as  a  virgin  terrain  ready  to  be  explored  without  any  inherited 
preconceptions and analyses.  In this regard, it  is trivially true that a Pygmee living in the 
central African jungle in the 19th century looks at the world differently, and explains the same 
phenomena in a radically different way, to a European scholar at the beginning of the 21st 
century. 
My argument – in this regard – is not that our shared cognitive nature provides for a unique 
and  universal  view  of  the  world  shared  by  all  humankind.  While  this  is  true  for  the 
commonsense  theories  we hold about  the world (cf.  Chapter  1  – 3.  Intuitive  theories),  it 
obviously  doesn’t  apply  to  our  scientific  or  other  explicitly  formulated  theories,  which 
transgress these commonsense assumptions about the world. Indeed, the very fact that we are 
able  to transgress our biologically  determined views is  what  opened up the kaleidoscopic 
realm  of  different  cultural  perspectives,  as  argued  in  chapter  3.  We  are,  as  pointed  out 
previously,  endowed with an  open cognitive  system (cf.  Chapter  4  -  2.3 Open cognitive 
relation), enabling us to shape an infinite number of different representations of the world. 
37 This does not, however, necessarily entail that the state of the world and the nature of our cognitive apparatus  
would determine a single, ideal theory or set of theories. We do, indeed, have to admit to the possibility of  
Quinean underdetermination (1975), stating that even our best scientific theories might be underdetermined by 
empirical data. In this regard, I merely commit to the view that our cognitive nature seriously constrains our  
‘fitting’ (and therefore desirable) theories of the world. The framework in virtue of which theories of the world  
are right or wrong, in other words, is by no means (exclusively) culturally determined. 
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The distinctiveness of human cognition, in this regard, is precisely that we are not forced to 
look at the world in a particular way.
This being said, we do possess a unique epistemic framework rooted in our cognitive nature. 
In this sense, while we are not born into a virgin world, neither are we born as virgins into the 
world. All human beings come equipped with similar perceptual and cognitive tools that they 
apply to the world. Furthermore, we share a common epistemic orientation (cf. Chapter 3 - 6.3 
Epistemic value system). What makes a representation true for us is – therefore – not some 
contingent  cultural  framework,  but  a  necessary  one,  since  this  framework  is  innately 
determined. 
The particular natural language we happen to acquire, in this regard, is not the inescapable 
prison house of thought it was once thought to be. Indeed, it is both the case that natural 
languages themselves are constrained by shared cognitive structures (cf. Chomsky’s universal 
grammar), and therefore are not as radically different as previously thought, and that human 
thought,  in  general,  is  constrained  by  a  set  of  shared  abilities  and  a  shared  orientation. 
Similarly, modern sciences are not merely the product of some contingent cultural framework, 
but are constrained by universal principles (universal among human cognisers, that is). Recall, 
in this regard, the fact that the epistemic values modern scientists adhere to are shared by all 
humans,  including illiterate  hunter-gatherer  societies  (cf.  Chapter  3  -  6.3 Epistemic  value 
system).  As Ruse (1986) so elegantly phrases  it,  our  scientific  endeavours  ‘flow through 
biologically channelled modes of thinking imposed on us by evolution’ (149). What makes a 
theory right or wrong, better or worse, or fitting or not, therefore, is ultimately determined by 
our cognitive nature,  not by the particular  culture in which the theory is formulated.  The 
framework by which our view of the world is fitted, in this regard, is written by the hand of 
nature, not by the hand of humankind. 
Knowledge,  therefore,  is  the  product  of  the  biologically  determined  cognitive  relation 
between the particular cognisers that we are and the world. This biological determination, 
rather  than  imposing  an  undermining  form  of  relativism  on  our  epistemic  endeavours, 
provides us with new grounding from which we can resist the destructive threats of cultural 
relativism. Indeed, as pointed out,  knowledge presupposes an epistemic goal and a set  of 
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values which are rooted in our cognitive nature and – therefore – only makes sense within the 
cognitive relation between the type of cognisers we are and the world. Biologically grounding 
human knowledge, in this regard, takes the necessity of an epistemic framework at face value, 
without  succumbing  to  an ‘anything-goes’  relativism.  A theory fits,  not  in  the  light  of  a 
convention or a contingent cultural framework, but in virtue of our very cognitive nature. 
The fact,  however,  that  we have  epistemic  access  to  the  external  world,  i.e.  that  we can 
successfully represent external objects and properties within the framework of our epistemic 
relation to the world, does not imply that there are no limits to this ability. Indeed, while our 
representations can correspond (as defined above) to external properties and objects, it does 
not mean that they automatically do so, nor does it mean that they represent the world in a 
complete fashion, representing everything there is to represent in every detail. 
4. What are the limits to our epistemic relation to the world?
4.1 Limits set by fallibility
Epistemic fallibility, i.e. the view that human beings could be wrong about their beliefs and 
understanding of the world, is – as Artigas (1992) points out – widespread in contemporary 
epistemology. Indeed, who in his right mind would deny that human beings can be mistaken? 
While this  claim is  trivial  with regards to our everyday experience – who doesn’t forget, 
misinterpret or deform information? – it also applies to our more carefully crafted and deeply 
reflected representations of the world. 
Evolution does, indeed, provide good reasons to support the view that our cognitive apparatus 
can lead us to misrepresent aspects of our environment. It is, as argued in chapter 2, shaped to 
provide  us  with  biological  fitness-enhancing  behaviour,  not  disinterested  accurate 
representations. In this regard, studies in cognitive science have brought to light a myriad of 
cognitive biases that human thinking is subject to (cf. chapter 2, 3.2.4 Cognitive biases and 
error management theory). Those ‘heuristics’, or mental strategies for information processing, 
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can in some cases lead to erroneous inferences. While we can often detect cases of fallacious 
reasoning and ‘straighten out’ our reasoning, we cannot exclude the possibility that fallacious 
reasoning seeps into even our best scientific endeavours. 
Furthermore,  rather  than  merely  being  the  product  of  fitness-enhancing  heuristics,  the 
fallibility of our cognitive apparatus follows more generally from a natural perspective on the 
human  mind.  Assuming  that  we  are  not  bestowed  with  some  outer-worldly,  all-potent 
rationality, but that we have a set of evolved perceptual and cognitive abilities that we apply 
to represent the world, we have to come to terms with the fact that – while they can and do 
provide us with accurate (i.e. fitting) representations – they can also err and fail to represent. 
Just like any other feature of any other organism, our cognitive abilities are imperfect and 
limited. In this regard, McGinn (1989:350) claims that: ‘Representational power is not all or 
nothing. Minds are biological products like bodies, and like bodies they come in different 
shapes and sizes, more or less capacious, more or less suited to certain cognitive tasks’.
The fallibility of the human mind is, in this context,  confirmed by the history of science, 
revealing a number of instances in which our representations of the world did not fit the actual 
states of the world. For example, it was once commonly accepted that the earth was flat and at 
the centre of the universe, that burning substances release ‘phlogiston’ – an element without 
taste, mass, odour and colour – and many scientists right up to the 19 th century believed in the 
possibility of ‘spontaneous generation’, claiming that life could arise from inanimate matter 
(supported, for instance, by the spontaneous appearance of maggots from rotting meat). All 
these  theories,  as  Laudan (1981) points  out,  were  both  successful  in  the  past  –  i.e.  they 
seemed to be empirically confirmed – but were non-referential  – they did not refer to an 
element in or property of the external world (33). The world, we discovered, is neither flat, 
nor in  the centre  of the universe;  there  is  no ‘phlogiston’,  and spontaneous generation  is 
impossible. 
If those past mistaken conjectures prove one thing, it is that we can get it wrong. Some would 
take the argument a step further, however, in what (the early ‘realist’) Putnam (1978) labelled 
‘the  disastrous  meta-induction’  of  scientific  reasoning.  It  infers,  from the  fact  that  those 
successful past scientific theories appear to be wrong, that our present theory must share the 
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same fate and fail to refer accurately to the external world. Indeed, as Goldman (1986:158) 
writes: ‘Suppose scientists decide that no term in the science of more than fifty years ago 
referred, and no theory of that vintage was true. If this keeps happening, shouldn’t we be led 
to the meta-induction that no theoretical term now or in the future will refer, and no present or 
future theory will be true’? 
This line of reasoning, however,  I argue along with Goldman (1986:158-160), is severely 
misguided.  First  of  all,  Goldman  claims,  it  is  self-undermining.  We can  only judge  past 
theories to be false in the light of present theories. If we derive from this that our present 
theories must be false, we lose all grounds to claim that those past theories are false. All we 
can claim, therefore, is that, while our past theories are definitely false in the light of present 
evidence, our present theories could be false in the light of future evidence. 
Furthermore, defenders of the pessimistic meta-induction often focus on highly speculative 
theories in science. Quantum theory and relativity theory may, indeed, very well prove to be 
(partially) wrong at some point in the future, but it is unfair to restrict considerations to those 
types of theory. Indeed, the more ‘prosaic’ theories that livers detoxify the blood, that liquids 
boil at a certain temperature, and that water is composed out of hydrogen and oxygen, are not 
at risk of being radically overthrown somewhere in the future of scientific enquiry. Finally,  
theories have numerous components. Even when the theory as a whole is rejected, not all of 
the components are necessarily overthrown. The general theory of the electron, for instance, 
has  changed over  time,  but  the view of  the  electron  as  a  basic  unit  of  electrical  charge, 
irresolvable into smaller units, has been retained (Goldman 1986:160). Similarly, the theory 
of evolution has been amended and completed since Darwin, but its basic premise – i.e. that 
all living organisms evolve by means of natural selection – is still valid, as is Copernicus’s 
heliocentric model of the universe. In this regard, I argue, rather than concluding from past 
mistakes that we can never get it right, we can only infer that we might get it wrong. 
We have to admit, therefore, to the possibility that our representations can, in principle, be 
mistaken, in other words, that they cannot, or can only poorly, fit an external object. While it 
is possible that our grasps of the world correspond to states of the external world, there is no 
absolute guarantee there actually is a correspondence. In this regard, while we can argue that 
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there is epistemic access to the world, it  would be wrong to see this correspondence as a 
‘given’. Our representations of the world do not, in other words, automatically refer to the 
external world. Therefore, inferring the existence of a corresponding external object from our 
mere possession of a mental representation is fallacious, and even contradicts the basic tenet 
of  metaphysical  or  ontological  realism -  that  there  is  a  mind-independent  reality.  Indeed, 
equating the world to our representation of it reduces it to our mental realm, and sucks us into 
a Berkeleyan vortex of idealism. 
This brings us to the conclusion that, while our representations can be about real objects and 
properties, they can also fail to represent anything. Our minds, indeed, are natural organs with 
fallible reasoning power, and the history of its products shows that this can and does occur 
more often than not. However, as argued above, this does not provide us with a reason to 
claim that no representations, present or future, will ever fit their objects. Imperfect as it is, 
the human mind is able to represent real objects and properties. 
4.2 Limits set by computational capacity
As  McGinn  (1994:I)  points  out,  we  need  to  distinguish  between  two  different  potential 
sources of cognitive limitation. The first is related to what McGinn calls ‘the content of our 
mental representations’38, which refers to that which I have called ‘the cognitive grasps’ we 
have at our disposal. This concerns the ‘range of concepts’ we can deploy in thought or – in 
my terms – the representations that are included in our conceptual space. As argued above (cf. 
2.1 Saving epistemological realism: the distinction between grasp and content), the fact that 
these  representations  are  particular  and  contingent  does  not  entail  they  cannot  represent 
external objects.
The second potential source of cognitive limitation, however, is what McGinn (1994) calls 
‘the specific character of the operational system’. This refers to the processing abilities we 
have at our disposal. As McGinn points out, ‘a system might be confined by what it can do 
with them [the concepts at its disposal] – say, because of attentional or memory limitations’ 
38 This  is  not  to  be  confused  with  Nagel’s  (1986)  content  of  a  representation,  which  points  to  what  a  
representation refers to.
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(I). There is, in other words, a limitation in computational capacity that could limit our ability  
to represent the world. Indeed, the fact that the human mind has limited processing power 
hardly needs to be argued for. We can only memorise so much in a certain period of time, can 
perform unassisted calculus only to a certain level of complexity,  and can only play out a 
limited number of chess moves in our mind in a certain lapse of time. 
Nevertheless, we are not restricted to the ‘bare’ mental powers we are endowed with in our 
attempts  to  represent  the  world.  Our  memory  is  dramatically  extended  by our  access  to 
libraries and other databases. Furthermore, our computational powers are equally increased by 
calculators,  computers  and  the  like.  In  this  regard,  the  natural  capacity  of  our  minds  is 
exponentially boosted by artificial aids. This, however, does not imply that there can be no 
limitations to our representational abilities imposed by the available computational capacity, 
including the cognitive aids we can or even possibly could bring to the task. 
In this regard, computational complexity theory considers some problems ‘intractable’. This 
entails that, while these problems can be solved in principle, they would require an infinite or 
astronomical amount of resources – such as, for instance, time, space, or memory – in order to 
be solved. When faced with an intractable problem, we do not,  therefore,  lack the proper 
computational operations to solve the problem, but rather the sufficient resources or capacity 
to carry out the operations. A famous example of intractability is given by the ‘travelling 
salesman problem’. Menger (1930) describes it in the following words: 
‘It is the task to find, for finitely many points whose pairwise distances are known, the 
shortest route connecting the points. Of course, this problem is solvable by finitely 
many  trials.  Rules  which  would  push  the  number  of  trials  below  the  number  of 
permutations of the given points, are not known. The rule that one first should go from 
the starting point to the closest point, then to the point closest to this, etc., in general  
does not yield the shortest route’. 
Mathematicians,  computer  scientists,  physicists  and  even  chemists  have  mulled  over  the 
problem for over a century and systematically found large numbers of variables intractable 
(Appelgate  et  al,  2007:1).  To  date,  the  largest  number  of  points  successfully  connected 
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reached  85  900  points,  using  the  powerful  computer  program  ‘Concorde  TSP  solver’ 
(Appelgate et al, 2007:53). While increasing computational power and better heuristics can 
still increase this number, some magnitudes are bound to remain intractable.
While this is a purely mathematical problem, it is possible that some levels of complexity in 
which  the  physical  world  could  theoretically  be  grasped  might  also  elude  us  due  to  the 
restricted availability of cognitive resources. Indeed, if we assume that reality is infinitely 
complex - that there is, in other words, no external limit to the level of complexity in which 
the world can be represented, we have to admit that our grasp could never get to ‘the bottom’ 
of its enquiry. If, on the other hand, reality is finitely complex or – in other terms – if there 
exists a point in enquiry where the world would harbour no finer structures than those already 
represented, it is still not guaranteed that we could muster up the proper resources to reach 
this point. This computational limitation could surface in two different ways. We could either 
be unable to reach the ‘perfect’ theory of the world because at a certain level of complexity it 
would become intractable or – on the other hand – it could very well be that, even if we could 
reach that perfect ‘theory’, we would still be limited by our available conceptual capacity and 
so could not apply it to all present and future instances of the world to predict all present and 
future states of the world. 
Some  degrees  of  understanding  and  predicting,  therefore,  are  very  likely  to  remain  un-
reached,  not  because  of  their  resistance  to  resolution  by  the  computational  tools  at  our 
disposal, but because of the amount of computational resources they would require in order to 
be reached. If, as argued above, there is no limit to the level of complexity in which the world  
can be grasped, no matter how much we increase the computational power at our disposal, our 
scope on the world will always be restricted to a certain level of resolution. If, on the other 
hand, there is such a limit, that limit could very well be beyond the computational resources 
we can bring to the task and even the resources we could theoretically (in the future) delve 
into.  
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4.3 Limits set by scope
As argued above (cf. 2.2 The nature of cognitive grasps: impossibility of a God’s eye view),  
there  is  a  one-way  implication  between  content  and  grasp  or  –  in  Quine’s  terminology 
(1975:313)  – between observation  and hypothesis,  meaning  that  the  same content  can  in 
principle be yielded by different grasps (cf. 2.2 The nature of cognitive grasps: impossibility 
of a God’s eye view). Every grasp, however, yields or ‘implies’ a singular content. Indeed, 
while a particular point in space can be grasped by both an axis-system and a grid-system, a 
point in  the axis-system only refers to  one point  in space.  Similarly,  while  a tree can be 
represented in a drawing or a description, both the drawing and the description only fit one 
instance in the world; namely, the tree they represent. Therefore, while an external object can 
be ‘fitted’ by a number of different grasps, a grasp only ‘fits’ a singular object. 
This opens the possibility that all our available representations do not cover all the content the 
external world harbours. In other words, some properties or elements of the world might be 
inaccessible to us because no grasps or representations at our disposal can fit these properties 
or elements. This is not, however, as argued above, necessarily the case. A particular set of 
grasps can, in principle, yield a complete representation of the world. Indeed, not only could a 
particular  grasp  access  the  world  in  its  totality,  as  I  claimed,  but  such  a  complete 
representation  would  necessarily  take  a  particular  grasp  (cf.  2.2  The  nature  of  cognitive 
grasps: impossibility of a God’s eye view).
Nevertheless, I suspect, some elements and properties of the world might elude us because of 
the nature of our grasp. They might, in other words, resist being grasped by the conceptual 
tools  we  have  at  our  disposal.  Indeed,  either  there  is  simply  no  representation  in  our 
conceptual space to fit certain external objects (closure) or we are (very) unlikely to form 
fitting representations, due to our particular cognitive nature (bias) (cf. Chapter 4). Recall, in 
this context, our numeracy lacking human beings (cf. Chapter 4 - 3.2.2 Cognitive resources). 
Not possessing the innate faculties underlying the ability to represent numerical information, 
they  would  –  as  pointed  out  –  be  hopelessly  closed  off  to  some  fundamental  ways  of 
representing the world (in this case: through mathematics, and by extension, science as we 
know it).  This  raises  serious  doubts  as  to  their  ability  to  represent  all  the  properties  and 
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elements of the external world we represent by means of their impaired grasp (impaired in 
comparison to us, that is). 
In this regard, it is very unlikely that our numeracy lacking humans would be able to represent 
Einstein’s space-time continuum (assuming this is an accurate representation of the world and 
therefore refers to an external property), or at least that they are biased against forming such a 
representation as they are lacking the concepts of mathematics and are therefore forced to take 
a different ‘conceptual road’ to arrive at a grasp which would represent this property of the 
world.  Just  as  our  a-numerical  humans,  lacking the  innate  faculty to  represent  numerical 
information, can be suspected to be most probably closed off to or at least biased against  
representing some aspects of the world, we could be lacking certain (theoretically possible) 
faculties, which would enable us to connect with a realm of external objects and properties 
that are now either straight-forwardly inaccessible  to us (because no representation in our 
conceptual space fits these objects) or highly unlikely to be grasped by us (because we are 
biased against forming the necessary representations).
Furthermore, the possibility that some elements of the world fall outside our epistemic scope 
makes  sense  from an  evolutionary  perspective.  As  pointed  out  in  chapters  2  and  3,  our 
evolutionary past  has endowed us with a set  of representational  tools  (i.e.  perceptual  and 
cognitive abilities) that provide us with a picture of the world that enhanced our ancestor’s 
chances for survival and successful reproduction. While we are not bound by this particular 
picture of the world, all our transgressing representations are still the product of recombining 
the perceptual and cognitive abilities that we are endowed with (cf. Chapter 3, 6.2 Variation 
through recombination). Considering that these tools only took shape when they provided a 
‘tangible’ advantage in terms of biological fitness, it is very plausible that the combinatorial 
set of the representations generated by these biological tools – i.e. our conceptual space – do 
not  fit  or  represent  some  aspects  of  the  world.  Anything  else,  while  not  impossible  in 
principle, would be highly unlikely, in much the same way as the possibility that the parts and 
tools designed for building a car could be rearranged and redeployed to build an impeccable 
airplane. There is, indeed, no reason to suppose that tools designed for one purpose (i.e. a 
picture of the world boosting our biological fitness) are perfectly apt to fulfil another (i.e. 
representing the world theoretically or scientifically).
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However, even if the scope of the representations within our conceptual space – i.e. all the 
representations we could possibly form – does not cover some elements and properties of the 
world – which therefore could never be grasped – this does not entail that representations we 
can possibly form cannot represent the world accurately, merely that they cannot represent it 
completely. Moreover, the incompleteness of our best possible theory or theories about the 
world is already strongly suggested by the fact that we are most probably limited,  by the 
available  computational  capacity,  to a certain  level  of complexity,  inferior  to the level  of 
complexity  in  which  the  world  could  theoretically  be  grasped  (cf.  4.2  Limits  set  by 
computational capacity).
Furthermore,  I  argue,  this  incompleteness  – in  the sense that  some external  objects  resist 
being grasped by the representations we can possibly form, not in the sense that some levels 
of complexity are inaccessible due to limitations in computational capacity – would only be 
evident  from a hypothetical  external  perspective,  not  from our  own point  of view.  There 
would,  in  other  words,  be  no  ‘black  holes’  in  our  best  possible  science:  no  irresolvable 
mysteries hovering in plain sight but all the while resisting satisfactory explanation. The ideal 
limit  of human enquiry,  in this  regard,  would provide us with a  ‘complete’  and accurate 
representation of the world for us. The fact that some other cognitive creatures could assess 
that we fail to represent some aspects of the world does not make our grasp of the world either 
erroneous  or  inherently  flawed.  It  merely  entails  that  our  cognitive  relation  to  the  world 
includes but a part of the elements and properties that could in theory be represented by a 
cognitive creature. 
My claim that our ideal understanding would be void of any irresolvable mysteries is opposed 
to the ‘New Mysterianism’ movement, advocating ‘Transcendental Naturalism’. The latter is 
championed  by  McGinn  (1989,  1993,  1994).  McGinn’s  argument  contains  two  distinct 
claims. The first is that, due to the nature of our cognitive apparatus, we are closed to certain 
aspects of the world. The second is that we can pinpoint those aspects of the world that we are 
closed to. While I agree with the first claim – although not in principle – I will reject the 
second. 
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According to McGinn’s (1989) Transcendental Naturalism, the human mind is cognitively 
closed to the solution of certain problems, not because those problems are different in nature 
than solvable scientific problems, but because the particular structure of our minds obstructs 
that knowledge. This is what he means by ‘Transcendental Naturalism’: they transcend our 
cognitive capacities,  but at  the same time are not supernatural;  not ontologically different 
from the natural  problems we can solve.  Examples  of  such problems are:  the mind-body 
problem, the self, meaning and intentionality, free will, a priori knowledge, and knowledge in 
general – the problems which have typically raised philosophical perplexity throughout the 
history of human thought. McGinn expands on the mind-body problem:
How  is  it  possible  for  conscious  states  to  depend  upon  brain  states?  How  can 
technicolour phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter? What makes the bodily 
organ we call the brain so radically different from other bodily organs, say the kidneys  
– the body parts  without  a  trace  of  consciousness?  How could  the aggregation  of 
millions of individually insentient neurons generate subjective awareness? We know 
that brains are the de facto causal basis of consciousness, but we have, it seems, no 
understanding whatever of how this can be so. It strikes us as miraculous, eerie, even 
faintly comic. […] The mind-body problem is the problem of understanding how the 
miracle is wrought, thus removing the sense of deep mystery.  We want to take the 
magic out of the link between consciousness and the brain (McGinn, 1989:349).
McGinn (1989:350) suggests that  the mystery arises because we are ‘cut off  by our very 
cognitive constitution from achieving a conception of that natural property of the brain (or of 
consciousness) that accounts for the psychophysical link’. We do not, in other words, have the 
conceptual grasp at our disposal to understand (and therefore represent) the nexus between 
mind and body, or between consciousness and brain. This problem, that has been haunting 
philosophers for ages,  cannot therefore be solved by a human mind – not because of the 
nature of the problem (it is, according to McGinn’s Transcendental Naturalism, no different 
from problems we do solve) but because of the nature of our cognitive apparatus. 
However, I object, along with Dennett (1991), that this line of thinking ignores one of the 
main characteristics of human thought: its productivity. As pointed out in chapter 4, we can 
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produce  an  infinite  amount  of  distinct  and  meaningful  representations  of  the  world  (cf. 
Chapter 4, 2.1 Productivity of thought). This should, as Dennett claims, enable us to formulate 
and  understand  sentences  or  propositions  that  best  express  the  solution  to  this  so-called 
humanly  irresolvable  problem.  There  must,  in  other  words,  be  representations  within  our 
conceptual space that best represent the psychophysical link.
Indeed, where McGinn’s argument fails is not so much in arguing that we are cognitively 
closed to certain aspects of the world – which I argued is very likely, although it does not 
follow in principle from the particular grasp we have of the world – but in arguing that we are 
cognitively  closed  to  the  answers  of  problems  we  pose.39 In  this  sense,  when  McGinn 
(1989:351) invokes the notion of monkeys being closed to the properties of electrons in order 
to  argue that  humans  might  very well  be closed with respect  to  certain  true theories,  he 
overlooks the fact that the properties of electrons are not the answer to problems the monkey 
mind can conceive of. Indeed, unlike monkeys, we understand the mind-body problem. As 
Dennett  (1991)  points  out,  ‘for  McGinn  to  have  a  convincing  case  for  human  cognitive 
closure, he should provide an empirical example of some creature, human or otherwise, who 
can definitely understand some question, but be definitively incapable of understanding the 
answer’.
In this regard, I argue that every intelligible problem would have to have a potential ideal 
answer equally intelligible to us. If, however, that answer falls short of the objective reality it 
attempts to grasp, then that very question would fall equally short of describing the objective 
problem it points at. It does not seem possible that we could understand a problem in all its 
aspects  and not  be  able  to  understand  an  equally  ‘complex’  ideal  answer.  Our  cognitive 
limitations would have an effect both on question and answer. It would be like someone who 
understands  the  concepts  of  numeracy  and  addition  still  not  being  able  to  solve  the 
mathematical  problem:  x  =  5+8.  Therefore,  if  McGinn  is  right  in  claiming  that  some 
philosophical conundrums can never be satisfactorily answered, because we do not have the 
proper cognitive grasp at our disposal to solve the problem, how can we expect to have the 
39 To be fair, McGinn (1989:351-352) does address this issue, arguing that a hypothetical ‘Humean mind’, only  
able to derive concepts from perception, would be closed to a true theory of physics (unable to conceptualise the 
existence of unobservables as atoms)  and  baffled by the physical  world because of this inability to form an 
accurate theory. This claim, however, is not supported by any argument, but merely offered as a fact.   
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proper grasp to understand the problem? The representations we use to describe the problem 
would have to be equally defective (our understanding of physical and mental categories and 
of interaction or nexus in the case of the mind-body problem) and therefore the very problem 
we pose would be, to say the least, a very poor representation of what really is at issue.
Delving into Boden’s (1990) terminology of ‘conceptual spaces’ once again, we have – as 
argued in the previous chapter, an infinite amount of representations at our disposal – in other 
words, an infinite amount of locations in our conceptual space (cf. Chapter 4, 2.4 Conceptual 
spaces:  reconciling  openness  and  closure).  While  some  aspects  of  the  world  might  be 
ungraspable for us,  because no representation in our conceptual  space can possibly grasp 
them, those aspects can never be the object of our enquiry. Indeed, if on the one hand, we 
have an accurate grasp of the problem, there would have to be an ideal grasp of the answer in  
our  conceptual  space,  since  our  conceptual  space  contains  an  infinite  amount  of 
representations and contains the proper representational tools to represent the issue at hand. If, 
on the other hand, an aspect of the world cannot be grasped by means of the representations  
within our conceptual space, we would be closed both to the question and to the answer. For 
instance, if a problem X can be grasped mathematically, there must be a correct mathematical 
solution to it.  Therefore,  to grasp the problem,  one needs mathematics,  the possession of 
which  entails  that  a  correct  answer is  within reach (by means  of  this  same mathematical 
reasoning). If,  however, some cogniser cannot engage in mathematical reasoning, it  could 
never grasp the problem in the first place.
Therefore,  while our scope on the world might  not  coincide with the world itself  (which 
already is the case, assuming that we are limited by our available computational capacity); 
within this scope, I argue, there are no irresolvable ‘black holes’ in principle. This follows 
from our previously outlined characterisation of human cognition as an open cognitive system 
within a particular conceptual space. Whatever can be grasped by means of our conceptual 
building blocks can potentially be ‘ideally’ represented. Whatever cannot be grasped – i.e. 
that which falls outside our conceptual space – can never be an object of enquiry. 
Furthermore,  this  view accords  with the two-sided determination of knowledge I  outlined 
above (cf.  3.1 The two-sided determination  of knowledge),  claiming that  knowledge only 
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makes  sense  within  the  particular  cognitive  relation  we  entertain  with  the  world.  In  this 
regard, while elements of the world might fall outside this cognitive relation, there must be, 
within the scope of this relation, a theoretically ideal fit for every object of representation. 
Knowledge of the world – i.e. representations fitting the properties of the objects represented 
in virtue of our epistemic orientation –  is, therefore, possible, and – moreover – the ideal 
limit  of  human  knowledge,  or  'the  perfect  fit',  would  be  neither  arbitrary  (cf.  biological 
determination), nor inherently flawed (there would be no irresolvable mysteries).
5. Conclusion
Gauging the implications of our ‘open cognitive relation to the world, comprised within a 
particular conceptual space’ for our epistemic endeavours, I argue that while we represent the 
world in a particular set of ways, this does not entail in principle that we can only represent it  
in a limited way.  However, the way our representations correspond to the world is not in 
virtue  of  some objective  ‘mirroring’,  but  in  virtue  of  a  particular  way of  fitting  (i.e.  our 
particular epistemic orientation) with a particular set of representational tools. Our knowledge 
of  the  world  –  i.e.  representations  corresponding  to  external  objects  –  is,  in  this  regard,  
fundamentally  grounded  in  our  biology.  It  is  the  outcome  of  our  particular  cognitive 
orientation, fuelled by our particular cognitive means. It is radically species-specific.
This, however, rather than sucking us into a bottomless vortex of relativism, bringing about 
scepticism,  enables  us  –  on  the  contrary  –  to  resist  pervasive  and  destructive  forms  of 
relativism. It  provides us, indeed, with a necessary framework through which we must view 
the  world  (i.e.  a  framework  rooted  in  our  cognitive  nature),  rather  than  a  multitude  of 
contingent cultural frameworks. Knowledge, in this regard, while on the one hand losing its 
untenable universality – which I argue, moreover, is not the product of our limited cognitive 
means but follows necessarily from the very act of representing – gains, on the other hand, a 
‘human objectivity’. It is not a random, nor a conventional perspective on the world, but a 
necessary one in virtue of the kind of cognisers we are. It is the product both of the way the  
world is and the way we must represent it.
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This brings my argument almost to a close. One more issue, however, needs to be addressed. 
That is the issue of the circularity of my approach – taking a particular human theory, i.e. the 
theory of evolution, to bear on the fundamental question as to what the scope and limits of 
human knowledge are – and its consequences. Indeed, it can be argued, how can we make 
claims about knowledge in general based on particular theories within our knowledge? This 
will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Evolutionary epistemology’s double-edged sword
1. Introduction
In this dissertation, I have based epistemological claims on evolutionary considerations. The 
question now arises as to whether this is a coherent strategy at all. In this chapter I will argue 
that it  is, defending my approach against what De Cruz et al (2011:518) call the ‘double-
edged sword’ that evolutionary approaches to epistemology present us with. In this regard, I 
will claim that my argument is neither self-defeating, nor (viciously) circular.
2. Evolutionary epistemology’s double threat
As De Cruz et al (2011) point out, evolutionary considerations can either be used to justify or 
to debunk beliefs. In other words, the premise that biological evolutionary forces have shaped 
our perceptual and cognitive faculties has been used to argue both that our beliefs about the 
world are justified, or – to the contrary – that those beliefs are unreliable. Indeed, as pointed 
out in chapter 2, the Lorenzian epistemologist argues that, since our perceptual and cognitive 
apparatus, which provide us with a representation of the world, are the result of evolution by 
natural selection, the structures of this representation must – at least approximately – match 
the structures of the world itself, because being endowed with an accurate representation of 
the  world  increases  one’s  biological  fitness,  and  therefore  the  perceptual  and  cognitive 
mechanisms allowing for this accurate representation must have been selected for (cf. Chapter 
2, 2. Lorenz’s evolutionary epistemology). 
Opposed  to  this  view  is  the  claim  that  I  defended  with  respect  to  our  commonsense 
representations,  which  holds,  contrary  to  the  Lorenzian  argument,  that  the  fact  that  our 
perceptual and cognitive faculties evolved does not entail that the representations they cause 
us to have are (even approximately) accurate. Indeed, natural selection can only be expected 
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to  shape  representations  of  the  world  that  lead  to  fitness-enhancing  behaviour.  As  Stich 
(1990)  points  out,  these  faculties  will  therefore  not  automatically  yield  accurate 
representations. Furthermore, natural selection is path-dependent, and evolution is also driven 
by other 'random' forces, namely genetic  drift  and the process of genetic  hitch-hiking (cf. 
Chapter 2, 3. Uncovering the fallacy).
Both views – i.e. evolutionary justification arguments and evolutionary debunking arguments 
– run into problems. The former, as it relies on a theory which is the product of human belief-
forming to justify the accuracy of human belief-forming,  is inherently circular.  Indeed, as 
Shogenji (2000) points out, 'it is commonly held by epistemologists that we cannot establish 
the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of beliefs that are obtained by that very 
process  since  such  self-dependent  justification  is  circular'  (287).  Such  an  approach  does, 
indeed, beg the question (i.e. commit the logical fallacy of 'petitio principii'), by assuming as a 
premise what is to be proven. 
Evolutionary debunking arguments, which conclude that our representations are not reliable, 
are, on the other hand – as De Cruz et al (2011:517) point out – self-defeating. Arguing from 
an evolutionary standpoint that our cognitive faculties are unreliable, robs our premise (i.e. 
that our cognitive faculties evolved) of its reliability, since it too is a product of our 'non truth-
tracking'  cognitive  faculties.  This  line  of  reasoning  is  at  the  core  of  Plantinga's  (1993) 
'evolutionary argument against naturalism', which claims that evolutionary naturalism is self-
defeating, since, if we accept that our cognitive faculties are the product of evolution, we must 
accept they do not endow us with reliable beliefs (cf. Chapter 2, 3.1 Plantinga’s case against  
evolutionary  naturalism).  Therefore,  he  argues,  we  have  an  'undefeated  defeater'  of 
evolutionary naturalism, since the very idea that our cognitive faculties are the product of 
evolution then becomes unreliable.  In other words, if we believe that evolution by natural 
selection has shaped our cognitive apparatus, we have good reasons to doubt the reliability of 
our beliefs, including the reliability of the belief that evolution by natural selection has shaped 
our cognitive apparatus. 
In this regard, De Cruz et al (2011) argue that 'if evolutionary approaches to the human mind 
are to be coherent, they should allow at the very least for cognitive capacities that are capable 
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of  generating  truth-tracking  theories,  such  as  evolutionary  theory'  (526).  Indeed,  if  we 
eradicate the reliability of our cognitive processes, we completely undercut the grounding on 
which  we  base  this  conclusion.  Granting  cognitive  reliability  from  evolutionary 
considerations,  however,  presents  us  –  as  pointed  out  –  with  the  threat  of  circularity, 
supporting the reliability of our beliefs on the basis of a particular belief (which is therefore 
still in need of justification). In the next section, I will analyse how the argument presented in 
this dissertation fares in the light of this double threat.
3. Answering the double threat
The argument I have presented has three major parts. The first part derives from the premise 
that our perceptual and cognitive abilities are the product of a blind evolutionary process, that 
these abilities are contingent, and that they could have been different, therefore, providing us 
with a different perceptual input and a different cognitive processing of this input (cf. Chapter 
1 – Chapter 2). The second part states that, while we are not bound by the commonsense 
representations these particular abilities provide us with (i.e. we are able to transgress these 
representations), we can nevertheless only produce representations that are included in the 
conceptual  space defined by the combinatorial  possibilities of the various representational 
tools we possess (cf. Chapter 3 – Chapter 4). Finally,  the third part states that the way in 
which we fit representations to the external world is by means of our biologically determined 
epistemic  orientation  (cf.  Chapter  5).  Therefore,  I  concluded,  we  entertain  a  particular 
cognitive  relation  to  the  world,  being  endowed  with  a  particular  set  of  perceptual  and 
cognitive resources, guided by a particular epistemic orientation. An accurate representation 
for  us,  in  other  words,  is  a  particular  fit  (epistemic  orientation)  with  particular  means 
(perceptual and cognitive resources) (cf. Chapter 5).
3.1 Is my argument self-defeating?
Is this  argument  self-defeating? The self-defeating character  of an argument can either be 
complete or not. When it is complete, the conclusion of the argument entails necessarily that 
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the  premise  on  which  it  is  based  is  false.  When  it  is  not  completely  self-defeating,  the 
conclusion  of  the  argument  entails  that  the  premise,  while  not  false  in  principle,  is 
nevertheless unreliable – i.e. likely to be false. The first, completely self-defeating argument, I 
will call ‘self-refuting’; the second, weaker form of a self-defeating argument, I will call ‘self-
undermining’. 
Is our argument self-refuting? An evolutionary debunking argument would be self-refuting if 
it infers, from the premise that our perceptual and cognitive faculties evolved, that all the 
beliefs  or  representations  they  generate  are  necessarily  false.  The  premise  on  which  this 
conclusion is based, therefore – since it is itself a representation generated by our perceptual 
and cognitive faculties – must be false. The argument, in this case, refutes itself, since if its 
conclusion is true, its premise must be false. 
The argument presented in this dissertation, however, is not self-refuting. Firstly, the fact that 
our perceptual and cognitive faculties are the outcome of a blind evolutionary process does 
not entail that all representations they cause us to have are necessarily false, but merely that 
these representations do not necessarily represent the world accurately because they originate 
from evolved faculties  (cf.  Chapter 2).  Secondly,  as argued in the fourth chapter,  we can 
transgress our commonsense representations, substituting them with representations that we 
perceive as epistemically preferable. In this regard, even if evolution only provides us with 
false (commonsense) beliefs (which I think it does not), we would still have the cognitive 
means to discard these beliefs and replace them with other (better fitting) representations.
This leaves the weaker possibility that our argument is self-undermining. This would be the 
case if I inferred from my premises (cf. above) that our beliefs, while not necessarily false, are 
nevertheless  unreliable  –  unreliable  in  the  sense  that  the  probability  that  any  of  our 
representations are accurate representations of the world, or, in terms of the last chapter, the 
probability that they fit the external world, is low. If I were to reach such a conclusion – i.e. 
that our representations of the world are unreliable – it would be very improbable that the 
premises on which this conclusion is based are accurate. Therefore, while the conclusion does 
not refute its premises (i.e. necessarily entails that they are false), it nevertheless undermines 
them.
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The conclusion I reached, however, does not state that our representations of the world are 
unreliable. While this might be true to a certain extent for the commonsense representations 
we have of the world (cf. Chapter 1 and 3), our ability to transgress these representations 
entails that we are able to produce representations we perceive as better fits. Our ability to 
transgress,  therefore,  increases  the  reliability  of  our  beliefs.  It  substitutes  our  (largely) 
unreliable  commonsense  representations  with  other  representations,  which  are  selected 
precisely because they are better fits and, therefore, more reliable.
In  this  regard,  note  that  the  theory  of  evolution  on  which  my  argument  is  based  is  a 
transgression of our commonsense representations of the organic world. Indeed, as pointed 
out in Chapter  1, at  a commonsensical  level  we divide the organic world into immutable 
categories and sub-categories based on an intuition of a hidden trait or essence that members 
of the same group share with one another (cf. Chapter 1, 3.2.2 Folk biology). The reliability of 
my premises, in this regard, can be considered to be high (or at least, higher than those of our 
commonsense representations), since they are the product of a ‘critical fit’ to the input we 
gather from the world. 
Another threat, however, could come from the fact that we entertain a particular cognitive 
relation with the world, fitting our representations to the particular and contingent epistemic 
orientation with which we are endowed (cf. Chapter 5), entailing that fitting representations 
are only fitting  for us. This, however, does not undermine our premises. Our premises can 
indeed, as pointed out, fit the external world for us and therefore be accurate for us. This 
entails that they can be reliable to us. The conclusions we draw from premises which are 
reliable to us can, in this regard, also be expected to be reliable to us. The fact that other 
cognitive beings could produce different representations of the matter (the product of different 
cognitive tools and a different orientation), and that different representations would therefore 
be reliable to them, doesn’t entail that our fitting representations are not reliable, or that they 
are less reliable,  but merely that  the reliability of a belief  is determined by the epistemic 
relation a cognitive being entertains with the world (cf. Chapter 5). 
A final threat comes from the fallibility of our representational abilities (cf. Chapter 5 – 4.1 
Limits set by fallibility). In this regard, our current theory of evolution could be mistaken in 
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some important respects (i.e. it could only poorly fit what is the case). However, even if this is 
the case,  the fact  that  our  perceptual  and cognitive  abilities  are  particular  and contingent 
would still  stand. The accuracy of our premise,  therefore,  is  not highly dependent  on the 
degree of accuracy of our best  theory of how our cognitive  and perceptual  abilities  were 
shaped,  but  merely  on  the  less  problematic  assumption  that  these  abilities  are  contingent 
products of a natural process.
3.2 Is my argument circular?
Evolutionary based epistemologies, however, present us with a ‘double-edged sword’, as De 
Cruz et al (2011:518) so eloquently phrase it. While we might have averted the threat of the 
self-defeating character of the argument presented here, we still face the threat of circularity.  
Is  our  argument  circular?  In  order  to  answer  this,  we  need  to  distinguish  between  two 
different threats  – on the one hand, the threat  of circularity with respect to the particular 
argument presented, and, on the other hand, the threat of the circularity of our approach in 
general (i.e. the alleged circularity of a naturalised form of epistemology). The former will be 
discussed  here,  while  the  latter  deserves  a  new  section  altogether  (cf.  4.  Defence  of  a 
naturalised epistemology).
With regards to the particular argument presented in this dissertation, I argue that it is not 
circular.  Indeed, I do not – as opposed to the Lorenzian epistemologist  (cf. Chapter 2, 2. 
Lorenz’s evolutionary epistemology) – ground our ability to represent the world accurately in 
the fact  that  our  cognitive  abilities  evolved,  which  commits  the  fallacy  of  grounding the 
reliability of our beliefs in a particular belief. In the contrary, I argue that the fact that these 
faculties evolved does not guarantee the accuracy of the representations they provide us with 
(cf. Chapter 2). It is precisely the ability to transgress those representations in the light of our 
cognitive orientation that enables us to tune our representations to the world; in other words, 
to produce a cognitive fit. 
Simply  put,  the  Lorenzian  epistemologist  bases  the  accuracy  of  our  representations  on 
evolution. I, on the other hand, base the reliability of our ability to represent the world in our 
possession of an open epistemic relation to the world, guided by an epistemic orientation – i.e. 
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in our ability to transgress (cf. Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). Is this circular? No.  
Whereas  the  Lorenzian  argument  bases  the  reliability  of  our  representations  on  one 
representation (i.e. the theory of evolution), I do not base the reliability of our representations 
on a particular representation we have of the world. I base it on the epistemic relation we 
entertain with the world. 
Furthermore,  rather  than  concluding  the  (approximate)  accuracy  of  our  beliefs,  as  the 
Lorenzian epistemologist does, I conclude that we fit representations to the external world by 
means of a particular set of tools in the light of a particular epistemic orientation. If anything, 
therefore,  my conclusion  casts  the  accuracy of  my premises  in  doubt,  since  it  holds  that 
accurate representations for us are particular fits by particular means, bringing about the self-
undermining  problem I  addressed  above.  This  threat,  however,  can,  as  argued above,  be 
satisfactorily averted.  
This leaves the threat of the circularity of my approach in general. Any form of naturalised or 
descriptive (i.e.  non-normative)  epistemology,  can,  indeed,  be said to be circular,  since it 
brings empirical findings (i.e. instances of knowledge) to bear on a theory of knowledge (i.e. 
knowledge in general), thereby presupposing what must be justified. This will be the subject 
of the next section.
4. Defence of a naturalised epistemology
Naturalised forms  of epistemology make use of  empirical  data  (i.e.  scientific  theories)  to 
reflect  on  epistemological  questions  (i.e.  questions  concerned  with  the  status,  scope  and 
limitations of knowledge). These forms of epistemology, therefore, make use of instances of 
knowledge (scientific  theories)  to  reason about  knowledge in  general.  Many philosophers 
have  criticised  such  an  approach  to  epistemology,  arguing  that  it  is  hopelessly  circular.  
Epistemology, according to these thinkers, must be a purely a priori analysis of the conditions 
which  make  knowledge  possible,  providing  the  framework  to  which  ‘positive’  claims  to 
knowledge have to yield. In the following pages, I will answer this criticism on the basis of 
179
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
both the argument that no form of epistemology can possible escape circularity, and that all 
forms of circularity or self-dependence need not be vicious, closed circles.
4.1 No alternative
The problem of circularity is not restricted to evolutionary epistemology or other kinds of 
naturalised (i.e. empirically informed) epistemology alone. It is at the core of any theory of 
knowledge. A theory of knowledge does, indeed, apply knowledge to reflect on knowledge. In 
providing our epistemic endeavours with foundations, we do so on the basis of criteria which 
are  themselves  in  need of  foundations.  In  this  regard,  Vollmer  (1987) points  out  that  an 
investigation into the validity of knowledge presupposes a criterion determining whether and 
when knowledge is valid – demarcating,  in other words, genuine or true knowledge from 
beliefs or representations lacking such justification (164). 
This criterion, Vollmer (1987) continues, can either be a piece of knowledge itself, or not. If it 
is a piece of knowledge, we are caught in a circle or an infinite regress. Indeed, either our  
criterion of validity already presupposes what it must determine (i.e. knowledge) or it is itself 
in need of a foundation, which in turn will require a foundation, ad infinitum (164). If, on the 
other  hand,  it  is  not  a  piece of  knowledge,  it  would be an axiom or a  convention.  This, 
however,  as Vollmer  points out,  could never  justify knowledge,  since such a justification 
would  have  to  be  recognisable  as  a  criterion  of  objective  knowledge.  A  criterion  of 
knowledge, therefore, has to be a piece of knowledge itself – i.e. we need epistemic reasons to 
consider it as a criterion of objective knowledge. This, however, brings us back either to a 
circle or to an infinite regress (164).
 This argument, Vollmer (1987) clarifies, does not entail that knowledge is impossible, but 
merely that an absolute justificatory theory of knowledge is impossible, in the sense that it  
cannot escape Munchausen’s trilemna, meaning that it is either caught in a circle or an infinite 
regress, or that it  is validated by an axiom. It is the problem of knowledge of knowledge 
(165).  In  this  regard,  ‘If  epistemology  is  indeed  meant  to  justify  knowledge,  to  produce 
sufficient  criteria  of  truth,  to  establish  necessary  propositions,  then  it  is  useless,  barren, 
impossible,  stillborn.  If we set out doubting the validity of every piece of knowledge,  no 
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knowledge can be justified’  (Vollmer,  1987:165).  In other  words,  a  theory of knowledge 
cannot start from nothing. As Russell argues:
If we adopt the attitude of the complete sceptic, placing ourselves wholly outside all 
knowledge, and asking, from this outside position, to be compelled to return within the 
circle of knowledge, we are demanding what is impossible, and our scepticism can 
never be refuted. For all refutation must begin with some piece of knowledge which 
the disputants share; from blank doubt, no argument can begin. Hence the criticism of 
knowledge which philosophy employs  must  not  be of this  destructive  kind,  if  any 
result is to be achieved. Against this absolute scepticism, no logical argument can be 
advanced (Russell, 1912:112).
Epistemology, in this regard, cannot ‘take off’ without presupposing knowledge. We must, as 
Neurath’s (1959) famous metaphor suggests, rebuild our ship while staying afloat, unable to 
start from ‘scratch’,  or, as Neurath puts it,  ‘never able to dismantle  it in dry-dock and to  
reconstruct  it  there  out  of  the  best  materials’  (201).  Knowledge  of  knowledge,  however, 
cannot escape a certain circularity.
Nevertheless,  as  Vollmer  (1987:165)  argues,  the  fact  that  epistemology  cannot  meet  the 
‘excessive and self-contradictory requirements’ that were traditionally attributed to it (i.e. to 
provide a criterion which is both non-arbitrary and not in need of further foundation) does not 
mean it should be abandoned. We have to change our conception of epistemology. It does not 
‘prove the existence of knowledge, it presupposes knowledge’(165). In this regard, Vollmer 
concludes, ‘It [epistemology] is neither infallible nor unfailing and should not claim to be. It  
works hypothetico-deductively, as any other scientific discipline does’ (165).
Epistemology, therefore, has no alternative but to lose its aspirations to be a ‘first philosophy’, 
attempting in Cartesian fashion to construct knowledge from the bottom up, and presupposing 
no knowledge when laying the foundations on which all knowledge is to be erected. As Quine 
(1969), argues, this traditional epistemological project has turned out to be a failure, and we 
are  consequently  left  with  no  other  alternative  than  a  naturalised  form of  epistemology, 
reflecting  on  epistemological  issues  from  a  background  of  established  beliefs.  There  is, 
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therefore,  no escaping a certain  form of circularity  or self-dependence  in  our attempts  to 
formulate a theory of knowledge. This self-dependence, however, need not be vicious. 
4.2 Virtuous circularity
The fact that we are deprived of absolute epistemological foundations does not mean we have 
to give up epistemology altogether. We can still reflect on human knowledge from premises 
which are not absolutely certain. This, as pointed out above, makes the approach circular or 
self-dependent, since the conjectures on which we base our epistemological considerations are 
themselves  ‘pieces  of  knowledge’  (and  therefore  in  need  of  justification).  Circularity, 
nevertheless,  is  not  vicious  per  se.  As  Buskes  (1998)  points  out:  ‘As  long  as  our 
presuppositions and premises are not sacrosanct but instead open to revision and refinement 
we are not caught in a vicious circle at all’ (13). In this regard, by granting our premises a 
hypothetical status, enabling us to critically examine them and revise them, if necessary, over 
time, we escape a closed circle and enter what Vollmer (1987:179) calls ‘an open spiral or 
self-correcting  feedback loop’.  In  this  context,  Vollmer  argues,  that  while  ‘of  course,  we 
cannot reasonably call in question our premises all at once, we should be ready to examine 
each of them in due time’ (179). Vollmer explains:
It [the process of a self-correcting feedback loop] is a continuous interplay, a perpetual 
give and take, a never-ending critical co-operation, an endless mutual correction. This 
process is not circular. We might rather liken it to a spiral. This spiral structure obtains 
both  historically  and  systematically:  New  knowledge  has  necessitated  new 
epistemologies, and new epistemological concepts have helped the advancement and 
the understanding of scientific theories (Vollmer, 1987:183).
Therefore, Vollmer concludes: 
The circle supposed to occur in empirically-oriented epistemologies is a virtuous circle 
[i.e. a circle which is not only consistent, but also fruitful and productive]. If there is 
any circularity at all, it is not a  petitio principii, because there is no principle to be 
begged.  Evolutionary  epistemology is  a  hypothetico-deductive  system which  starts 
from  a  combination  of  factual  and  epistemological  premises,  trying  to  draw 
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conclusions,  to  check  them  for  consistency  and  for  truth,  and  to  correct  them  if 
necessary (Vollmer, 1987:182, his italics).
In a similar  vein,  Shimony (1981:101) claims that  scientific  results  can shed light  on the 
reliability of human cognition and – reciprocally – that these considerations can give adequate 
justification  to  the  process  of  scientific  investigation.  This  ‘dialectical  framework’,  as 
Shimony calls it, accepts tentative suppositions at the beginning of enquiry, which are then 
subject  to  criticism,  and may  be  revised  and  refined.  ‘This  dialectic’,  Shimony  therefore 
concludes, ‘is open, with no foregone conclusions and no suppositions that are so entrenched 
that they cannot be critically evaluated’ (101). 
The  alleged  circularity  of  naturalised  epistemology,  in  this  regard,  can  be  viewed  as  an 
epistemic  upward  spiral,  in  which  scientific  conjectures  lead  to  epistemological 
considerations,  which  in  turn  refine  the  scientific  conjectures,  leading  to  better 
epistemological  criteria  and  methods,  and  so  on.  It  enables  us  to  improve  our  epistemic 
situation, all the while acknowledging the necessity to reason from somewhere – i.e. to take 
particular  ‘pieces  of  knowledge’  (void  of  absolute  certainty)  as  the  starting  point  of 
epistemological considerations. 
Indeed, knowledge, as Popper (1957) rightly argues, proceeds by conjectures and refutations, 
and it is precisely our willingness to critically reflect on the conjectures we take as premises 
of our epistemological considerations, that demarcates what Popper calls ‘critical thinking’ 
from  ‘dogmatic  thinking’.  This  critical  thinking,  or  refusal  to  grant  our  premises  a 
‘sacrosanct’ status, as Buskes (1998:13) puts it, is exactly what shields empirically informed 
epistemologies  from  a  vicious  kind  of  circularity,  in  which  premise  and  conclusion  are 
trapped in a closed circle. While self-dependent to a certain extent, therefore, the interplay 
between (empirical) premises and (epistemological) conclusions becomes dynamic, as each 
feedback loop provides us with better conjectures.
In this regard the (epistemological) conclusions of the argument presented in this dissertation 
are  not  founded on a  rusted  set  of  dogmatic  premises,  but  rather  on a  set  of  tentatively 
formulated hypotheses – i.e. our best conjectures to date. As argued above, these premises 
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could very well be amended to an important extent in the future of scientific enquiry. This, in 
turn, would sharpen the emerging epistemological picture. The fact that these premises are not 
the absolute,  immutable foundations the Cartesian epistemologists  seek for their  epistemic 
building,  does not entail  that the considerations  on the status,  scope and limits  of human 
knowledge  presented  here,  can  and  should  be  discarded  as  mere  ‘unfounded’  ramblings. 
Rather, they should be viewed as a temporary picture to be enhanced in the future of enquiry.
In  this  regard,  (future)  research  in  evolutionary  biology  in  general  and  cognitive  and 
neuroscience in particular could provide valuable insights into how exactly human thought 
processes work; how, in other words, we form thoughts based on the resources that evolution 
has provided us with. This, in turn, would further define the epistemological issues of the 
scope  and  limits  of  human  knowledge.  It  is  a  continuous  process,  bringing  forth  ever 
improving cognitive fits.  In this context, as Einstein pointed out, ‘there could be no fairer 
destiny for any theory than that it should point the way to a more comprehensive theory in 
which it lives on’ (cf. Popper, 1957).
5. Conclusion
While an evolutionary informed epistemology faces the double threat of being either self-
defeating or circular,  the argument presented in this dissertation resists this ‘double-edged 
sword’.  Indeed,  as  argued,  it  is  not  self-defeating,  since  the  evolutionary  origin  of  our 
perceptual  and  cognitive  apparatus  does  not  impose  on  us  the  conclusion  that  our 
representations of the world cannot be trusted to be reliable. We are, indeed, able to transgress 
the commonsense representations – which are shaped in the light of biological fitness and are 
therefore not truth-tracking per se – by other representations that we perceive as better fits to 
the external world in virtue of our epistemic orientation.
Neither  is  our  argument  circular,  since  –  on  the  one  hand  –  I  do  not  derive  from  the 
evolutionary  origin  of  our  cognitive  apparatus  that  we  are  endowed  with  an  accurate 
representation of the world, thereby grounding the validity of our beliefs in a single belief. On 
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the  other  hand,  I  argued  that  our  approach  –  basing  epistemological  considerations  on 
empirical theories, i.e. basing a theory of knowledge on instances of knowledge – is, while 
circular, not viciously so. This self-dependence is, indeed, a critical one, where premises are 
not dogmatically accepted but subject to critical evaluation. The picture emerging from these 
premises is therefore, while not absolute, nevertheless justified, and constantly adapted to, or 
rather sharpened by, the best conjectures we possess. 
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Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to fundamentally rethink our epistemic situation (i.e. the status, 
scope  and  limits  of  human  knowledge),  given  the  fact  that  the  perceptual  and  cognitive 
abilities  we  are  endowed  with  are  shaped  by  the  blind  process  of  evolution  by  natural 
selection. In order to do so, I analysed our uncritical scope on the world determined by our 
perceptual and cognitive abilities (our commonsense theories) and the way we, nevertheless, 
overcome  this  ‘myopic’  and  contingent,  species-specific  scope,  by  transgressing  our 
biologically determined view of the world. 
This transgression, however, is not boundless. Indeed, being the product of our perceptual and 
cognitive  faculties,  it  is  restricted  to  the  conceptual  space  defined  by  the  combinatorial 
possibilities generated by these faculties. This brings to light, a number of limits to our ability 
to represent the world. Furthermore, as transgression is guided by an epistemic orientation, 
human knowledge itself – i.e. the ‘fit’ between a representation and the world – is determined 
by this orientation, and therefore defined by the epistemic relation we hold to the world. It 
becomes  species-specific  –  a  product  of  our  very own,  biologically  determined  epistemic 
project. 
Evolution, therefore, rather than ‘simply’ endowing us with accurate representations (as the 
Lorenzian epistemologists claim) or unreliable representations of the world (as the opposite 
sceptical camp claims), has endowed us with a particular set of species-specific perceptual 
and cognitive abilities, providing us with a set of contingent commonsense theories  and the 
ability to overcome these representations, by digging into a conceptual space defined by the 
combinatorial possibilities generated by our perceptual and cognitive abilities. This provides 
us with an open but particular  epistemic relation,  enabling us to fit  representations to the 
world in the light of our epistemic orientation. In this regard, while all other creatures we are 
acquainted  with  are  restricted  to  a  particular,  ‘given’  scope on  the  world,  homo  sapiens 
radically broadens its cognitive horizons, being endowed both with the means to go beyond 
this  scope  (variation  through  recombination),  and  with  the  orientation  to  guide  these 
explorations.
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The cognitive abilities to transgress our biologically based representations, therefore, provide 
us with a new level of cognition altogether. Whereas other animal species possess a given 
cognitive framework in which they integrate the input they gather from their environment, we 
have the means to adapt this framework, i.e. we can override and replace the core intuitions 
we hold about the world and which make sense of the input data we gather. Language, as 
briefly pointed out (cf. Chapter 4) may have played a crucial role in this, since both our ability 
to metarepresent and our ability to map across domains and reason by analogy, seem closely 
tied  to  the  development  of  natural  language  in  the  evolutionary  history  of  humankind. 
Another crucial aspect of human cognition, is, however – and I cannot emphasise this enough 
– the possession of an epistemic orientation. Together, these distinctive features of the human 
mind underlie the remarkable achievements of human epistemic endeavours, resulting from 
this new level of cognition that humankind developed.
Despite its distinctiveness, however, human knowledge is still fuelled by a set of contingent 
perceptual  and  cognitive  resources.  This  tension  is  at  the  core  of  the  human  epistemic 
situation. We transgress our biological view of the world, but can only do so based on our 
‘natural’ abilities; we can produce an unlimited amount of different representations, but these 
representations  are  nevertheless  comprised  within  a  particular  conceptual  space.  Human 
knowledge, in this regard, is neither an instance of God-like or universal rationality as so 
often assumed in the pre-Darwinian era, nor is it, at best, a boosted kind of primate cognition 
(as some evolutionary debunking arguments seem to suggest). The human mind is a natural 
product  of  evolution  with  certain  limits,  but  it  is  nevertheless  a  unique  feature  in  the 
evolutionary tree, endowing us, as pointed out, with a whole new level of cognition.
The knowledge resulting from this distinctive epistemic relation we entertain with the world, 
is an ‘active’ or conscious fit to the world by means of a contingent set of available perceptual 
and cognitive resources - a fit, in other words, resulting from a conscious enquiry into the 
external  world,  aimed at  producing matching representations,  and guided by an epistemic 
orientation. In this regard, while all other species possess a ‘primary’ cognitive relation to the 
world, endowed with a particular framework in which they integrate the input they gather 
from their environment, homo sapiens possesses a ‘secondary’ cognitive relation to the world, 
holding a framework by which he constructs frameworks which allow him to best represent 
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the input he gathers from the world. Human knowledge, therefore, is not – as opposed to the 
representations  of  other  animal  species  –  a  given perspective  on  the  world  fashioned  by 
natural  selection  (natural  selection,  which  is,  in  this  case,  the  locus  of  the  fit  between 
representation and world) but a human creation, integrating the locus of this fit by virtue of an 
internal epistemic orientation.
This brings our discussion to a close. Reaching back to the question posed at the start of this 
dissertation:  ‘is  knowledge  of  the  world  possible,  given  the  fact  that  our  perceptual  and 
cognitive abilities are the product of evolution?’, I answer emphatically: ‘yes’. Knowledge, 
however, is not solely determined by the states of the world it represents, but also by the 
available perceptual and cognitive resources and the epistemic orientation we inherited from 
our evolutionary past. It is a maxim to which all human representations must adhere. It is 
neither simply given, nor forever unreachable, but a goal to be realised, firmly grounded in 
our cognitive architecture, shaped by the remarkably agile hand of the ‘blind watchmaker’ 
that is evolution. 
As I am very well aware of, this dissertation – rather than 'closing' the debate – points the way 
to future research. For instance, I purposefully avoided committing to a theory of truth. The 
explicit formulation of a theory of truth, would have taken us far beyond the scope of this 
work.  In  this  regard,  my  main  claims  were  negative,  arguing  –  on  the  one  hand  –  that 
conceptualising correspondence by means of the mirror metaphor is untenable, while – on the 
other  hand  –  at  the  extreme  opposite,  outright  and  radical  anti-realistic  standpoints  are 
uncalled for. 
Closely related to the issue of truth, is the debate about epistemological realism. Drawing a 
positive and elaborate view from the arguments presented here, comparing it with some of the 
important  stances  taken  on  the  issue  of  epistemological  realism  -  as  Rorty's  (1979) 
neopragmatism, Davidson's (1986) coherence theory of truth and Putnam's internal realism 
(1990)40, to name but a few giants – we may well arrive at a novel position that could be 
fruitfully discussed in modern epistemology. 
40 A comparison beyond the tentative remarks made about Putnam and Rorty's views (cf. 2.2 The nature of 
cognitive grasps: impossibility of a God’s eye view).
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Finally, more than just pointing the way to further research in epistemology, the premises and 
approach of this thesis could find fertile ground in other areas of philosophy, such as morality. 
Indeed,  the  ability  to  override  or  transgress  the  innate  set  of  implicit  basic  cognitive 
predispositions evolution provided us with, does not only hold for our representations of the 
world. It also holds for moral intuitions. In this regard, in the same way that we overcome our 
species-specific and uncritical view of the world, we overcome (in the sense of going beyond 
and against) our predisposed behavioural inclinations towards one another, other 'groups' and 
other species. In a similar way, a critical analysis of what underlies this feat, could point the 
way to the origin, scope and limits of moral theories. This dissertation, therefore, much rather 
than marking the end of an enquiry, marks its beginning. As so often in philosophy, every 
tentative answer points the way to more questions. 
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